People v. Buford

Decision Date27 October 2016
Docket NumberF069936
Citation209 Cal.Rptr.3d 593,4 Cal.App.5th 886
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Parties The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Victor Leon BUFORD, Defendant and Appellant.

4 Cal.App.5th 886
209 Cal.Rptr.3d 593

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Victor Leon BUFORD, Defendant and Appellant.

F069936

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Filed October 27, 2016


Certified for Partial Publication.*

Heather J. MacKay, Oakland, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen G. Herndon and Paul E. O'Connor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

209 Cal.Rptr.3d 597

OPINION

DETJEN, Acting P.J.

4 Cal.App.5th 893

INTRODUCTION

Victor Leon Buford (defendant), an inmate serving a term of 25 years to life in prison following conviction of a felony that was not violent (as defined by Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (c) ) or serious (as defined by Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subd. (c) ), filed a petition pursuant to the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (hereafter Proposition 36 or the Act) to have his sentence recalled and to be resentenced.1 (§ 1170.126, subd. (b).) Following a hearing, the trial court concluded resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety and denied the petition.

In the published portion of this opinion, we hold the People have the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts on which a finding that resentencing a petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety reasonably can be based. Those facts are reviewed for substantial evidence. We further hold, the preponderance of the evidence standard does not apply to the trial court's determination regarding dangerousness, nor does section 1170.126, subdivision (f), create a presumption in favor of resentencing. The ultimate decision—whether resentencing an inmate would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety—instead lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. We also hold section 1170.18, subdivision (c) does not modify section 1170.126, subdivision (f). As we explain in the unpublished portion of our opinion, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm.

4 Cal.App.5th 894

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

DISCUSSION

I

The Applicable Legal Principles

In order to be eligible for resentencing as a second strike offender under the Act, the inmate petitioner must satisfy the three criteria set out in subdivision (e) of section 1170.126.12 (People v. Superior Court (Martinez) (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 979, 988–989, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 763.) If the inmate satisfies all three criteria, as did defendant, he or she “shall be resentenced [as a second strike offender] unless the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing the [inmate] would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).) In exercising this discretion, “the court may consider: [¶] (1) The [inmate]'s criminal conviction history, including the type of crimes committed, the extent of injury to victims, the length of prior prison commitments, and the remoteness of the crimes; [¶] (2) The

209 Cal.Rptr.3d 598
inmate]'s disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation while incarcerated; and [¶] (3) Any other evidence the court, within its discretion, determines to be relevant in deciding whether a new sentence would result in an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (Id. subd. (g).)

A. A trial court's ultimate determination regarding dangerousness lies within its discretion; its ruling, therefore, is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

The plain language of subdivisions (f) and (g) of section 1170.126 calls for an exercise of the sentencing court's discretion. “ ‘Discretion is the power to make the decision, one way or the other.’ [Citation.]” (

[4 Cal.App.5th 895

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 880, 92 P.3d 369.) “Where, as here, a discretionary power is statutorily vested in the trial court, its exercise of that discretion ‘must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124–1125, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1 ; see People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 948 P.2d 429 [abuse-of-discretion review asks whether ruling in question falls outside bounds of reason under applicable law and relevant facts].)

Under the clear language of section 1170.126, the ultimate determination that resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger is a discretionary one. We, therefore, review that determination for abuse of discretion. Of course, if there is no evidence in the record to support the decision, the decision constitutes an abuse of discretion. (See In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1066, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 654.)

B. The burden of proof of preponderance of the evidence applies to proof of the facts, not to the trial court's ultimate determination.

Defendant asserts he cannot be denied resentencing unless the People proved dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt. Alternatively, he says, the People must at least have proven the ultimate conclusion of dangerousness by a preponderance of the evidence. Although we agree preponderance of the evidence is the appropriate standard, we disagree with defendant on its application to the ultimate determination.13

“The standard of proof, the United States Supreme Court has said, ‘serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.’ [Citation.] At one end of the spectrum is the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard, which apportions the risk of error among litigants in roughly equal fashion. [Citation.] At the other end of the spectrum is the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard applied in criminal cases, in which ‘our society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself.’ [Citation.] Between those two standards is the intermediate standard of clear and convincing evidence. [Citation.] These three standards are codified in California's Evidence Code. Section 115 of that code states: ‘The burden of proof may require a
209 Cal.Rptr.3d 599
party to ... establish the existence or nonexistence of a fact by a preponderance of the evidence, by
4 Cal.App.5th 896
clear and convincing proof, or by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶] Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of proof requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence .’ (Italics added.)

“If the Legislature has not established a standard of proof, a court must determine the appropriate standard by considering all aspects of the law. [Citation.] No standard of proof is specified in section [1170.126]....

“ ‘The standard of proof that is required in a given instance has been said to reflect “... the degree of confidence our society thinks [the factfinder] should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.” ... The standard of proof may therefore vary, depending upon the gravity of the consequences that would result from an erroneous determination of the issue involved.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Arriaga (2014) 58 Cal.4th 950, 961–962, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 678, 320 P.3d 1141.)

“In enacting section 1170.126 as part of Proposition 36, the issue before the voters was not whether a defendant could or should be punished more harshly for a particular aspect of his or her offense, but whether, having already been found to warrant an indeterminate life sentence as a third strike offender, he or she should now be eligible for a lesser term.” (People v. Osuna (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1036, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 55.) Although voters could have permitted automatic resentencing, under any and all circumstances, of those eligible therefor, they did not do so. This demonstrates a recognition of two highly plausible scenarios: (1) Some inmates sentenced to indeterminate terms under the original version of the three strikes law for crimes not defined as serious or violent felonies may have started out not posing any greater risk of danger than recidivists who will now be sentenced to determinate terms as second strike offenders under the prospective provisions of the Act, but have become violent or otherwise dangerous while imprisoned, or (2) Enough time might have passed since some inmates committed their criminal offenses so that those offenses no longer make such inmates dangerous, but other factors do. Because of the severe consequences to society that may result if a dangerous inmate is resentenced as a second strike offender and released to the community upon completion of his or her term with little or no supervision (see, e.g., § 3451) and without undergoing any suitability assessment (see, e.g., In re Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1204, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169, 190 P.3d 535 ), we believe it appropriate to apportion the risk of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
76 cases
  • People v. Frierson
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • December 28, 2017
    ...preponderance of the evidence ... and are themselves subject to [appellate] review for substantial evidence." ( People v. Buford (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 886, 901, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 593 ; see also People v.Flores (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1075-1076, 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 390 ; Kaulick, supra, 215 Ca......
  • People v. Frierson
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • December 28, 2017
    ...preponderance of the evidence ... and are themselves subject to [appellate] review for substantial evidence." ( People v. Buford(2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 886, 901, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 593 ; see also People v.Flores(2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1075-1076, 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 390 ; Kaulick, supra, 215 Cal.......
  • People v. Marquez
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • May 16, 2017
    ...are also silent on this question. (Voter Information Guide, supra , at pp. 54–57, 141–146; see People v . Buford (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 886, 918–920, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 593 (conc. opn. of Peña, J.) [analyzing silence of Prop. 47 on question of retroactivity], review granted Jan. 11, 2017, S23879......
  • Bates v. Paramo
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
    • August 21, 2020
    ...the trial court make a discretionary determination as to whether he or she should be resentenced."); see also People v. Buford, 4 Cal. App. 5th 886, 903 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) ("[A] conclusion resentencing to a second strike term is a generally mandatory presumption from which courts can depa......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT