People v. Buffum

Citation40 Cal.2d 709,256 P.2d 317
Decision Date20 April 1953
Docket NumberCr. 5293
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (California)
PartiesPEOPLE v. BUFFUM et al.

Joseph A. Ball, Long Beach, Leonard Wilson, Los Angeles, and Robert P. Dockeray, Burbank, for appellants.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., and Stanford D. Herlick, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

GIBSON, Chief Justice.

Roy L. Buffum, a physician and surgeon, and Reginald L. Rankin were indicted for and convicted of violating section 182 of the Penal Code 1 in that they conspired to use certain means to induce miscarriages contrary to action 274. 2 Defendants appeal from the judgments and from an order denying their motions for a new trial.

Four women who were pregnant went separately to the office of Buffum in Long Beach to solicit his aid in inducing miscarriages. One of the women was accompanied by her mother. Buffum refused to perform the abortions but took the telephone numbers of three of the women and told each she would receive a call. Rankin later telephoned them, told them the amount they must pay, arranged to meet them at a designated intersection in Long Beach, and indicated that he would transport them to the place where the abortions were to be performed. Buffum gave Rankin's telephone number to the fourth woman, and she called Rankin and made similar arrangements.

Rankin met the women at the appointed place and drove them in his automobile to Tijuana, Mexico. There, with the assistance of Rankin, another man performed an operation upon each of them. While in the operating room, three of the women gave money to Rankin. Later the same day Rankin returned the women to Long Beach, where they again went their separate ways. Subsequently three of them required hospitalization. Buffum treated one of them without preliminary examination or inquiry as to the nature of her illness, and reimbursed her family for the hospital bill.

The principal questions raised on this appeal are: (1) Can the convictions be supported on a showing that defendants conspired in California to perform abortions in Mexico? (2) Did the court err in admitting proof of the law of Mexico on abortions? (3) Is the evidence sufficient to support a finding that defendants conspired in California to perform abortions in this state? (4) Did the court err in failing to instruct upon the necessity for corroboration?

Conspiracy to Perform Abortions in Mexico

A conspiracy may be established by showing that there was an agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime and that an act was done in California to effect the object of the agreement. Pen.Code, §§ 182, 184; see People v. Daener, 96 Cal.App.2d 827, 831, 216 P.2d 511; People v. Benenato, 77 Cal.App.2d 350, 175 P.2d 296; People v. Huling, 71 Cal.App. 144, 146, 234 P. 924. The object of defendants' agreement, as alleged in the indictment, was 'to violate section 274, Penal Code of the State of California.' No other unlawful purpose was stated, and defendants, of course, cannot be punished for conspiracy unless the doing of the things agreed upon would amount to a violation of section 274. The statute makes no reference to the place of performance of an abortion, and we must assume that the Legislature did not intend to regulate conduct taking place outside the borders of the state. See People v. Chapman, 55 Cal.App. 192, 197, 203 P. 126; Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284 286, 69 S.Ct. 575, 93 L.Ed. 680; American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-357, 29 S.Ct. 511, 53 L.Ed. 826. Similarly, section 182 of the Penal Code, standing alone, should not be read as applying to a conspiracy to commit a crime in another jurisdiction.

The People rely upon subdivision 1 of section 27 of the Penal Code, which provides that persons may be punished 'under the laws of this state' if they 'commit, in whole or in part, any crime within this state', and also upon section 778a of that code, which provides: 'Whenever a person, with intent to commit a crime, does any act within this state in execution or part execution of such intent, which culminates in the commission of a crime, either within or without this state such person is punishable for such crime in this state in the same manner as if the same had been committed entirely within this state.' These sections were not mentioned in the indictment, but if it be assumed that they may properly be considered here, they do not authorize a conviction on the evidence presented. The statutes must be construed in the light of the general principle that, ordinarily, a state does not impose punishment for acts done outside its territory. See People v. McGowan, 127 Cal.App. 39, 42, 14 P.2d 1036; State v. Volpe, 113 Conn. 288, 155 A. 223, 226, 76 A.L.R. 1083; Rest., Conflict of Laws, §§ 425, 427.

