People v. Burgund

Citation66 N.E.3d 553,408 Ill.Dec. 761
Decision Date22 November 2016
Docket NumberNo. 5–13–0119.,5–13–0119.
Parties The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Michael S. BURGUND, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Curtis M. Dawson, Lucco, Brown, Threlkeld & Dawson, LLP, Edwardsville, IL, for Appellant.

Thomas D. Gibbons, State's Attorney, Edwardsville, IL, Patrick Delfino, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, Patrick D. Daly, Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Mt. Vernon, IL, for Appellee.

OPINION

Justice STEWART delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 A jury found the defendant, Michael S. Burgund, guilty of five counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/12–14.1(a)(1) (West 2010)). The circuit court sentenced the defendant to natural life in prison. The defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that the circuit court erred in precluding him from presenting certain testimony, including expert testimony, that he argues would have supported his claim that he gave a false confession. The defendant also argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in allowing the State to present hearsay statements of one of the victims pursuant to the exception to the hearsay rule contained in section 115–10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115–10 (West 2014) ). For the following reasons, we agree with the defendant's argument that the circuit court improperly excluded testimony that would have supported his false confession defense. These erroneous evidentiary rulings denied the defendant his constitutional right to a fair trial. We, therefore, reverse his convictions and sentence and remand for a new trial.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The charges against the defendant stem from allegations that he committed acts of sexual penetration upon his two minor daughters, M.B. and K.B. At the time of the trial, M.B. was five years old, and K.B. was three years old. The alleged abuse occurred when M.B. was between the ages of 1 and 3 ½, and K.B. was between one and two years old. M.B. testified at trial, but K.B. did not. M.B.'s trial testimony was vague and inconclusive. Medical testimony presented by the prosecution was also inconclusive; while some of the medical evidence supported the State's allegations, the evidence was also explainable by potential innocent causes.

¶ 4 The State's evidence of the defendant's guilt consisted largely of a videotaped confession that he voluntarily gave to a detective with the Alton police department at a time when he was not under any suspicion of any wrongdoing. In addition, the State's case relied on hearsay statements M.B. allegedly made to Melissa, who is the children's mother and, at the time of the alleged abuse, was the wife of the defendant. The State also relied on hearsay statements M.B. allegedly made to Melissa's mother, Mary Buttry. Accordingly, the success of the State's case was heavily dependent upon the credibility of the defendant's confession and the credibility of Melissa and Buttry.

¶ 5 The defendant testified in his defense and denied abusing his daughters. His defense was based on a claim that he gave a false confession because of coercion, suggestion, and manipulation by Melissa and Buttry. He claimed that they created a coercive and accusatory psychological environment throughout his marriage. He emphasized that he, Melissa, and Buttry had deeply held religious beliefs and that Melissa's and Buttry's coercion involved religious overtones, false accusations of sexual lust, and claims by both Buttry and Melissa as to having God-gifted, supernatural powers of "discernment." He maintained that the coercion ultimately caused him to falsely believe and confess that he had abused his children. He claims that, after his arrest and removal from Melissa's and Buttry's influence, he realized that he had given a false confession to crimes that had never occurred.

¶ 6 On appeal, the defendant argues that the circuit court improperly excluded testimony from witnesses who would have corroborated important aspects of his testimony concerning the psychological conditions leading up to his false confession, particularly his description of continual accusations by Melissa involving religious and sexual overtones and her claim to have the power of discernment. The defendant also argues that the court improperly excluded testimony from a psychological expert who would have opined that his psychological conditions made him highly suggestible and easily led, especially in matters involving religious or sexual overtones.

¶ 7 In order to fully understand and analyze the defendant's claims, we must set out the unique and unusual facts of this case with particular detail. Our background discussion focuses only on the testimony presented at the jury trial. In our analysis of the specific issues raised by the defendant, we will provide further facts that were adduced outside the presence of the jury that are relevant to the circuit court's evidentiary rulings.

¶ 8 Melissa and the defendant were married in 2006, and they lived with Buttry for 2 ½ to 3 years before they obtained their own residence. Buttry testified that she, Melissa, and the defendant attended the same church, The River of Life in Alton, Illinois. Melissa testified that their attendance at the church was sporadic. She stated, "there were seasons where we were every Sunday, some Wednesdays. There were times when we would miss on occasion." The pastor of the church, Mark Church, testified that when they first came to the church, they came consistently, then "sporadically later, and then hardly none at all then after that."

