People v. Buford, 1-88-3512

Citation601 N.E.2d 1099,235 Ill.App.3d 393
Decision Date16 September 1992
Docket NumberNo. 1-88-3512,1-88-3512
Parties, 176 Ill.Dec. 401 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wydrick BUFORD, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1099

601 N.E.2d 1099
235 Ill.App.3d 393, 176 Ill.Dec. 401
The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Wydrick BUFORD, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 1-88-3512.
Appellate Court of Illinois,
First District, Third Division.
Sept. 16, 1992.

Page 1102

[235 Ill.App.3d 395] [176 Ill.Dec. 404] Jack O'Malley; State's Atty. of Cook County, Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, David Stabrawa, Carrie Weiner, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

Rita A. Fry; First Asst. Public Defender of Cook County, Chicago (Michael Davidson, Vicki Rogers, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

Presiding Justice GREIMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial, defendant Wydrick Buford was convicted of murder, attempted murder, and aggravated battery. The trial court [235 Ill.App.3d 396] sentenced defendant to prison terms of 30 years, 15 years and 5 years respectively for each crime, to be served concurrently.

On appeal, defendant raises seven issues as to whether: (1) the peremptory challenges by the prosecutor constitute a Batson violation; (2) defendant was denied a fair trial due to the allegedly improper and prejudicial interjection of race issues; (3) defendant was denied a fair trial due to the testimony about the victim's future plans and allowing a photograph of the victim before his death to be taken to the jury room; (4) the absence of a voluntary manslaughter instruction was error; (5) defendant's conviction for aggravated battery should be vacated since it arose out of the same act as his attempted murder conviction; (6) defendant was proven guilty of each charge; and (7) defendant's 30-year sentence is excessive.

For the reasons which follow, we vacate defendant's conviction for aggravated battery and find no error in the trial court's rulings on all other issues.

The shooting incident occurred during an argument over a small bag of marijuana on May 8, 1987. The Straman and Flores families lived next door to each other and defendant was the boyfriend of one of the Flores' children. On the evening of the incident, several young men were in the Straman's backyard, including Marty Glines (the murder victim), Wesley Pucek (the attempt murder victim), and other guests.

Sometime during the evening, Steve Straman obtained a small bag (a "dime" bag valued at $10) of marijuana from Ricardo Flores and brought the bag into the backyard inquiring if anyone wished to purchase some marijuana. Steve gave the bag to Marty and Wesley who had expressed interest in that regard. Later in the evening, in response to Steve's inquiry, Marty and Wesley claimed they no longer had the bag and Steve became upset.

About that time, defendant arrived at the Straman's house and Steve explained his problem to defendant. Thereafter, in the alley behind the Straman's backyard, a confrontation occurred among defendant, Marty, Wesley, Ricardo Flores, and other guests. While the argument continued, defendant

Page 1103

[176 Ill.Dec. 405] took a gun from the garage and fired one shot wounding Wesley and then a second shot killing Marty.

The testimony of the several occurrence witnesses essentially recounted the same sequence of events.

During the voir dire, the prosecutor peremptorily challenged three black venirewomen and defendant moved for a mistrial, claiming that the prosecutor's actions constituted a Batson violation. The trial court denied defendant's motions and found no Batson violations.

[235 Ill.App.3d 397] Following the trial, defendant was convicted of murder, attempt murder and aggravated battery, and was sentenced to 30 years, 15 years and 5 years respectively for each conviction to run concurrently.

On appeal, defendant first asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motions for a mistrial based on alleged Batson violations during jury selection.

Defendant was the only black person involved in this case. The State exercised peremptory challenges to exclude three black women from the jury--Alice Bush, Bernice Talley and Valerie Lewis.

Batson established a three-step analysis to determine whether or not the State used its peremptory challenges to remove venire members on the basis of race. (Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d 69.) First, the defendant must establish a prima facie showing of discrimination. Second, if the defendant made the requisite showing, the State has the burden to come forward with a race-neutral explanation for challenging black jurors. Finally, the trial court then "will have the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination." Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724, 90 L.Ed.2d 69.

