People v. Brown

• Decision Date: 19 November 2020
• Docket Number: Docket No. 125203
• Citation: 2020 IL 125203,181 N.E.3d 823,450 Ill.Dec. 471
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Shawn Marlon BROWN, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2020 IL 125203

181 N.E.3d 823

450 Ill.Dec. 471

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,

v.Shawn Marlon BROWN, Appellee.

Docket No. 125203

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Opinion filed November 19, 2020

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Katherine M. Doersch, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Thomas A. Karalis and Peter A. Carusona, Deputy Defenders, and Emily A. Brandon, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee.

OPINION

JUSTICE MICHAEL J. BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defendant, Shawn Marlon Brown, was convicted of armed robbery ( 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2016)) and aggravated robbery (id. § 18-1(b)(1)). The Peoria County circuit court sentenced defendant to 21 years' imprisonment on the armed robbery count. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia , that the trial court erred in failing to affirmatively exercise its discretion in determining that defendant was fit to stand trial. The Appellate Court, Third District, with one justice dissenting, agreed with defendant, reversing his conviction and remanding for a new trial. 2019 IL App (3d) 170119-U, 2019 WL 3297518. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant was charged by indictment with one count of armed robbery and one count of aggravated robbery for the robbery of a Family Dollar Store in Peoria, Illinois, in April 2016. On August 29, 2016, the parties appeared before Judge Stephen Kouri for a pretrial conference. At that conference, defense counsel informed Judge Kouri that the defense was ready for trial but informed the court that

"in speaking with my client just last night, he told me that—of a mental problem that he has had in the past has resurfaced. He's under medication for this, but he had in the past heard voices. He tells me that he is again starting to hear the voices and said that he was having some difficulty in communicating with me.

This is the first that I've heard of it since I've been representing him, although he did mention to me previously that he had this condition and that it may have factored into the events in question in this case.

So having been told by my client that he is again having these problems, I'm bringing it to the Court's attention, because I think it may be necessary to do an evaluation to determine whether or not he's fit to stand trial."

¶ 4 When Judge Kouri asked defense counsel if he was asking for a fitness evaluation or thinking about it, defense counsel responded that he was asking for one. Defense counsel explained:

"I'm asking for it based on the statements by my client. I can tell you it seemed to me that he was understanding most of what I was telling him, but any difficulties were more a matter of education than mental illness. However, he tells me that he has these issues, and I—I can't determine that he's fit just by myself talking to him. I don't have that ability. So I think that we have to have an evaluation in order to determine whether or not he's fit to stand trial."

¶ 5 When asked his opinion, the assistant state's attorney responded that, because the issue had been raised, he would rather have an evaluation. Judge Kouri then vacated the trial date, ordered an evaluation, and continued the case for 30 days. At the conclusion of the hearing, the assistant state's attorney asked if the "evaluation would just be for fitness." Defense counsel responded, "That's all that I'm asking for is for fitness."

¶ 6 An order was entered, with a box checked next to a preprinted line stating, "Hearing held on People's/Defendant's Motion for:" with the word "fitness" handwritten on a blank space following the preprinted line. The order also stated, "Dr. Finkenbein [sic ] appointed to conduct mental fitness evaluation" and continued the case for "review" in 30 days.

¶ 7 A fitness report was prepared by Jean Clore, Ph.D., and reviewed by Ryan Finkenbine, M.D. Dr. Clore indicated that defendant was evaluated pursuant to court order for an opinion on defendant's fitness to stand trial. Dr. Clore's opinion was that defendant met the DSM-5 criteria for three psychiatric diagnoses: schizoaffective disorder

, bipolar type; posttraumatic stress disorder ; and mild intellectual disability. Nonetheless, in Dr. Clore's opinion, defendant had the ability to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him and to assist in his defense. Dr. Clore stated that defendant "required some information for some of the concepts (for example, the number of jurors), but once educated, understood the material and was able to retain the information some time later." Due to defendant's mild intellectual disability, Dr. Clore indicated that "it may be reasonable for his attorney to periodically provide reminders and education during the adjudication of the alleged crime."

