People v. Buford
| Decision Date | 22 January 1947 |
| Docket Number | No. 29848.,29848. |
| Citation | 71 N.E.2d 340,396 Ill. 158 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. BUFORD. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; Leonard C. Reid, Judge.
Thomas Buford was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill, and he brings error.
Judgment affirmed.
Braden, Hall, Barnes & Blakey, of Chicago (Houston H. Hall, of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.
George F. Barrett, Atty. Gen., and William J. Tuohy, State's Atty., of Chicago (Edward E. Wilson, John T. Gallagher and Melvin S. Rembe, all of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
Plaintiff in error, Thomas Buford, was convicted by a jury in the criminal court of Cook county of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon, with intent to kill one Theodore Flowers, and was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of not less than eight nor more than twelve years. He now prosecutes this writ of error.
Flowers testified for the People that at 10 o'clock on the morning of August 12, 1945, while standing in the vicinity of 31st street and Indiana avenue, with a baby in his arms, he was struck in the back of his right shoulder by a bullet; that, on turning, he saw plaintiff in error, Buford, a few feet behind him with a gun in his hand; that complaining witness dropped the baby and started to run, and Buford fired again hitting him in the back of his left shoulder. Flowers testified that he continued to run until he reached a drugstore where he summoned the police. He stated that he was not aware of Buford's presence until struck by the first shot, and that he had no explanation for what prompted the shooting.
Complaining witness further testified that he later saw plaintiff in error in front of his, witness' home watching a fire; that he, witness, sent his wife to summon the police but plaintiff in error met her on the porch, drew a gun, and forced her back into the building. In this episode he was corroborated by his wife, Ruth Flowers, who stated that plaintiff in error threatened both her and her husband at the time. This evidence, with that of two police officers who testified as to the search for plaintiff in error and his arrest, was the evidence offered by the State.
Plaintiff in error testified in his own defense that the shooting was done in self-defense. He testified that he had had trouble with Flowers over witness' wife; that on two occasions, in the presence of witness' wife, Flowers had threatened him with a knife, and on one occasion Flowers knocked him down when witness told him to leave his wife alone, and pulled a knife, but was restrained by two men, and that Flowers threatened to kill him next time he saw him.
In his version of what occurred on August 12, plaintiff in error testified that he was walking along the street with groceries in his arms, including a paper sack containing a revolver, which belonged to and was being delivered to a tavernkeeper who was a roomer in the Buford home; that he met Flowers, who drew a dirk-like knife and came at him thereatening to kill him; that he fired the gun to scare Flowers and with no intention of hitting him; that, being excited, he fired the gun twice. He denied that Flowers had a baby in his arms and also denied that he had been near the Flowers apartment on December 3, or that he had ever seen or threatened Mrs. Flowers.
In rebuttal, the complaining witness, Flowers denied threats or assaults against plaintiff in error with a knife and denied any misconduct with Buford's wife at any time. Further, ion rebuttal the State put in evidence, over objection, an exemplified copy of a judgment of conviction rendered by a court in the State of Ohio, against one Oscar Jones, of the crime of grand larceny. A police officer had testified that he had known the accused for over five years and that he also went by the name of Oscar Jones.
It is here contended by plaintiff in error that the court erred in admitting the exemplified copy of the conviction in the State of Ohio and that his conviction here was contrary to the law and the evidence. In support of his first contention plaintiff in error argues that before the foreign judgment was admissible in evidence it must be proved that Thomas Buford, the plaintiff in error, was the same person as Oscar Jones, and further, that at the time of the conviction Thomas Buford was in the county where the criminal proceedings were had. This question under exactly these facts has not previously been considered by this court. In People v. Schanda, 352 Ill. 36, 185 N.E. 183, the argument was that the record of conviction was erroneously received in evidence because there was no proof that the Frank Schanda named in the record was the defendant Frank Schanda. It was there held, however, citing Clifford v. Pioneer Fire-Proofing Co. 232 Ill. 150, 83 N.E. 448, that the record of a conviction of a witness for an infamous crime was admissible to affect his credibility without evidence of the identity of the person convicted as the witness other than the identity of names, as such fact will be presumed if not denied. While this was a civil case, the same rule has been held to apply in criminal cases. People v. Lawson, 331 Ill. 380, 163 N.E. 149.
The conviction of an infamous crime in either case is allowed to be shown for no other purpose than to affect the credibility of the witness. Such record is not introduced, and cannot be considered, for the purpose of proving guilt, but only for the purpose of discrediting him as a witness. Proof of such conviction need not, therefore, be made beyond a reasonable...
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