People v. Brown
| Decision Date | 07 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 11SC441 |
| Citation | 322 P.3d 214 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner v. Eric Lamont BROWN, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, Court of Appeals Case No. 06CA1751
Attorneys for Petitioner: Daniel H. May, District Attorney, Deborah F. Pearson, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado
Attorney for Respondent: Jenifer Stinson, Stinson Law Office, Denver, Colorado
¶ 1 In this case, we consider the balance between a defendant's Sixth Amendment constitutional right to his or her counsel of choice and the public's interest in the fairness and efficiency of the judicial system. In People v. Brown, ––– P.3d ––––, No. 06CA1751, 2011 WL 1195778, *3–5 (Colo.App. Mar. 31, 2011), the court of appeals developed a balancing test for a trial court to use when deciding whether to grant or deny a defendant's request for a continuance so that the defendant may change counsel. The court of appeals applied its newly developed test to the facts in this case and concluded that the trial court abused its discretion and violated Brown's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice when it denied his request for a continuance. Id. at –––– – ––––, 2011 WL 1195778 at *3–6. As a result, the court of appeals reversed Brown's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial.
¶ 2 While we agree with the court of appeals that the decision whether to grant a continuance is a fact-based question best decided by the trial court, we decline to adopt the test that the court of appeals developed because it does not adequately reflect our precedent requiring the trial court to consider the totality of the circumstances when deciding whether to grant or deny a continuance. SeePeople v. Hampton, 758 P.2d 1344, 1353–54 (Colo.1988) (). We hold that when deciding whether to grant a continuance to allow a defendant to change counsel, the trial court must conduct a multi-factor balancing test and determine whether the public's interest in the efficiency and integrity of the judicial system outweighs the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice. Applying the test to this case, we conclude that the record is inadequate to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Brown's request for a continuance. Hence, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and return the case to that court to remand the case to the trial court for additional findings and conclusions.
¶ 3 Respondent Eric Lamont Brown was arrested and charged with kidnapping, sexual assault, attempted unlawful sexual contact, assault, and menacing in March 2005. The events giving rise to the charges occurred in March 2004.
¶ 4 The trial court appointed a public defender, Cynthia Jones, to represent Brown. The trial was initially scheduled to begin in mid-September 2005. In August 2005, Jones requested a continuance of the jury trial because the Colorado Bureau of Investigation had not completed its testing of the evidence; however, because Brown was not in attendance, the trial court deferred its ruling until Brown was present. Brown appeared before the court on September 12, 2005, at which point Jones renewed her request for a continuance. The People did not object because they also needed more time to prepare. The court granted the continuance and rescheduled the trial for December 6, 2005.
¶ 5 On December 1, 2005, five days before the trial date, the People requested a continuance on the grounds that the victim could not testify because her newborn child was in the intensive care unit. Brown agreed to the continuance but refused to waive his speedy trial right. As a result, the court granted the continuance and rescheduled the trial for January 10, 2006, a date within the speedy trial deadline.
¶ 6 On January 10, 2006, the date scheduled for trial, the People asked the trial court to reconsider its denial of the People's motion to introduce prior acts evidence under CRE 404(b). The trial court reversed its previous ruling and granted the People's request to introduce prior acts evidence. In light of the trial court's ruling, Jones requested another continuance to prepare for the introduction of the prior acts evidence. The trial court reset the trial for February 14, 2006.
¶ 7 On February 2, 2006, David Foley, a private defense attorney, filed an entry of appearance on behalf of Brown. On February 6, 2006, Foley filed a written motion for a continuance on Brown's behalf stating that he had just been retained and wanted an opportunity to negotiate with the People. In connection with this motion, Brown, who was in custody at the time, offered to waive his right to a speedy trial. At a previously scheduled pretrial hearing on February 6, 2006, the trial court noted its receipt of Foley's entry of appearance; however, Foley was not present at the hearing. Jones, Brown's public defender, was present. Not only was Jones unaware that Brown had hired a new attorney, but she was not even aware that Brown was intending to hire a private attorney. Jones indicated that she had been preparing for months and was prepared for trial the following week. The trial court responded,
¶ 8 On February 8, 2006, Foley appeared in court, along with Jones, and explained that he had started meeting with Brown's family over one month prior to the trial date but that he did not get involved in the case until the previous week because he was waiting to be officially retained. He explained to the trial court that he wanted to take the case but that he needed more time to prepare and could not possibly be ready to go to trial the following week because he was still waiting on discovery. He also noted that Brown remained in custody and opined that he did not believe Brown hired him for purposes of delay. The People “strongly” objected to any continuance. When asked by the court, Jones again reiterated that she would be prepared for trial the following week.
¶ 9 After listening to Foley, Jones, and the People, the trial court denied the motion to continue. The trial court gave several reasons for its decision:
It's been continued several times; we've got a number of witnesses subpoenaed; Ms. Jones is ready to proceed; and, you know, I have no doubt that Ms. Jones will do a very competent job representing Mr. Brown. Mr. Foley, if you wanted to enter into negotiations some time the rest of this week with [the People] to see if this could be resolved, you are certainly welcome to do that. But absent some other reason that I have not been told, I am not going to continue the trial in this case.
In reaching this decision, the trial court neither asked Foley how long it would take him to prepare nor made any additional findings with respect to whether a continuance was warranted in this situation. The trial court also did not ask what the victim's position was regarding a potential continuance.
¶ 10 After the trial court denied the request for a continuance, Foley alerted the trial court of a possible conflict between Brown and Jones. The trial court set a conflict hearing with a different judge for later that same day. At the conflict hearing, the judge ruled that it was not legally necessary to replace Jones. That court explained that there was no conflict requiring substitution of counsel because the only conflict that existed was that Brown wished to hire private counsel. Hence, the court concluded that Jones was in a position to provide Brown with adequate representation. In light of this ruling, the trial court did not change its decision to deny Foley's motion for a continuance. Foley subsequently withdrew his appearance.
¶ 11 The trial commenced as scheduled on February 14, 2006, with Jones representing Brown. A jury convicted Brown of kidnapping, sexual assault, attempted unlawful sexual contact, assault, and menacing. The trial court adjudicated Brown a habitual criminal and sentenced him to an indeterminate term of 36 years to life in the Department of Corrections.
¶ 12 Brown appealed his convictions and argued that the trial court committed reversible error by denying his motion to continue, which violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice. The court of appeals, in a published opinion, agreed and reversed Brown's convictions. Brown, ––– P.3d at ––––, 2011 WL 1195778, at *1. In reaching its decision, the court of appeals developed a new test to assist trial courts in determining whether to grant a continuance. Id. at –––– – ––––, 2011 WL 1195778 at *3–5. The court of appeals explained that the trial court should weigh the defendant's right to choose counsel against the following four considerations: (1) whether the defendant has an improper motive such as delaying trial; (2) whether the defendant's chosen counsel is available to take and try the case; (3) whether granting a continuance impacts the court's docket; and (4) whether granting the continuance prejudices the prosecution beyond simply causing an inconvenience. Id. Applying this test, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court abused its discretion because its “findings do not show that it adequately considered the right of [Brown] to counsel of his choosing when it refused to continue the trial to afford his newly-retained counsel time to prepare.” Id. at ––––, ––––, 2011 WL 1195778 at *1, *6.
¶ 13 We granted certiorari and now reverse and remand.1
¶ 14 Brown argues that the trial court reversibly erred by refusing to continue the...
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