It is apparent from the authorities which have discussed subdivision 1 of section 27 and similar statutes in other jurisdictions that such a provision can apply where the acts done within the state are sufficient to amount to an attempt to commit a crime but not otherwise. People v. MacDonald, 24 Cal.App.2d 702, 709-711, 76 P.2d 121; People v. Werblow, 241 N.Y. 55, 148 N.E. 786, 789 (opinion by Judge Cardozo); see Rest., Conflict of Laws, § 428, Comment e; People v. Botkin, 132 Cal. 231, 233, 64 P. 286; People v. Sansom, 37 Cal.App. 435, 438-439, 173 P. 1107; People v. Chapman, 55 Cal.App. 192, 196-199, 203 P. 126 (act constituting an 'essential ingredient' of the crime); cf. People v. Harden, 14 Cal.App.2d 489, 58 P.2d 675; People v. Lakenan, 61 Cal.App. 368, 214 P. 1021; Reass v. United States, 4 Cir., 99 F.2d 752, 755 (stating that certain acts were only preparation and not 'part' of the crime itself). To read such a statute as authorizing the punishment by one state of acts which do not amount to an attempt but are merely preparatory to the commission of a crime in another state would seem tantamount to an effort to regulate conduct in the other jurisdiction. Cf. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-286, 69 S.Ct. 575, 93 L.Ed. 680.

Section 778a of the Penal Code should also be construed as applying only where the acts done within the state amount to an attempt. By its terms the section is limited to acts done 'in execution or part execution of' an intent to commit a crime, and these words are comparable to the expression 'in whole or in part' as used in subdivision 1 of section 27. The statute further requires that what is done in the state must be of such a nature that it 'culminates' in the commission of an offense, and this is analogous to the requirement in attempt cases that there must be a 'direct' ineffectual act towards consummation of the crime. Cf. People v. Miller, 2 Cal.2d 527, 530, 42 P.2d 308, 98 A.L.R. 913. Our construction of section 778a is in accord with the decision in People v. MacDonald, supra, 24 Cal.App.2d 702, 709-711, 76 P.2d 121, which held that the section did not warrant a conviction for contracting an incestuous marriage where it appeared that the defendant and his daughter, while in California, formed an intent to marry and then travelled on a train from California to Arizona, in which jurisdiction the ceremony was performed. The cases of People v. Marvin, 48 Cal.App.2d 180, 192, 119 P.2d 413, and People v. Harden, 14 Cal.App.2d 489, 492, 58 P.2d 675, are not in conflict with what we have said. The opinions in those cases indicate that sufficient acts were performed within the state to constitute attempts to commit crimes.

The questions presented here are different from those arising in venue cases. In People v. Anderson, 90 Cal.App.2d 326, 330-331, 202 P.2d 1044, it was held that the defendants, who were prosecuted for abortion and conspiracy to commit abortion, could properly be tried in the county where the conspiracy was formed and from which they transported one of the women involved, even though the abortions were performed in another county. Sections 182 and 184 of the Penal Code, however, specifically provide that a conspiracy case may be tried in any county where an overt act is done. The Anderson case also relied on section 781 of the Penal Code, 3 relating to venue where acts occur in two or more counties, but under this section venue may lie in a particular county even though the acts done there are not sufficient, considered alone, to constitute an attempt. See People v. Megladdery, 40 Cal.App.2d 748, 774-777, 106 P.2d 84. Moreover, the courts, in construing the venue statutes, obviously are not limited by the operation of the general principles, discussed above, that a state ordinarily does not impose punishment for acts done in other jurisdictions and that, in the absence of a contrary intent, its statutes will not be read as seeking to regulate conduct beyond its own borders.

Since section 778a and subdivision 1 of section 27 do not apply unless acts are done within the state which amount at least to an attempt, we must next determine whether defendants could properly be convicted of an attempt to violate section 274 upon a showing that they transported the four women from a place in California to a place in Mexico with the intention of performing abortions upon them in that country. Sections 663 and 664 of the Penal Code prescribe punishment for attempts to commit crimes but do not define the offense. This court has held that two elements are necessary to establish an attempt, namely, a specific intent to commit a crime and a 'direct' ineffectual act done towards its commission. People v. Miller, 2 Cal.2d 527, 530, 42 P.2d 308, 98 A.L.R. 913; see People v. Anderson, 1 Cal.2d 687, 689-690, 37 P.2d 67. Preparation alone is not enough, there must be some appreciable fragment of the crime committed, it must be in such progress that it will be consummated unless interrupted by circumstances independent of the will of the attempter, and the act must not be equivocal in nature. People v. Miller, supra, 2 Cal.2d at pages...

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