People v. Brown

Decision Date31 January 1974
Docket NumberNo. 43349,43349
Citation56 Ill.2d 312,307 N.E.2d 356
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Richard BROWN, Appellant.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

James J. Doherty, Public Defender, Chicago (John M. Kalnins, Asst. Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Chicago

(James B. Zagel, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Kenneth L. Gillis and Dennis J. O'Hara, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel, and Frank De Boni, Senior Law Student), for the People.

GOLDENHERSH, Justice:

Defendant, Richard Brown, was found guilty of murder by a jury in the circuit court of Cook County and sentenced to not less than 15 nor more than 30 years in the Illinois State Penitentiary.

Defendant and Jimmie Claggett were charged in a four-count indictment with the murder of Roger O. Corpus. , at approximately 5:00 P.M. on May 6, 1968, Corpus's body, his ankles bound with white electric cords, was discovered lying on the floor of the living room in his apartment. The door to the apartment was open, lights were on, and music was playing, presumably on a radio. The deceased's wallet, credit cards and much of his clothing were missing.

As grounds for reversal defendant contends first that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress two statements, one made to the arresting police officers, and the other to an assistant State's Attorney. He argues that his arrest was unlawful in that it was made in his home, at night, without a warrant, after forcible entry by the police and that there were no exigent circumstances shown which justified the failure to seek a warrant for his arrest. He contends further that the statements taken from him following his arrest were obtained prior to his being taken before a magistrate, that they are 'the products of the unlawful custody' and should have been suppressed and excluded from introduction into evidence.

The People contend that at the time of defendant's apprehension the arresting officers had reasonable grounds to believe that he was implicated in the murder and that the arrest without a warrant was, therefore, lawful.

The testimony adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress shows that on May 13, a week after the murder, two detectives went to defendant's apartment, that one of term concealed himself within the apartment and the other concealed himself out-side the apartment. The entry into the apartment was accomplished in defendant's absence and without a warrant. After they had waited for approximately three hours defendant appeared, and Detective Lenz greeted him with drawn revolver and placed him under arrest.

In support of their contention that the police officers had probable cause for defendant's arrest, the People rely principally on the testimony of the deceased's sister, Constance DeLoach. The record, however, shows that Mrs. DeLoach testified, not at the hearing on the motion to suppress, but at the trial, and there is no evidence that the police, at the time of the arrest, were possessed of knowledge of the matters to which she testified. The deceased's brother testified that he had given defendant's name to the police on May 7, but made no suggestion that defendant was responsible for the death because 'nobody asked.' Later, apparently on May 9, the police were told that on the day of the murder defendant had been seen in the building where the deceased lived.

Upon review of the record, we conclude that the testimony fails to show that at the time of his apprehension there was probable cause for defendant's arrest, that his arrest was, therefore, unlawful, and we consider next the question whether the statements were the product of the illegal arrest and, therefore, improperly admitted into evidence.

The People contend that even assuming that defendant's arrest was illegal, his statements were voluntarily made after he was fully and properly advised of his right to remain silent and of his right to have an attorney appointed to represent him and to have him present during questioning, and that the giving of the Miranda warnings (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694) served to break the causal chain so as to sufficiently attenuate and dissipate the taint of the unlawful arrest. (Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441.) They argue that his statements did not result from his arrest but rather from the defendant's realization that, even from the facts already known to police, he was implicated in the killing and that he wanted it known that he was merely a bystander and that Claggett was the actual killer.

The testimony adduced at the hearing on the...

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