People v. Bush
| Decision Date | 22 December 1921 |
| Docket Number | No. 14102.,14102. |
| Citation | 300 Ill. 532,133 N.E. 201 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. BUSH. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Circuit Court, Saline County; William N. Butler, Judge.
John Bush was convicted of statutory rape, and he brings error.
Reversed and remanded.
Charles T. Flota and Fowler & Rumsey, all of Harrisburg, for plaintiff in error.
Edward J. Brundage, Atty. Gen., Charles H. Thompson, State's Atty., of Harrisburg, and James B. Searcy, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the People.
The plaintiff in error, John Bush, seeks to reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Saline county by which he was convicted of statutory rape and sentenced to imprisonmentin the penitentiary for ten years, on the grounds of the insufficiency of the evidence and error in the record.
The special grand jury which returned the indictment was ordered at the first day of the June term, 1920, which was the 14th day of the month. The venire was made returnable the next day. It is claimed that for this reason the grand jury was not legally impaneled. Section 19 of chapter 78 of the Revised Statutes authorizes the judge of the court to order a special venire for a grand jury whenever he shall be of opinion that public justice requires it. The section does not state when the venire shall be returnable, but only that it shall state the day on which the persons summoned shall appear. There was no defect in the special venire.
Objection is made to the indictment because it is said that Edwin Stricklin was sworn as foreman of the grand jury, but the indorsement on the back of the indictment is signed by Ed M. Stricklin as foreman of the grand jury. An examination of the recordshows that Ed M. Stricklin was summoned as a grand juror, was appointed foreman, and signed the indorsement on the back of the indictment, and the objection therefore is not sustained by the record.
The indictment consisted of three counts, the second of which was quashed because it failed to allege that the girl on whom the offense was alleged to have been committed was under the age of 16 years. It is contended that the third county should have been quashed for the same reason, but an examination of the third count shows that it does contain the allegation the omission of which is complained of.
Error is also assigned on the overruling of a motion by the defendant for a continuance, but this motion and the affidavits in support of it are not made a part of the bill of exceptions, and therefore we cannot consider them.
The 14 year old girl who was the alleged victim testified positively to the commission of the crime, and the defendant, with equal positiveness, denied his guilt. She was corroborated by circumstances testified to by another girl of about her own age, by the probation officer, and by an associate of the defendant in the taxicab business. She was impeached by numerous contradictory statements testified to by many witnesses which she admitted having made, including an affidavit in which she stated that she never did have sexual intercourse with the defendant, and that if she made oath before Ed M. Stricklin, a justice of the peace, that she did have intercourse with him, she did not know what she made oath to. The testimony was conflicting and the question on the evidence close. Since the judgment must be reversed for error in the record, no further comment will be made on the evidence.
Complaint is made of the conduct of the state's attorney. On the cross-examination of the defendant the state's attorney asked him these questions:
‘John, you made a specialty down at that garage of enticing little girls 10, 12, and 15 years old—in taking them out driving?’
‘This is not the first girl you done that way to, is it?’
‘Didn't you make the remark down at your garage when you was arrested in there why you didn't run around after women—that little 12 year old girls was your prey?’
An objection to each of these questions was sustained by the court. They were, of course, incompetent. It cannot be presumed that the state's attorney was so ignorant as not to know they were incompetent, and therefore his intention in asking the questions could have been no other than to take an unfair advantage of the defendant before the jury by an insinuation of facts which he knew he could not legally bring to the attention of the jury, but which he believed would prejudice the defendant on his trial.
Complaint is also made of other misconduct of the state's attorney as well as of the trial judge, but there is nothing in the record on which to base the complaint. The counsel on both sides have inserted in their briefs statementsof a number of things which are said to have been done and to have been proved on the trial of which the record contains no intimation. Of course, these statements cannot be considered in the disposition of the case, and the insertion of them in the briefs was improper.
Charles Leeper was a witness for the defendant, and it appeared that he was a surety on the defendant's recognizance. On cross-examination the witness was asked how many other bonds he had signed for the defendant, and over the defendant's objection answered that he had signed four. It was incompetent in this indirect way to prove that other criminal charges were pending against defendant, and it was error for the court to permit it.
Andy Jenkins, who was associated with the defendant in the taxicab business, was a witness for the people, and among other things said that he talked to Bush before he was arrested about Hazel Keneipp, the prosecuting witness, and was asked the question, ‘Tell the jury what you said to him.’ The abstract then continues as follows:
‘I said that—‘John,’ I says, I said he needs money; he work and stay close to busines and let these young girls alone. He said he was having a pretty good time. He said it was worth it. I said, ‘You are spending your time and losing money on the side.’ Said something to him about Hazel Keneipp. I said, ‘Let these young girls alone; take care of your business.’
‘Mr. H. R. Fowler: I move to exclude the answer. It is not responsive and does not involve any question between the prosecuting witness and the defendant.
‘The...
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State v. Phillips, 509
...of specific acts of misconduct which he knew he could not bring to their attention by legally admissible evidence. People v. Bush, 300 Ill. 532, 133 N.E. 201; Fry v. State, 91 Okl.Cr. 326, 218 P.2d 643. Any one experienced in court room psychology knows that where a prosecuting attorney per......
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State v. Sorrentino
... ... Watson v. Com., 119 S.W. 288; State v ... Teeter, 144 S.W. 447; Little v. State, 105 S.E ... 359; Martin v. Com., 245 S.W. 869; People v ... Watson, 133 P. 298; People v. Harris (Mich.) ... 182 N.W. 673; Baldwin v. State, (Okla.) 144 P. 634; ... People v. Gengels, (Mich.) 188 N.W. 398; People ... v. Bush, (Ill.) 133 N.E. 201; the court erred in the ... admission of evidence procured by an unlawful search of ... defendant's premises, Peterson v ... ...
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People v. Hicks
...This prejudicial error is not cured by the trial judge's sustaining objections to the improper cross-examination. People v. Bush, 300 Ill. 532, 133 N.E. 201; People v. Decker, 310 Ill. 234, 141 N.E. 710; People v. Harges, 87 Ill.App.2d 376, 231 N.E.2d 650; and People v. Ring, 89 Ill.App.2d ......
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People v. Cook, 60501
...objection to its materiality was sustained by the trial court. The witness answered none of the questions. Unlike People v. Bush (1921), 300 Ill. 532, 133 N.E.2d 201, cited by defendant, these questions were not so obviously incompetent as to give rise to the conclusion that they were posed......