People v. Brumbeloe
| Decision Date | 18 June 1968 |
| Docket Number | Gen. No. 51210 |
| Citation | 97 Ill.App.2d 370,240 N.E.2d 150 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Barney Joseph BRUMBELOE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
John J. Stamos, State's Atty., County of Cook, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee. Elmer C. Kissane, John M. Goldbert, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel.
Gerald W. Getty, Public Defender of Cook County, Chicago, Ill., for appellant; Constantine P. Xinos, James J. Doherty, Asst. Public Defenders, of counsel.
On the evening of April 17, 1964, Thomas Kenney was fatally stabbed during a street fight. William Michael Perkins, who inflicted the fatal wound, and the defendant, Barney Joseph Brumbeloe, were indicted for murder. At a bench trial, both Perkins and defendant were found guilty of voluntary mansalughter and sentenced to a term of two to fourteen years in the Illinois State Penitentiary. Only the defendant, Barney Brumbeloe, appeals.
Defendant urges several grounds for reversal. We deem it necessary to consider two of those points.
On April 16, 1964, the day before the killing, Thomas Kenney, the deceased, confronted defendant in a pool hall. He accused defendant of running around with his wife and also of taking money from her. Defendant denied these accusations. As defendant backed out of the pool hall, the deceased followed him with knife drawn, cursing and threatening to kill defendant.
Deceased again confronted defendant later that afternoon in a bar. The bartender testified that deceased swore at defendant at this time. He asked the defendant the whereabouts of Mike Perkins. (William Michael Perkins). When defendant replied that he did not know, deceased stated that either Perkins or defendant had stolen money from his wife, and that he was going to kill Perkins. He then threatened defendant with an immediate fight in the alley. As deceased started toward the back door, defendant went out the front door. The deceased gave chase and lunged at him with a knife, and defendant ran into an adjacent restaurant to escape.
Perkins, having learned of the meetings between defendant and deceased and of the threats made on his life, did not leave his home on the evening of April 16.
On the afternoon of April 17, 1964, deceased returned to the pool hall several times asking the whereabouts of Perkins and defendant. When asked what was wrong, the deceased replied that he was 'plenty mad' at them.
While defendant was sitting in the Huddle House restaurant later that afternoon, he saw the deceased across the street. Before leaving, defendant took a butcher knife from the kitchen of the restaurant and put it in his coat.
On the evening of April 17, while defendant was in another restaurant, the deceased's wife told defendant that her husband was still looking for him. Shortly thereafter, deceased walked by the restaurant and pointed a finger at defendant. After deceased's wife left the restaurant, Perkins and his brother arrived. Defendant testified that he was afraid to walk home alone and asked the Perkins brothers to accompany him. They agreed, and the three men left together, walking down Irving Park toward Sheridan Road, Chicago.
As they reached the corner of Irving Park and Sheridan Road, the deceased ran up to the defendant with his hand in his coat, and the fight began. There is a conflict in the testimony as to who struck the first blow. Defendant, Perkins and Ronald Pratt, an eye witness, testified that deceased hit defendant first. However, in a statement given to police on April 18, Perkins had said that defendant struck the first blow.
Defendant testified that, after he was struck by deceased, he pulled out the butcher knife and hit deceased across the face with it. As the two men wrestled to the ground, defendant dropped the knife to the sidewalk and it was subsequently picked up by Perkins. Someone pulled defendant away and, thinking it was another attacker, defendant started to fight the bystander. Deceased started to rise, and in doing so, he grabbed Perkins by the waist and Perkins fatally stabbed him. Deceased fell to the ground, and defendant struck and choked him. Pratt and defendant testified that deceased had a knife, and Pratt also testified that it dropped to the sidewalk, after which he picked it up and took it home. In a statement given to police on April 18, defendant did not mention that deceased had a knife.
It was stipulated that the cause of death was a stab wound of the heart. Deceased had also sustained two other stab wounds in the fight.
Defendant first contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct of Perkins for which defendant was held accountable constituted the crime of voluntary manslaughter.
'A person who intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code, but his belief is unreasonable.' Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, § 9--2(b).
Article 7 provides that a person * * * 'is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself on another.' Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, § 7--1.
It is the province of the trial court, sitting as the trier of fact, to settle conflicts in evidence and to determine from the facts and circumstances whether defendant acted in self-defense or, if not, whether the circumstances attending the assault were such that the death at defendant's hands constituted murder, manslaughter or justifiable homicide. People v. Washington, 27 Ill.2d 104, 187 N.E.2d 739 (1963).
In the instant case, the trial judge found that Perkins committed the homicide under the belief that his killing was justified under the theory of self-defense, but that this belief was unreasonable. The testimony indicated that during the fight, as deceased was trying to pull himself to his feet, he grabbed Perkins around the waist, and that Perkins then stabbed him fatally. This evidence was sufficient to support the trial judge's finding that Perkins' belief that deadly force was necessary to defend himself was unreasonable. We find no error in the trial judge's ruling that the acts of Perkins constituted the offense of voluntary manslaughter.
Defendant next contends that, even if Perkins' conduct in killing the deceased was unlawful, the State failed to prove defendant accountable for that conduct beyond a reasonable doubt, and that without such proof, defendant cannot be held to be guilty of the crime of voluntary manslaughter.
Sections 5--1 and 5--2(c), ch. 38 Ill.Rev.Stats. (1961) are applicable to this case. Section 5--1 states:
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