People v. Brown, 106243
| Decision Date | 04 February 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 106243,106273.,106243 |
| Citation | 923 N.E.2d 748,236 Ill.2d 175 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. Raymond BROWN, Appellant and Cross-Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
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Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Unsinn, Deputy Defender, Yasaman Hannah Navai, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for appellant and cross-appellee.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Richard A. Devine and Anita Alvarez, State's Attorneys, Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Alan J. Spellberg, Brian K. Hodes and Mary P. Needham, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Petitioner Raymond Brown alleged in a pro se postconviction petition that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a fitness hearing. The circuit court of Cook County summarily dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently without merit. The circuit court also assessed fees and court costs of $155 under section 22-105 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/22-105 (West 2006)), for filing a frivolous postconviction petition. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the petition but vacated the circuit court's imposition of fees and court costs. No. 1-06-3275 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
We allowed petitions for leave to appeal filed by both petitioner and the State (210 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and consolidated the appeals. We hold the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing the postconviction petition as frivolous and patently without merit. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of the postconviction petition, affirm the judgment vacating the assessment of fees and court costs, and remand this matter to the circuit court for second stage postconviction proceedings.
Petitioner was charged with two counts of attempted first degree murder of a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2002)), and two counts of aggravated assault (720 ILCS 5/12-2(a)(6) (West 2002)). At the bench trial, the testimony showed petitioner lived in an apartment with Gloria Flores. Petitioner became intoxicated and argued with Flores because he believed she had cheated on him. Eventually, Flores threatened to call the police. Petitioner told her to "go ahead and call" because he was not afraid of the police. Flores went upstairs to her sister's apartment. After hearing petitioner continue to yell and throw items in their apartment, Flores and her sister called the police.
When several police officers arrived at the apartment building, petitioner was standing outside the front door of his apartment holding a butcher knife. One of the officers began to approach petitioner. The officer mistakenly believed the object in petitioner's hand was a screwdriver and ordered him to "drop the screwdriver." Petitioner responded by stating, "come on and I'll kill you." After recognizing the object as a knife, the officer repeatedly told petitioner to drop the knife. Petitioner refused and repeated his threat to kill the officer.
Petitioner then advanced toward the officer. The officer backed away and continued ordering petitioner to drop the knife. Petitioner kept walking toward the officer and began swinging the knife as the officer backed away. The officer drew his handgun and pointed it toward petitioner, continuing to order him to drop the knife. Petitioner lunged at the officer, reaching for the handgun with his free hand. When petitioner continued to approach, another officer shot him. Petitioner did not stop and the officer shot him again. Petitioner was shot in the leg and lower back and fell to the ground. Based on the evidence, the trial court found petitioner guilty of attempted first degree murder of a peace officer.
Petitioner read a statement to the court at sentencing. He asserted that he had been depressed and previously tried to kill himself. He did not intend to harm the police officers, but only wanted them to kill him. He had seen a news report where a man was shot and killed by police officers after threatening them with a machete. Petitioner thought the officers would kill him if he waved a knife at them.
Petitioner further stated he was taking "psych medication" and was told he should have received a psychiatric evaluation prior to his trial, but his trial attorney failed to bring the matter to the court's attention. Petitioner stated he began taking his medications after incarceration and he no longer felt depressed or wanted to kill himself. He still felt like he wanted to die, though, as recently as his previous court hearing.
The trial court questioned counsel about petitioner's statements on taking psychotropic medication. Defense counsel stated he was not aware that petitioner was taking psychotropic medication. The court further inquired whether there was any reason for counsel to have a bona fide doubt of petitioner's fitness to stand trial. Counsel responded that petitioner "spoke very coherently to me," he "seemed fine," and counsel "had no problem communicating with him." The trial court noted it had not observed anything in petitioner's conduct or appearance indicating a bona fide doubt of his fitness. Petitioner's treatment with psychotropic medication, standing alone, did not raise a presumption of unfitness to stand trial. Accordingly, the trial court proceeded with the sentencing hearing and imposed a 25-year term of imprisonment. The trial court's judgment was affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Brown, No. 1-03-2620, 354 Ill.App.3d 1158, 318 Ill.Dec. 554, 883 N.E.2d 1148 (2005) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
Petitioner then filed a postconviction petition alleging, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a fitness hearing. Petitioner alleged he told his attorney that he was taking psychotropic medication, including Zoloft, Seroquel, and Sinequan, both before and after his arrest. He alleged he was taking the psychotropic medication to treat bipolar disorder and depression. He also informed counsel that he attempted suicide before he was arrested and on the day of his arrest. He alleged he was attempting "suicide by police" on the day of the offense. During his trial, he was taking "very heavy psych medication" that affected his ability to comprehend the events. Petitioner alleged he "didn't know exactly what was happening at his trial and didn't understand everything at his trial." Petitioner further alleged his trial counsel lied when he informed the trial court that he was unaware petitioner was taking psychotropic medication.
Petitioner also alleged his attorney only visited him for a few minutes before each hearing. Petitioner believed his attorney was too preoccupied with his father's death to represent petitioner adequately. Petitioner alleged he stopped taking some of his medications to draft his postconviction petition.
Petitioner appended to his petition medical records documenting his bipolar disorder and his medications to treat it. Additionally, he provided affidavits from his mother and aunt attesting that petitioner's mother informed trial counsel petitioner was taking medication to treat his bipolar disorder. Petitioner's mother also averred she told counsel petitioner had attempted suicide on several occasions. Petitioner's mother and aunt averred trial counsel lied to the court when he stated he had no knowledge of petitioner's mental illness or medications.
The trial court summarily dismissed the petition. The court ruled petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to request a fitness hearing was barred by res judicata because the appellate court considered that claim on direct appeal. The trial court further found the petition was frivolous and patently without merit. Petitioner was assessed $155 in fees and court costs under section 22-105 of the Code for filing a frivolous postconviction petition.
On appeal, petitioner contended he stated the gist of a constitutional claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a fitness hearing. Petitioner also challenged the trial court's imposition of fees and court costs.
The appellate court observed it did not consider petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal because that claim was based on matters outside the record. The appellate court, therefore, held that challenge was not barred by res judicata. The appellate court, nevertheless, held the petition did not state the gist of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. According to the appellate court, petitioner was "unable to establish the trial court would have found a bona fide doubt of his fitness and ordered a fitness hearing had it been apprised of the evidence offered in his postconviction petition." The appellate court further held assessment of fees and court costs under section 22-105 of the Code was not authorized. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's summary dismissal of the postconviction petition but vacated the assessment of fees and court costs. No. 1-06-3275 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
Petitioner and the State filed petitions for leave to appeal (210 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). We allowed both petitions and consolidated them for review.
In his appeal, petitioner contends his postconviction petition established the gist of a claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an issue of petitioner's fitness to stand trial. Petitioner argues the appellate court applied an incorrect standard by requiring him to prove his ineffective assistance of counsel claim at the first stage of the proceedings.
The State responds that the allegations in the petition are not sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt of petitioner's fitness to stand...
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