¶ 8 At the next court date following Dr. Clore's evaluation, the parties appeared before Judge Jodi Hoos. When the case was called, defense counsel informed the court that the parties were there "on a review of fitness." Defense counsel told the court that Dr. Clore's report found "no reason to believe that [defendant] is unfit to stand trial in any way." Defense counsel further informed the court that he was "looking to have this put back on the calendar for jury trial." The assistant state's attorney indicated that that was his understanding as well. Judge Hoos then stated:

"All right. The Court will acknowledge receipt of the report with the findings contained therein and acknowledge the stipulation if called to testify the doctor would testify consistent to that report."

A written order was entered that day that included the handwritten notation, "fitness report received, parties stipulate to contents of report." The order also set the matter for jury trial and stated, "by agreement—Defendant is fit to stand trial."

¶ 9 As noted, defendant was found guilty of both charges following a jury trial and was sentenced to the statutory minimum of 21 years in prison on the armed robbery count.

¶ 10 Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court failed to affirmatively exercise its judicial discretion to determine defendant's fitness for trial. Defendant claimed that the trial court made no inquiries, conducted no review of the expert's report, and made no factual findings. Rather, the trial court accepted the parties' stipulation to the content of Dr. Clore's report and issued an order finding defendant fit to stand trial by agreement of the parties. Because the trial court failed to exercise any judicial discretion in finding defendant fit, defendant's fitness hearing was constitutionally deficient. Defendant conceded that he had forfeited the issue by failing to object in the trial court but asked the appellate court to review the issue under the plain error doctrine.

¶ 11 The appellate court noted that a defendant's right to be fit for trial is fundamental. Id. ¶ 12. The appellate court therefore agreed that issues concerning a defendant's fitness to stand trial are subject to review under the second prong of the plain error doctrine. Id.

¶ 12 The appellate court then noted that, when a bona fide doubt concerning a defendant's fitness exists, the trial court has a duty to hold a fitness hearing and the record must show an affirmative exercise of judicial discretion with regard to the determination of fitness. Id. ¶ 14. The appellate court stated that a trial court cannot base its determination of fitness solely upon a stipulation to the existence of psychiatric conclusions or findings. Id. A defendant's due process rights are not violated, however, when a trial court's finding of fitness is also based upon its own observations of the defendant and a review of a psychological report. Id. When the parties stipulate concerning what an expert would testify to, rather than to the expert's conclusions, the trial court may consider that stipulated testimony in exercising its discretion. Id.

¶ 13 The appellate court noted that the trial court's written order in this case stated that it found defendant fit " ‘by agreement.’ " Id. ¶ 15. Although the trial court acknowledged that it had received the fitness evaluation report and that the parties had stipulated that Dr. Clore would testify consistently with that report, the trial court did not indicate that it had reviewed the contents of the report or that it was basing its finding of fitness on the stipulated testimony of the doctor. Id. In addition, the judge could not rely on her past observations of defendant in determining fitness because she had not presided over prior proceedings involving defendant. Id. The appellate court therefore found that the trial court in this case had failed to independently exercise its discretion in finding defendant fit to stand trial. Id.

¶ 14 Having found that the trial court did not exercise its judicial discretion in finding defendant fit to stand trial, the appellate court held that the appropriate remedy was to remand the case for a new trial. Id. ¶ 17. The appellate court rejected the State's argument that the proper remedy was to remand for a new fitness hearing. Remand for a new trial was warranted because it had been more than two years since defendant's original trial and sentencing and because defendant's condition was not alleged to have been caused by a single, readily assessed factor. Id. ¶ 19.

¶ 15 Justice Wright dissented, disagreeing with the majority's finding that the trial court failed to exercise its judicial discretion. Id. ¶ 25 (Wright, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that the trial court acknowledged receipt of the psychologist's report and the findings contained therein. Id. ¶ 27. The dissent would find that the trial court's use of the term "ack...