¶ 9 Buttry testified that she was familiar with the concept of discernment. She explained that discernment was the ability "[t]o see past just what's in front of you." As an example, she stated that normal discernment is "if your child is acting happy, and you can see that they're just acting happy and that they're really sad about something, and you see past that that they're really bothered instead." She also described supernatural discernment, which can be a gift from God. She explained supernatural discernment as taught in their church as follows:

"In the Bible it talks about there are different gifts. So, like where discernment is a normal thing, then someone might have a discernment that's a gift, and they would be able to discern things that no one—no one else could."

¶ 10 Buttry denied having supernatural discernment as a gift from God and denied ever telling the defendant that she had the gift of discernment. She also testified that discernment was "in scripture" but that the church did not "elaborate on it or anything."

¶ 11 Melissa also testified about "discernment." She told the jury that she "believe[d] in discernment" but was not an expert on it. In describing her understanding of discernment, she told the jury that it was "being able to understand something maybe. * * * I don't know." When asked whether discernment was being able to see that the defendant was lusting, she replied, "I don't even understand what that question means." When asked whether she had ever told anyone that she had discerned that "somebody was a very lustful person," she answered, "Now, why would I say that?" She testified that she would never say anything like that.

¶ 12 Their pastor, Mark Church, testified that discernment meant "you think you can figure something out. * * * You're smart. You have wisdom maybe." When asked whether discernment was something that is used often in his church, he testified, "um—I don't know if it's—it's used. I mean, we a—you know, we teach that we should seek wisdom, you know, from the Lord in our lives." When asked whether Buttry ever told him that she has a supernatural power of discernment, he responded, "Not that I can recall." On cross-examination, the pastor testified that in "First Corinthians 12 there's a list of gifts" and "there is a gift of discernment in that list." He added, "we don't teach on First Corinthians 12 much. So, I can't really tell you that a—it's something that we emphasize."

¶ 13 Buttry testified that the defendant and Melissa had verbal and physical arguments during their marriage, but neither was physically abusive toward their children. She testified that she was concerned about their verbal and physical arguments on occasion. On one occasion, she told Melissa that physical arguments were not going to happen in her house and that, if it happened again, she would call the police.

¶ 14 On cross-examination, Buttry explained that the arguments between Melissa and the defendant concerned the defendant's "lust." She testified that during or after the arguments, Melissa told her that she had to remove certain things from around the house because she was "upset about what [the defendant] was telling her that he was attracted to." The things Melissa told Buttry to remove from her house included angel figurines, babysitter pictures on the refrigerator, children's books, and princess books.

¶ 15 Buttry testified that the defendant was present at times when Melissa told her that she had to remove these things from the house. She told the jury, "Sometimes he would acknowledge what's going on." She explained, "he would just put his head down, and, you know, acknowledge that, yeah, that was the case. * * * That that needed to be removed, or a—maybe, even, you know, say, well, you know, you just—it—it's something that bothered him."

¶ 16 Melissa described her marriage with the defendant as "[w]eird, exhausting." She admitted that they would fight verbally and physically but testified that the police were never involved in their fights. She admitted to punching the defendant in the eye at times during physical confrontations, resulting in him having a black eye two or three times, and admitted to "head butting" him two separate times when he either held her down or held her against a wall during a fight....

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4 cases
  • People v. Soto
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 4 Febrero 2022
    ...of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statements in question. People v. Burgund , 2016 IL App (5th) 130119, ¶ 242, 408 Ill.Dec. 761, 66 N.E.3d 553. Important factors in determining whether the time, content, and circumstances of statements provide sufficient safeguards of relia......
  • State v. Chavez
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • 7 Septiembre 2017
    ...State, 796 S.E.2d 893, 896 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017) (applying GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-608 (effective January 1, 2013)); People v. Burgund, 66 N.E.3d 553, 594-95 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (applying ILL. R. EVID. 608 (effective Jan. 1, 2011)); Jacobs v. State, 22 N.E.3d 1286, 1289 (Ind. 2015) (applying IN......
  • People v. Scott
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 10 Junio 2021
    ...defendant and D.H. was not hearsay. In support of his argument, defendant cites People v. Burgund, 2016 IL App (5th) 130119, ¶¶ 198, 208, 66 N.E.3d 553 (The defendant sought to introduce out of court statements made by the victim's mother to a corroborating witness to prove the proposition ......
  • People v. O.M. (In re O.M.)
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 11 Diciembre 2017
    ...typical four- or five-year-old child would not and should not be familiar." See also People v. Burgund, 2016 IL App (5th) 130119, ¶ 249, 66 N.E.3d 553 (finding the content of a child-victim's statements tended to support their reliability where the child's statements "were stated in age-app......

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