The three-step analysis articulated in Batson and applied by its progeny establishes a systematic procedure whereby each step is to be considered in order. (E.g., People v. Andrews (1989), 132 Ill.2d 451, 139 Ill.Dec. 469, 548 N.E.2d 1025 (only if the defendant establishes a prima facie case of discrimination does the State rebut the defendant's showing by explaining its contested peremptory challenges).) However, in the present case, a consolidated proceeding, i.e., the simultaneous consideration of the defendant's proffered prima facie case and the State's explanations, was employed. Such proceeding, although not improper, hampers our review. (People v. Valentine (1991), 221 Ill.App.3d 1082, 1086-87, 164 Ill.Dec. 394, 582 N.E.2d 1338 ("[t]his practice of 'collapsing' the Batson steps, as well as trial courts' failure to make detailed findings of fact to clarify the record when the Batson objection is raised, needlessly adds to the number of costly appeals"); People v. Murff (1991), 214 Ill.App.3d 1034, 1040, 158 Ill.Dec. 702, 574 N.E.2d 815 ("we do not approve of the consolidated Batson hearing held below"); People v. Jones (1989), 185 Ill.App.3d 208, 216, 133 Ill.Dec. 324, 541 N.E.2d 161 (although the consolidated proceeding was not erroneous, "this is not the recommended procedure as set forth in Batson ").) At oral argument, the parties agreed that the consolidated procedure is not an issue. See Hernandez v. New York (1991), 500 U.S. 352, ----, 111 S.Ct.[235 Ill.App.3d 398] 1859, 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d 395, 405 ("departure from the normal course of proceeding need not concern us").

In Hernandez, as in the present case, the prosecutor defended his use of peremptory strikes without any direct inquiry from the trial court so that the trial court had no occasion to rule clearly and specifically on whether or not a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination had been made by the defendant. Where the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination after a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot. Hernandez, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. at 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d at 405; People v. Williams (1992), 230 Ill.App.3d 761, 172 Ill.Dec. 445, 595 N.E.2d 1115; People v. Hemphill (1992), 230 Ill.App.3d 453, 171 Ill.Dec. 759, 594 N.E.2d 1279; People v. Finley (1991), 222 Ill.App.3d

Page 1104

[176 Ill.Dec. 406] 571, 580, 165 Ill.Dec. 97, 584 N.E.2d 276.

Our analysis must now address the second step of a Batson inquiry, i.e., whether or not the State came forward with race-neutral reasons for excluding the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • People v. Maggette
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • 29 Marzo 2001
    ......See People v. Buford, 235 Ill.App.3d 393, 404-05, 176 Ill.Dec. 401, 601 N.E.2d 1099 (1992) (collecting cases); People v. Hines, 105 Ill.App.3d 35, 38, 60 Ill.Dec. ......
  • Oblander v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • 1 Diciembre 2000
    ......That seemed to be the distinction that he went through with regard to all of these people. . "And I did not strike based on race. I struck based on other aspects. And whether or not a ....         In People v. Buford, 235 Ill.App.3d 393, 176 Ill.Dec. 401, 601 N.E.2d 1099 (1992), the State struck a black juror who ......
  • People v. Aguirre
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 19 Marzo 1993
    ...... See People v. Buford (1992), 235 Ill.App.3d 393, 176 Ill.Dec. 401, 601 N.E.2d 1099.         The prosecutor excluded Mr. Acosta because he was "tight-lipped" and ......
  • People v. Barraza, 4-92-0586
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 28 Diciembre 1993
    ...v. Bowen (1993), 241 Ill.App.3d [253 Ill.App.3d 858] 608, 631, 182 Ill.Dec. 43, 61, 609 N.E.2d 346, 364; People v. Buford (1992), 235 Ill.App.3d 393, 404, 176 Ill.Dec. 401, 410, 601 N.E.2d 1099, 1108; People v. Craddock (1987), 163 Ill.App.3d 1039, 1048, 115 Ill.Dec. 1, 7, 516 N.E.2d 1357, ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT