People v. Bruno

• Decision Date: 11 May 2010
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Stephen BRUNO, appellant.

900 N.Y.S.2d 447

73 A.D.3d 941

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,

v.Stephen BRUNO, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

May 11, 2010.

Stefani Goldin, Melville, N.Y., for appellant.

Kathleen M. Rice, District Attorney, Mineola, N.Y. (Margaret E. Mainusch and Cristin N. Connell of counsel), for respondent.

WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., PETER B. SKELOS, THOMAS A. DICKERSON, and PLUMMER E. LOTT, JJ.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (LaPera, J.), rendered September 10, 2007, convicting him of robbery in the third degree (four counts), upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence, including a direction that the defendant make restitution in the sum of $16,715.

ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law and as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by vacating the provision of the sentence directing the defendant to make restitution in the sum of $16,715; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant's contention that he was deprived of his statutory right to a speedy trial pursuant to CPL 30.30 was forfeited by his plea of guilty ( see People v. O'Brien, 56 N.Y.2d 1009, 1010, 453 N.Y.S.2d 638, 439 N.E.2d 354; People v. Perez, 51 A.D.3d 824, 824, 856 N.Y.S.2d 862; People v. Mosley, 50 A.D.3d 1161, 1161, 855 N.Y.S.2d 378; People v. Holmes, 303 A.D.2d 690, 691, 756 N.Y.S.2d 778).

The decision to permit a defendant to withdraw a previously entered plea of guilty rests within the sound discretion of the court ( see People v. Seeber, 4 N.Y.3d 780, 793 N.Y.S.2d 826, 826 N.E.2d 797; People v. Pooler, 58 A.D.3d 757, 757, 871 N.Y.S.2d 707; People v. Ford, 44 A.D.3d 1070, 1070, 844 N.Y.S.2d 400; People v. Mann, 32 A.D.3d 865, 821 N.Y.S.2d 616; People v. Kucharczyk, 15 A.D.3d 595, 790 N.Y.S.2d 522), and this determination generally will not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of discretion ( see People v. Pooler, 58 A.D.3d at 757, 871 N.Y.S.2d 707; People v. Ford, 44 A.D.3d at 1070, 844 N.Y.S.2d 400; People v. DeLeon, 40 A.D.3d 1008, 837 N.Y.S.2d 189). Here, the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered his negotiated plea of guilty with the assistance of competent counsel, in exchange for a favorable sentence promise ( see People v. Pooler, 58 A.D.3d at 757, 871 N.Y.S.2d 707; People v. Ford, 44 A.D.3d at 1070, 844 N.Y.S.2d 400; People v. Mann, 32 A.D.3d 865, 821 N.Y.S.2d 616). The sentencing court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying, without a hearing, the defendant's pro se motion to vacate his plea of guilty on the ground that he was innocent ( see People v. Doherty, 134 A.D.2d 513, 513, 521 N.Y.S.2d 397). The defendant's bare assertions of innocence at the time of sentencing were insufficient to justify grantinghis motion to withdraw his plea of guilty ( see People v. Cummings, 53 A.D.3d 587, 587, 863 N.Y.S.2d 217; People v. Beasley, 50 A.D.3d 697, 697-698, 853 N.Y.S.2d 917; People v. Ford, 44 A.D.3d at 1070-1071, 844 N.Y.S.2d 400; People v. Mann, 32 A.D.3d at 866, 821 N.Y.S.2d 616). Moreover, contrary to the defendant's arguments, his attorney was not obligated to "participate in a baseless pro se motion to withdraw a plea of guilty which was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made" ( People v. Caple, 279 A.D.2d 635, 635, 720 N.Y.S.2d 166; see People v. Pooler, 58 A.D.3d at 757, 871 N.Y.S.2d 707; People v. Ford, 44 A.D.3d at 1070, 844 N.Y.S.2d 400; People v. Doherty, 134 A.D.2d at 514, 521 N.Y.S.2d 397). There is no merit to the defendant's contention that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel ( see People v. Pooler, 58 A.D.3d at 757, 871 N.Y.S.2d 707; People v. Brooks, 36 A.D.3d 929, 930, 828 N.Y.S.2d 553; People v. Grimes, 35 A.D.3d 882, 883, 827 N.Y.S.2d 268; People v. Campbell, 180 A.D.2d 808, 809, 580 N.Y.S.2d 445; People v. Bourdonnay, 160 A.D.2d 1014, 1015, 555 N.Y.S.2d 134).

The defendant's contention that the County Court breached the plea agreement by directing him to pay restitution is unpreserved for appellate review. However, we review the contention in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction ( see CPL 470.15). Although a court is free to reserve the right to order restitution as part of a plea agreement, the plea minutes in this case do not indicate that the plea of guilty...