People v. Burnham

Decision Date01 June 1922
Citation35 Idaho 522,207 P. 589
PartiesTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, on the Relation of MILTON A. BROWN, Prosecuting Attorney of Custer County, upon the Complaint of JENNIE E. KELLEHER, Respondent, v. MARGARET BURNHAM, Appellant
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

USURPATION OF OFFICE-RIGHT OF JURY TRIAL.

In an action for usurpation of office under C. S., sec. 7024, a defendant has no right to have the title to such office determined by a jury.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, for Custer County. Hon. F. J. Cowen, Judge.

Action for usurpation of office. From judgment for plaintiff defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed, with costs to respondent.

W. W Adamson, for Appellant.

This action is in the nature of a criminal action and defendant is entitled to a trial by jury. (People ex rel. Gorman v Havird, 2 Idaho 531, 25 P. 294, 10 L. R. A. 831; People ex rel. Warfield v. Sutter St. Ry., 129 Cal. 545, 79 Am. St. 137, 62 P. 104.)

The right of trial by jury, as provided for under art. 1, sec. 7, of our constitution, "Secures the right as it existed at the date of the adoption of the constitution." (Christensen v. Hollingsworth, 6 Idaho 87, 96 Am. St. 256, 53 P. 211; Shields v. Johnson, 10 Idaho 476, 3 Ann. Cas. 245, 79 P. 391.)

Milton A. Brown, Chase A. Clark, W. A. Broadhead and Solon B. Clark, for Respondent.

A defendant in proceedings such as these is entitled to a trial by jury. This constitutional right exists only where there are questions of fact raised. (Buckman v. State ex rel. Spencer, 34 Fla. 48, 15 So. 697, 24 L. R. A. 806; People v. Kadletz, 30 Idaho 698, 167 P. 1161.)

Judgment in this case was rendered notwithstanding the verdict, which proceeding has been a recognized and regular course of procedure for trial courts when verdicts contrary to the law such as the one in this case are rendered, and constitutes the only proper action which a trial court can take to dispense real justice between the parties. (Baxter v. Covenant Mutual Life Assn., 81 Minn. 1, 83 N.W. 459; Welch v. Northern P. Ry. Co., 14 N.D. 19, 103 N.W. 396; Sheehy v. Duffy, 89 Wis. 6, 61 N.W. 295; Plano Mfg. Co. v. Richards, 86 Minn. 94, 90 N.W. 120.)

DUNN, J. Rice, C. J., and Budge, McCarthy and Lee, JJ., concur.

OPINION

DUNN, J.

This action was brought by the prosecuting attorney of Custer county for the purpose of trying the title of appellant to the office of superintendent of public instruction of said county. The complaint alleged that appellant "was not eligible to said office at the time of her nomination or election; that she did not at said time or times hold a state or state life certificate and was not a teacher of not less than two years' actual experience and service in the schools of Idaho, one of which years' experience being while holding a valid certificate of a grade not lower than a state certificate."

Appellant denied this charge of ineligibility and the case was tried before a jury. Appellant offered in evidence in her behalf her certificate entitled "Specialist's State Certificate," which entitled her to teach primary grades in the public schools of Idaho for a period of eight years. The jury returned a verdict in favor of appellant. This verdict was clearly contrary to the law as given by the court in its instructions and contrary to the evidence. One or the other of the state certificates mentioned in the complaint was required to qualify appellant for the office. (People v. Kadletz, 30 Idaho 698, 167 P. 1161.) Thereupon the court set aside the verdict of the jury, made findings of fact in which it set out all the proceedings up to and including the verdict of the jury, and found that appellant was not qualified to hold the office of county superintendent of public instruction for the reason that she was not at the time of her nomination and election a holder of a state or state life certificate as provided by law. Thereupon judgment was entered that appellant unlawfully held the office of county superintendent of public instruction in and for Custer county, Idaho, and that she be excluded therefrom and said office declared to be vacant. Appeal was taken from said judgment.

The second assignment of error made by appellant is that "the court erred in vacating and setting aside the verdict of the jury and entering judgment for relator, thus denying the defendant the right of a trial by jury."

This action was brought under C. S., sec. 7024, which authorizes the prosecuting attorney to bring such an action "in the name of the people of the state against any person who usurps, intrudes into, holds or exercises any office or franchise, real or pretended, within this state, without authority of law." The procedure provided for by this section and several succeeding ones was enacted in substance by the first territorial legislature of Idaho, as part of the civil practice act, which was entitled, "An act to regulate proceedings in civil cases in the courts of justice of the territory of Idaho." Said provisions of this territorial act have been carried down from that date to the present with no changes that affect the merits of this controversy. The original act provided that the action should be brought by the district attorney in the name of the people of the United States and of the territory of Idaho upon his own information or upon the complaint of a private party. (First Ter. Sess. Acts, p. 138.) In 1875 the legislature amended this law slightly and enacted that "the writ of scire facias, the writ of quo warranto and proceedings by information in the nature of quo warranto are abolished. The remedies obtainable in these forms may hereafter be obtained by civil actions under the provisions of this chapter," which was the chapter dealing with actions for the usurpation of office or franchise. (Eighth Ter. Sess. Acts, 157, sec. 333.)

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17 cases
  • State v. Bennion
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
    • 18 Diciembre 1986
    ...Court carved out a narrow exception to allow courts "to punish summarily for contempt." Id. at 222, 128 P. at 965. In People v. Burnham, 35 Idaho 522, 207 P. 589 (1922), the state had brought an action against a school teacher "under C.S., sec. 7024, which authorizes the prosecuting attorne......
  • State v. Creech
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
    • 23 Mayo 1983
    ...as a deft display of judicial sleight-of-hand, the Sivak author cites for the proposition so stated by him the case of People v. Burnham, 35 Idaho 522, 207 P. 589 (1922). 1 Contrary to indications, this was not a criminal case, but a statutory action to remove a civil officer--which the cou......
  • Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
    • 30 Agosto 1999
    ...jury has been interpreted to secure that right as it existed at common law when the Idaho Constitution was adopted. See People v. Burnham, 35 Idaho 522, 207 P. 589 (1922); Christensen v. Hollingsworth, 6 Idaho 87, 53 P. 211 (1898). However, the right of trial by jury is strictly enforceable......
  • Ross v. Coleman Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
    • 27 Julio 1988
    ...to a jury trial on all fact issues raised in the case. See State v. Miles, 43 Idaho 46, 248 P. 442 (1926); People ex rel. Brown v. Burnham, 35 Idaho 522, 207 P. 589 (1922); Shields v. Johnson, 10 Idaho 476, 79 P. 391 (1904); Christensen v. Hollingsworth, 6 Idaho 87, 53 P. 211 (1898). "[T]he......
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