People v. Burn

Decision Date25 March 1982
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Elizabeth H. BURN, Defendant.
CourtNew York Justice Court

HERMAN H. TIETJEN, Justice.

Defendant was issued a Uniform Traffic Summons for violation of Vehicle & Traffic Law Sec. 319(1), no insurance in addition to two other summonses. At the trial, the arresting officer testified that while on routine patrol on October 1, 1981, he saw a vehicle traveling south on NY Route 9 in the Town of Rhinebeck. He saw that the vehicle lacked a current inspection sticker. The vehicle was stopped and the driver was asked to produce her registration and insurance card. Defendant could not produce either a current registration or insurance card as requested by the Trooper. The arresting officer then testified as follows: "When I asked the defendant for the insurance card she said 'she had none.' Then I asked her whether she had no card or no insurance." Defendant's attorney objected to the admission of the last statement on the ground that the People failed to comply with CPL 710.30 in disclosing oral admissions the defendant had made to the public servant. In addition he also objected on the grounds that the Trooper should have given defendant the required warning pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). He claimed that stopping of the motor vehicle resulted in depriving the defendant of her freedom of action, cf., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).

This case presents two questions for determination: First, whether a person who is stopped for a routine motor vehicle check must be given a Miranda warning before the arresting officer may testify to an answer given to him in connection with his request of the driver's vehicle documents and second, whether defendant's admission that she had no insurance must be excluded for failure of the people to comply with the requirements of CPL 710.30?

United States Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse, supra, held that the police must have an "articulable and reasonable suspicion" that a law has been violated by a motorist before he can be stopped at random. New York's courts came to this conclusion in People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67, 330 N.E.2d 39 (1975). In the instant case, the Trooper testified that he observed that the defendant had an expired inspection sticker on her windshield and this expressed an "articulable and reasonable suspicion" that there was a violation of the Vehicle & Traffic Law.

The arresting officer requested the driver's registration and insurance card. This evidentiary material does not call for any personal statement on the part of the defendant. The courts of this state, applying Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) have held that Miranda does not protect the use of physical evidence such as sobriety tests against a motorist without first giving a warning, see People v. Rosenthal, 87 Misc.2d 186, 384 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Dist.Ct.Nassau Co., 1976); People v. Kates, 53 N.Y.2d 591, 441 N.Y.S.2d 442, 424 N.E.2d 276 (1981) and People v. Thomas, 46 N.Y.2d 100, 412 N.Y.S.2d 845, 385 N.E.2d 584 (1979).

Requesting a driver, therefore, to produce his registration and insurance card does not violate Miranda, cf., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). In Brignoni-Ponce the Court sanctioned limited questioning by the officer of the driver and occupants of the vehicle in order to determine their citizenship and immigration status "and he may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances", at 882, 95 S.Ct. 2580. The Court deemed a "valid public interest" to exist in determining the citizenship of persons near the United States Border. The analogy of the foregoing can be applied to an officer's questioning concerning whether a driver has insurance. New York has a "valid public interest" in resident motorists using its highways to have financial security in force, cf., Olivio v. Govt. Employees Ins., 46 A.D.2d 437, 362 N.Y.S.2d 873 (2nd Dept. 1975), Vehicle & Traffic Law Sec. 310(2).

New York's courts, stating other reasons, have held that Miranda does not apply to Vehicle & Traffic Infractions. In People v. Bliss, 53 Misc.2d 472, 278 N.Y.S.2d 732 (County Ct., Alleghany Co., 1967) it was held that Miranda did not apply to a vehicle and traffic infraction since a person is not accused of a crime and all traditional constitutional safeguards were not meant to apply, see also People v. Bailey, 60 Misc.2d 283, 302 N.Y.S.2d 874 (County Ct., Fulton Co., 1969), People v. Phinney, 22 N.Y.2d 288, 292 N.Y.S.2d 632, 239 N.E.2d 515 (1968). In Phinney the issue whether Miranda applied to a vehicle and traffic infraction was presented to the Court of Appeals. The court sidestepped the Miranda issue holding that a traffic infraction "is not a crime", and all constitutional protections normally offered to criminal defendants should not apply, while on the other hand the rules governing criminal law do apply in vehicle and traffic trials. "Whether or not this includes the right to a warning under Miranda is, however, a question which we need not decide in the present case, since under no view of the facts may it be said that this defendant was in the custody of the authorities at the time he made his statement". The court went on to say that a person not actually placed under "arrest" is not deemed in custody when questioned by the police unless "the questioning takes place under circumstances which are likely to affect substantially the individual's will to resist and compel him to speak when he would not otherwise do so freely", People v. Phinney, supra, 22 N.Y.2d at 291, 292 N.Y.S.2d 632, 239 N.E.2d 515. In Phinney the police officer's questioning took place in a hospital and not on the open road. The court felt that this was not in a police dominated atmosphere. Phinney was also decided prior to enactment of CPL 710.30.

In the recent decision of Robart v. Post-Standard, 74 A.D.2d 963, 425 N.Y.S.2d 891, aff'd 52 N.Y.2d 843, 437 N.Y.S.2d 71, 418 N.E.2d 664 (1981) the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the fact that the issuance of a traffic summons does not constitute an arrest see also Farkas v. State of New York, 96 Misc.2d 784, 409 N.Y.S.2d 696 (Court of Claims, 1978). Since the defendant was not under "arrest" when she received the traffic summons and there was...

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