People v. Bunton
| Citation | 488 N.Y.S.2d 988,128 Misc.2d 162 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. French BUNTON. |
| Decision Date | 25 April 1985 |
| Court | New York City Court |
Howard Relin, Monroe County Dist. Atty., Louise Boillat, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff.
Paul Riordan, Rochester, for defendant.
The defendant, French Bunton, is charged with violating Section 1219(a) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law which prohibits throwing or depositing injurious substances on the highway. A non-jury trial was conducted before this Court on January 24, 1985.
The following facts have been presented to this Court: At approximately 11:15 a.m. on October 23, 1984, defendant Bunton was operating a truck on Route 490 westbound An eyewitness account by Officer Thomas Sleep of the Brighton Police Department revealed the following facts: a small brown car, traveling in the center lane of Route 490 westbound, suddenly turned and was struck by another vehicle. The small brown car then collided with the concrete median strip and came to a stop. The officer testified that, at the point of impact, the road was covered with a large amount of debris, including straw, rocks, and a "mud-like" material. Officer Sleep further testified that he saw a tractor-trailer dump-style truck parked on the road's shoulder further down Route 490 westbound.
in the City of Rochester. The truck was filled with a "mud-like" substance which, according to witnesses, was dripping from the back of the truck as it traveled along Route 490.
Rochester Police Evidence Technician Theresa Fahrer and Rochester Police Officer Dale Schaeffer traced the debris for a distance of approximately four-tenths of a mile from the beginning of the debris on the highway to the place where the dump truck was stopped. Photographs entered into evidence as well as further testimony by these witnesses indicated that the tailgate of the dump truck was partially open and a mud-like debris was coming out the back. The driver of the vehicle which collided with the small brown car testified that the "mud-like" substance was slippery and despite his attempts to slow his vehicle, his car slid into the driver's door of the small brown car.
Upon approaching the dump truck and talking with its' driver, defendant Bunton, Officer Schaeffer issued a ticket, citing defendant with a violation of Section 1219(a) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, "Depositing Injurious Substance on the Highway".
The issue in this case is whether the defendant's conduct constitutes a violation of Section 1219(a) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. The defense argues that it does not. First, defendant claims that the "mud-like" substance left on the highway is not an "injurious" substance within the scope of the Statute, and second, defendant claims that the substance was not "deposited" or "thrown" on the highway in a manner required by the Statute.
Section 1219(a) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law reads:
"No person shall throw or deposit upon any highway any glass bottle, glass, nails, tacks, wire, cans, snow or any other substance likely to injure any person, animal, or vehicle upon such highway."
Whether the mud, grass and rocks which dripped from the defendant's truck amounted to "an injurious substance" requires an examination of the Statutory language, its legislative history, and relevant case law. The language of the Statute is broad; while enumerating certain items in particular, (e.g. glass, tacks, snow), it adds a catch-all phrase: "or any other substance likely to injure". The 1957 Revision note following the Statute refers to "any material likely to injure the highway or users of the highway". (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1219, 1957 revision note; emphasis added; see also Joint Legislative Committee on Motor Vehicle Problems, 1954 Leg.Doc. No. 36, p. 110 [McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 62A, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1219 (1960) ] ). Clearly, a slippery "mud-like" substance is a material likely to injure the users of the highway.
A slight incongruity exists, however, in the same revision note which states the purpose of all three subdivisions is "... to prevent materials having sharp edges or points from being left where it may puncture tires and injure people or animals". (Joint Legislative Committee, supra, at 110). This language would appear to limit "injurious substances" to sharp objects, such as glass and tacks. Yet the statutory language includes "snow", which is neither sharp nor pointed, and whose physical properties are very much like mud. The "catch-all phrase" in the Statute also supports the notion that the Statute is meant to be broader than the revision note suggests.
A review of the somewhat limited case law in the area reveals that violations of Section 1219 have included mud on the roadway (Nielson v. City of New York, 38 A.D.2d 592, 328 N.Y.S.2d 698), timbers obstructing the road (People v. Troia, 207 Misc. 463, 141 N.Y.S.2d 90), as well...
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Stanton v. Gasport View Dairy Farm, Inc.
... ... Supreme Court erred in concluding that mud is not included within the scope of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1219 (see, People v. Bunton, 128 Misc.2d 162, 488 N.Y.S.2d 988; see also, Nielsen v. City of New York, 38 A.D.2d 592, 328 N.Y.S.2d 698, appeal dismissed 30 N.Y.2d ... ...