People v. Buie

Decision Date05 November 1992
Docket NumberNo. 1-88-2166,1-88-2166
Citation606 N.E.2d 279,238 Ill.App.3d 260
Parties, 179 Ill.Dec. 447 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joel BUIE, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Randolph Stone, Public Defender of Cook County, Chicago (Julie M. Campbell, Asst. Public Defender, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

Jack O'Malley, State's Atty. of Cook County, Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Kenneth T. McCurry, Christine Cook, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

Presiding Justice JIGANTI delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of murder and armed robbery and sentenced to natural life imprisonment for murder, and a 30-year concurrent sentence for armed robbery. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) that his fourth amendment rights were violated when he was detained without probable cause and his confession should have been suppressed; (2) that his fifth amendment rights were violated because his confession was not voluntary; (3) the hair analyst expert made an improper scientific conclusion; (4) the hair expert's findings were based on incorrect data; (5) that he was denied due process and the right to a fair trial when the expert's report which was tendered to the defense before trial differed from the expert's trial testimony; (6) that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the armed robbery count when the evidence failed to show that the force involved in the murder was related to the taking of property or money; (7) that his constitutional confrontation rights were denied when the State introduced inadmissible hearsay testimony and relied on that testimony during closing argument; (8) that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (9) that the trial court committed reversible error when it refused his challenge for cause to excuse a juror; (10) that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that the offense was accompanied by brutal and heinous behavior; and (11) that he was sentenced under a statute which violated his due process and equal protection rights.

We summarize the evidence from the record.

I. Pretrial hearing on the defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress statements.

Detectives McGuire and Tansey were assigned to the victim's murder investigation on August 17, 1986. They went to the victim's home where they found no signs of a forced entry. When they were inside the house, they found that the burglar alarm system had been ripped from the wall and had a blood smear on it. While proceeding down to the basement, they observed a long scratch mark along the right side of the wall along the stairs. At the bottom of the stairs, they found a metal ceiling hook. They found the victim in the basement lying face down, her hands bound behind her with a nylon, and her mouth gagged with a nylon. She appeared to have died from a blunt head trauma. To the victim's right was a toolbox and tools were strewn across the floor. The detectives proceeded to the second floor of the house where they found the master bedroom ransacked.

Later that day while canvassing the area, the detectives spoke with the defendant who resided two houses west of where the victim lived. The defendant told them that he saw the victim on August 15 at about 4 p.m. She had asked the defendant if he could fix a ceiling hook in her living room. The defendant told her to get the materials and then he would fix it.

The detectives also spoke to two of the victim's co-workers. They told the detectives that the victim was scheduled to work on August 16 and 17. When she did not report to work, they went to her home, but no one answered the door. One of the victim's co-workers also decided to go over to the defendant's home to inquire about the victim. The defendant told her that he had fixed a ceiling hook in the victim's living room on August 15. The co-worker also told the detectives that the defendant was vague and slow when speaking with her.

McGuire stated that he determined from his investigation that the defendant was the last person to see the victim alive. On August 18, Detectives Popovits and Robertson were assigned to investigate the victim's murder and learned all of the aforementioned information from the previously assigned detectives.

On August 19 at 6 a.m., Popovits and Robertson went to the defendant's home and identified themselves to the defendant as officers who were investigating the victim's homicide. They requested that the defendant come to headquarters to be interviewed. They waited outside while the defendant retrieved his coat and the defendant rode in the back seat of their squad car. Both detectives testified that the defendant was not handcuffed at this time. After arriving at Area One headquarters, the defendant was seated in an interview room and was given his Miranda rights. The defendant told Popovits that the last time he had seen the victim was on August 15 at 4 o'clock when she asked him to hang a ceiling hook for her. The defendant went into her home, looked at the job, and told her that he would do the job the next day after she purchased the materials. The defendant consented to take a polygraph test. When the defendant was told that the test could not be scheduled until 9 a.m. that morning, the defendant said he wanted to help the police in any way he could. At 8:30 a.m., the defendant was given a polygraph examination and signed a statement that he was voluntarily submitting to that examination. After the results were analyzed, it was determined that the defendant failed the polygraph as to his participation in and knowledge of the victim's murder.

The defendant agreed to be fingerprinted and to submit hair samples. In the interim, the detectives interviewed the defendant's alibi witness, his girl friend, Adlena Bright. She told one officer that on the afternoon of August 15, she had smoked a reefer with the defendant. She later told another detective that in the early morning and afternoon of August 15, she and the defendant ingested cocaine and reefers. The defendant's account of the events of August 15 differed from Bright's account. When confronted with the disparity, the defendant added that he had purchased and ingested cocaine several times on August 15. Later Bright told detectives that the defendant had tried to pawn a gold necklace to purchase cocaine.

On August 19, the defendant spoke with Detective Robertson and confessed to the victim's murder. The defendant told Robertson that he wanted to relieve himself of the burden of what he had done. On August 20, the defendant agreed to give a court-reported statement in which he again confessed to the victim's murder. The defendant also requested to direct the detectives to the location of his bloody clothes and items which he took from the victim's home. The defendant accompanied the detectives to several locations but nothing was recovered.

The defendant testified that the detectives initially told him that he had to go to the police station for questioning. He stated that he wanted to make a phone call but the detectives would not allow it. He was handcuffed and brought to the station. At the station, he was not allowed to make a phone call. He stated that he was never read his Miranda rights. When he was asked to take a polygraph test, the defendant wanted to go home first, but the detectives would not allow him to do so. The defendant further testified that the polygraph examiner slapped him and hit him in the chest with a closed hand. Another officer pushed him against the wall. When he was brought back to the interview room, he was handcuffed to the wall. The defendant stated that he was not given any food and was not allowed to make a phone call. Detective Robertson told the defendant that he was making him "look like an ass" in front of his boss and then "beat the shit" out of him. Robertson made the defendant get on his knees while he was still handcuffed to a ring on the wall and hit him in the stomach. Robertson pushed him onto the floor and was punching him with a closed fist and kicking him. Robertson told the defendant that he could "blow [his] fucking brains out and dump [him] somewhere around Indiana." At that time, the defendant told Robertson that he would say anything he wanted him to say. Robertson told the defendant what to say in his confession to the victim's murder. Robertson called Detective Thompson into the interview room and the defendant confessed to the murder. The defendant resisted giving a court-reported statement to the assistant State's Attorney, but he was forced to cooperate.

It was stipulated that if Detective McGuire were called to the stand, he would testify that during his investigation on August 17, he spoke with Rosalie Pierce who stated that she spoke with the victim on August 15 between 7 and 7:30 p.m. while the victim was working on her lawn.

It was further stipulated that the paramedic who examined the defendant at Cook County jail would testify that he conducted a physical examination of the defendant on August 21. The defendant told him that he was in good health. He had no bruises, cuts, swelling, or soreness on his body.

We first address the defendant's contention that the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion to quash arrest and suppress his confession. The defendant claims that he was detained without probable cause in violation of his fourth amendment rights and his confession should have been suppressed as a result of that unlawful seizure. The defendant argues that he was at the police station involuntarily and the police did not have probable cause to arrest him. The defendant points to the fact that he had five interviews during his 24-hour stay at the police station and at one point was handcuffed to the wall....

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