People v. Buffer

• Decision Date: 18 April 2019
• Docket Number: Docket No. 122327
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Dimitri BUFFER, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2019 IL 122327
137 N.E.3d 763
434 Ill.Dec. 691

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,
v.
Dimitri BUFFER, Appellee.

Docket No. 122327

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Opinion filed April 18, 2019

JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

434 Ill.Dec. 693

¶ 1 Defendant, Dimitri Buffer, filed a pro se postconviction petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act ( 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2014) ). Defendant asserted that his 50-year prison sentence, imposed for a crime he committed when he was 16 years old, was unconstitutional

137 N.E.3d 766

434 Ill.Dec. 694

as applied to him. The circuit court of Cook County summarily dismissed the petition. The appellate court reversed the dismissal, holding that defendant's sentence, imposed without consideration of his youth and its attendant characteristics, violated the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution ( U.S. Const., amend. VIII ). The appellate court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded the case to the circuit court for resentencing. 2017 IL App (1st) 142931, 412 Ill.Dec. 490, 75 N.E.3d 470.

¶ 2 This court allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2017). We now affirm the judgment of the appellate court, but on different grounds, and remand the cause to the circuit court for resentencing in accordance with section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2016) ).

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The appellate court has previously recited the details of defendant's conviction and sentence. Therefore, we discuss only those facts and the procedural history that are pertinent to the issues raised in this appeal.

¶ 5 A jury found defendant guilty of four counts of first degree murder ( 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2008) ), and specifically found that defendant personally discharged a firearm that caused the victim's death. Defendant was sentenced in July 2010. At that time, Illinois law prescribed a sentencing range of 20 to 60 years for first degree murder ( 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2008) ), and mandated a minimum 25-year additional prison term for personally discharging a firearm that caused the victim's death (id. § 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) ). The circuit court stated that it had "considered all of the relevant statutory requirements * * * including but not limited to" the evidence at trial, the gravity of the offense, the presentence investigation report, to a limited extent the financial impact of incarceration, given defendant's age and his lack of children or dependents, the evidence in aggravation and mitigation, potential substance abuse issues, treatment, the potential for rehabilitation, the possibility of alternative sentencing, defendant's statement in allocution, the victim impact statement, and all hearsay at the sentencing hearing deemed relevant and reliable. The court merged the first degree murder counts and sentenced defendant to 25 years on the first degree murder conviction and 25 years for the mandatory firearm add-on, for an aggregate sentence of 50 years, followed by 3 years of mandatory supervised release.

¶ 6 Defendant timely appealed. In June 2012, while defendant's direct appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), which held that imposing on a juvenile offender a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole, without consideration of the defendant's youth and its attendant characteristics, violated the eighth amendment. Defendant filed a motion seeking leave to file a supplemental brief addressing the applicability of Miller to his 50-year sentence. The State objected, and the appellate court denied defendant leave to file the supplemental brief. The appellate court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. People v. Buffer , 2012 IL App (1st) 102411-U, 2012 WL 6951472, leave to appeal denied , No. 115148, 367 Ill.Dec. 620, 982 N.E.2d 770 (Ill. Jan. 30, 2013). In March 2014, this court held that Miller applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. People v. Davis , 2014 IL 115595, 379 Ill.Dec. 381, 6 N.E.3d 709.

137 N.E.3d 767

434 Ill.Dec. 695

¶ 7 In May 2014, defendant filed the instant pro se postconviction petition in the circuit court. Relying on Miller , defendant argued that his 50-year sentence, imposed for a crime committed when he was a juvenile, violated the eighth amendment because it constituted a de facto life sentence. Defendant requested that the circuit court vacate his sentence and conduct a new sentencing hearing. On August 8, 2014, the circuit court summarily dismissed defendant's postconviction petition as frivolous and patently without merit.

¶ 8 On September 5, 2014, defendant filed a notice of appeal from the circuit court's summary dismissal of his postconviction petition. While defendant's appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Montgomery v. Louisiana , 577 U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), and agreed with the conclusion we reached in Davis that Miller applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. Id. at ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. at 729, 736. Also during the pendency of defendant's appeal, this court decided People v. Reyes , 2016 IL 119271, 407 Ill.Dec. 452, 63 N.E.3d 884 (per curiam ), and extended Miller 's holding barring juveniles from mandatory natural life sentences to include mandatory de facto life sentences. Id. ¶ 9.

¶ 9 The appellate court reversed the summary dismissal of defendant's postconviction petition. 2017 IL App (1st) 142931, 412 Ill.Dec. 490, 75 N.E.3d 470. The appellate court concluded that, (1) pursuant to Reyes , defendant's 50-year sentence was a mandatory de facto life sentence and (2) the circuit court failed to consider defendant's youth and its attendant characteristics in imposing sentence. Therefore, defendant's sentence violated the eighth amendment. Id. ¶¶ 63-64. The appellate court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded his case to the circuit court for resentencing under the juvenile sentencing statute (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2016) ). 2017 IL App (1st) 142931, ¶¶ 67-69, 412 Ill.Dec. 490, 75 N.E.3d 470.

¶ 10 The State appeals to this court. We granted the John Marshall Law School's Pro Bono Program & Clinic, and the Children and Family Justice Center et al. , leave to submit amicus curiae briefs in support of defendant. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 This case comes before us in the context of a postconviction proceeding. The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a procedural mechanism through which criminal defendants can assert that their federal or state constitutional rights were substantially violated in their original trials or sentencing hearings. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a) (West 2014). A postconviction proceeding is not a substitute for a direct appeal but rather is a collateral attack on a prior conviction and sentence. The purpose of the proceeding is to allow inquiry into constitutional issues involved in the original conviction and sentence that have not been, and could not have been, adjudicated previously on direct appeal. People v. Harris , 224 Ill. 2d 115, 124, 308 Ill.Dec. 757, 862 N.E.2d 960 (2007) ; People v. Peeples , 205 Ill. 2d 480, 509-10, 275 Ill.Dec. 870, 793 N.E.2d 641 (2002). Review of the circuit court's dismissal of a postconviction petition is de novo . People v. Hodges , 234 Ill. 2d 1, 9, 332 Ill.Dec. 318, 912 N.E.2d 1204 (2009) (collecting cases).

¶ 13 A. The Eighth Amendment

¶ 14 The State assigns error to the appellate court's holding that defendant's 50-year prison sentence violated the eighth amendment. The State contends that defendant's sentence is constitutional as applied to him.

137 N.E.3d 768

434 Ill.Dec. 696

¶ 15 The eighth amendment prohibits, inter alia , "cruel and unusual punishments" ( U.S. Const., amend. VIII ) and applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551, 560, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (collecting cases). "Inherent in that prohibition is the concept of proportionality." People v. Holman , 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 33, 418 Ill.Dec. 889, 91 N.E.3d 849 (citing Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 59, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) ). The eighth amendment's ban of excessive punishment flows from the basic precept that criminal punishment should be graduated and proportioned both to the offender and the offense. Miller , 567 U.S. at 469, 132 S.Ct. 2455 ; Roper , 543 U.S. at 560, 125 S.Ct. 1183 ; People v. Davis , 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 18, 379 Ill.Dec. 381, 6 N.E.3d 709. A claim that punishment is constitutionally excessive is judged not by the standards of the past "but rather by those that currently prevail." Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 311, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed courts to look beyond history to "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" ( Trop v. Dulles , 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, ...