People v. Burke, Court of Appeals No. 18CA0625
| Decision Date | 15 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 18CA0625 |
| Citation | 452 P.3d 124 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shannon Deane BURKE, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Daniel P. Rubinstein, District Attorney, Richard B. Tuttle, Assistant District Attorney, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Sarah A. Kellogg, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
¶ 1 The People appeal the trial court’s order granting the motion of defendant, Shannon Deane Burke, for a new trial. The People contend that the trial court granted Burke’s motion based on evidence that was inadmissible under CRE 606(b). We agree and reverse the trial court’s order.
¶ 2 Burke was charged with second degree burglary and theft after breaking into her ex-boyfriend’s home. A jury convicted Burke of the burglary charge.1 After trial, the jury commissioner sent an attorney performance evaluation form to the jurors. Jurors' responses to these evaluation requests are anonymous. On one of the evaluation responses that was directed to Burke’s counsel, an anonymous juror wrote "[h]ard to believe a client when they choose to remain silient [sic]." Burke then moved for a new trial, arguing that the statement showed that at least one juror had disregarded the trial court’s instructions and based his or her decision on an impermissible basis. The trial court found that the anonymous juror’s statement was evidence that there had been jury misconduct and, therefore, concluded that CRE 606(b) did not render the juror’s statement inadmissible. Without taking additional evidence, the trial court granted Burke’s motion for a new trial. The People appeal the trial court’s order.
¶ 3 On appeal, the People contend that CRE 606(b) precluded the trial court from considering the anonymous juror’s statement as a basis to grant Burke a new trial. They contend that the anonymous juror’s statement was inadmissible under the plain language of CRE 606(b), which bars admission of any juror testimony or statement to impeach a verdict where the testimony or statement concerns what occurred during jury deliberations. The People further contend that the trial court erroneously concluded that the juror’s statement was evidence of misconduct, arguing that misconduct is not shown by the juror’s statement and cannot be shown without conducting the specific sort of inquiry into the juror’s deliberative process that CRE 606(b) prohibits.
¶ 4 Burke responds that the trial court properly found that CRE 606(b) did not apply to the anonymous juror’s statement. In the alternative, Burke contends that the trial court’s order granting a new trial should be affirmed because the juror’s statement shows that the juror deliberately concealed during voir dire a bias against defendants who exercise their constitutional right to remain silent. Burke also contends that, even assuming CRE 606(b) applies, a constitutional exception to the rule is warranted.
¶ 5 We agree with the People and conclude that the anonymous juror’s statement was inadmissible under CRE 606(b). We conclude that the trial court, therefore, erroneously granted Burke’s motion for a new trial based on the anonymous juror’s statement alone. We further conclude that a constitutional exception to CRE 606(b) is not warranted under these circumstances. We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s order granting Burke’s motion for a new trial.
¶ 6 A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a defendant’s motion for a new trial is one we review for an abuse of discretion. People v. Bueno , 2018 CO 4, ¶ 19, 409 P.3d 320. The trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or unfair, or if it bases its decision on an erroneous view of the law. Id.
¶ 7 In Colorado, the testimony of jurors is governed by CRE 606(b). Pursuant to that rule, jurors are generally prohibited from testifying regarding their deliberative process:
But there are three exceptions to this general prohibition:
¶ 8 Finally, whether a trial court may consider evidence from a juror turns on whether the juror would be permitted to testify about such a matter:
A juror’s affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror may not be received on a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying.
CRE 606(b) (emphasis added).
¶ 9 Thus, CRE 606(b) provides that a juror’s testimony, affidavit, statement, or other evidence may not be admitted to impeach the verdict unless that evidence falls within one of the three exceptions in subparts (1)-(3). These exceptions permit juror testimony about "exposure of a jury to information or influences outside of the trial process itself," People v. Harlan , 109 P.3d 616, 625 (Colo. 2005), and also permit, pursuant to the 2007 amendments, testimony about "whether there was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict form," Malpica-Cue v. Fangmeier , 2017 COA 46, ¶ 12, 395 P.3d 1234 (quoting CRE 606(b) ).
¶ 10 In its application, CRE 606(b) "strongly disfavors any juror testimony impeaching a verdict, even on grounds such as mistake, misunderstanding of the law or facts, failure to follow instructions, lack of unanimity, or application of the wrong legal standard." Harlan , 109 P.3d at 624. CRE 606(b) ’s exclusionary principle is broad and "in terms of subject, ... reaches everything which relates to the jury’s deliberations, unless one of the exceptions applies." Stewart v. Rice , 47 P.3d 316, 321 (Colo. 2002) (). The rule "has three fundamental purposes: to promote finality of verdicts, shield verdicts from impeachment, and protect jurors from harassment and coercion." Stewart , 47 P.3d at 322.
¶ 11 CRE 606(b) does not preclude jurors from discussing their service after the fact, "including their deliberations, how they viewed the evidence and reached their verdict, and how they view the intent and meaning of their verdict." Id. at 325. "[N]one of this," however, "can become evidence unless one or both of the CRE 606(b) exceptions apply to the case." Id. (). Although "[a]ttorneys may benefit from learning how the jurors viewed their case," they "may not make jurors witnesses except under the provisions of 606(b)." Id. To do so "requires a proper showing that the juror testimony, affidavit, or statement is admissible under the rule’s exceptions." Id.
¶ 12 The issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in relying on the unsworn post-trial statements of an anonymous juror to grant Burke a new trial. We conclude that it did.
¶ 13 Burke advances three arguments on appeal as to why the trial court did not err. First, she argues that the trial court correctly found that CRE 606(b) did not apply to the anonymous juror’s statement. Second, she argues that the trial court’s order granting her a new trial should be affirmed because the juror’s statement establishes that the juror concealed a bias during voir dire. Third, she argues that, even assuming CRE 606(b) applies, we should recognize a constitutional exception to the rule where, as here, the juror demonstrates a bias against the defendant based on her exercise of a constitutional right.
¶ 14 We conclude that CRE 606(b) precluded the trial court from relying on the anonymous juror’s statement to grant Burke a new trial. We further conclude that a new constitutional exception to CRE 606(b) is not warranted. We address each of Burke’s arguments, in turn, below.
¶ 15 In opposing Burke’s motion for a new trial, the prosecution relied on People v. Collins , 730 P.2d 293 (Colo. 1986), for the proposition that juror affidavits may be used to impeach a criminal verdict only if there have been external influences on the jury or juror misconduct. In Collins , the defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion for a new trial after his conviction for first degree assault and crime of violence. Id. at 295. In his motion, the defendant had relied on juror affidavits alleging that at least five jurors had "misunderstood or failed to follow" the trial court’s instruction that their verdict must be unanimous. Id. at 302.
¶ 16 On appeal, the defendant argued that the jurors' failure to follow the court’s unanimity instruction constituted jury misconduct that rendered the verdict invalid. Id. Our supreme court disagreed and affirmed the conviction. Id. It held that the juror affidavits on which the defendant relied in seeking a new trial were inadmissible under CRE 606(b) because "[a] juror may not testify as to the wrong exercise of his judgment or his confusion on the law or the facts or his misunderstandings." Id. at 301-02.
¶ 17 Distinguishing Collins , the trial court found the anonymous juror’s statement in this case established that "a juror clearly disregarded the law they were instructed to follow—not that they didn't understand the law." Finding that...
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...the line," and thus the juror affidavit was inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 606(b). Id. ; see also People v. Burke , 2018 COA 166, ¶ 23, 452 P.3d 124 (applying Tanner and Warger to conclude that an affidavit alleging a juror deliberately concealed bias during voir dire was inadmissible und......