People v. Butler, 47933

Citation64 Ill.2d 485,1 Ill.Dec. 204,356 N.E.2d 330
Decision Date20 September 1976
Docket NumberNo. 47933,47933
Parties, 1 Ill.Dec. 204 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Richard BUTLER, Appellee.
CourtSupreme Court of Illinois

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Robert H. Rice, State's Atty., Belleville (James B. Zagel, Jayne A. Carr, and Anne Taylor, Asst. Attys. Gen., and Robert L. Craig, Asst. State's Atty., of counsel), for the People.

Richard J. Wilson, Deputy State Appellate Defender, and Richard E. Cunningham, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for appellee.

SCHAEFER, Justice.

A jury in the circuit court of St. Clair County found the defendant, Richard Butler, guilty of the armed robberies of Max Wilson and Lloyd Hall, and he received concurrent sentences of 8 to 15 years on each conviction. The Appellate Court, Fifth District, with one justice dissenting, reversed the conviction and sentence for the armed robbery of Hall. The appellate court affirmed the conviction for the armed robbery of Wilson, but remanded for resentencing. (31 Ill.App.3d 433, 334 N.E.2d 831.) We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal.

The two victims of the robbery drove in Wilson's car to East St. Louis in search of a tavern where they understood they could pick up women. They saw the defendant and Joe Smith standing on a street corner, and stopped to ask directions to the tavern. Smith drew a revolver and the defendant pulled out a steak knife, and Wilson and Hall were ordered out of the car. The four were standing within arm's length of one another as the defendant robbed Wilson of four dollar bills and some change, and Smith robbed Hall of a five dollar bill. Wilson and Hall were then told to get out of the area. They drove a couple of blocks, encountered a police car and directed the two officers to the scene of the robberies, where the defendant and Smith were still standing. When one of the officers emerged from the squad car with his gun drawn, Smith ran. The defendant did not, and the other officer arrested him and found a steak knife in his pocket. Smith was shot when he turned and pointed a shiny object at the pursuing officer. A .38-caliber revolver found a few feet from Smith's dead body was identified at trial by the victims as the one used during the robberies. The money allegedly stolen was never recovered, but when the victim Hall returned to the scene, he picked up credit cards which he testified Smith had thrown to the ground in the course of searching his wallet for money. Both victims positively identified the defendant at trial.

The appellate court reversed the defendant's conviction for the armed robbery of Hall on the ground 'that the two armed robberies arose from but one alleged course of conduct stemming from one intent or motivation. Defendant at the time of the commission of the crime had one intent and that was to commit armed robbery. This intent was carried out by his committing the crime of armed robbery. The victim's testimony that each robber actually took money from only one victim does not constitute a substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective. Neither does charging the defendant both as a principal and as an accomplice change the criminal objective.' 31 Ill.App.3d at 435, 334 N.E.2d at 833.

The majority of the appellate court felt that this result was compelled by our decision in People v. Williams (1975), 60 Ill.2d 1, 322 N.E.2d 819. There Williams and an accomplice had entered a home intending to commit robbery. In the course of the robbery one of the occupants was murdered. The defendant was convicted of burglary, armed robbery and murder, and was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 10 to 20 years for the burglary and 20 to 40 years for the armed robbery. He was also sentenced to a consecutive term of 75 to 100 years for the murder. He contended that only his conviction for the most serious offense, murder, could stand. We affirmed the convictions for murder and armed robbery but reversed the conviction for burglary on the ground that the burglary and armed robbery arose from the same conduct and motivation. There was a single charge of armed robbery in the Williams case, and the legal consequences of robberies of multiple victims were neither involved nor discussed. Nothing said in our opinion in that case bears upon the issue involved in the present case.

A case that does closely resemble the present one is People v. Prim (1972), 53 Ill.2d 62, 289 N.E.2d 601, Cert. denied (1973), 412 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 2731, 37 L.Ed.2d 144. Separate convictions and concurrent sentences for each armed robbery had been imposed in that case upon a defendant who was one of several men found guilty of robbing three persons aboard a Chicago Transit Authority bus. The defendant contended that 'since his sole act was taking money from the bus driver, multiple sentences should not have been imposed.' (53 Ill.2d at 77, 289 N.E.2d at 610.) The court rejected that contention, saying:

'The armed robbery of the bus driver, of William Giersz and of Ermelindo Maldonado were three separate and distinct crimes committed by different persons or the same person at different times. * * * Separate criminal acts were involved in each case and the court properly imposed separate though concurrent sentences for each offense. People v. Raby, 40 Ill.2d 392, 240 N.E.2d 595.' 53 Ill.2d at 78, 289 N.E.2d at 610.

Because the defendant and his companion each devoted his primary attention during the robbery to a different victim, it does not follow that each was not guilty of both robberies. The crime of robbery is defined as follows:

'A person commits robbery when he takes property from the person or presence of another by the use of force of by threatening the imminent use of force.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 38, par. 18--1(a).)

Neither the threat posed by the defendant's knife nor the threat posed by his companion's gun was confined to a single person. Both robbers mounted a concerted threat of the use of force against both victims,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
74 cases
  • People v. Jones
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 21 december 1995
    ... ... 59, 431 N.E.2d 344; People v. Gleckler (1980), 82 Ill.2d 145, 162, 44 Ill.Dec. 483, 411 N.E.2d 849; People v. Lykins (1979), 77 Ill.2d 35, 40, 31 Ill.Dec. 805, 394 N.E.2d 1182; People v. Lambrechts (1977), 69 Ill.2d 544, 559, 14 Ill.Dec. 445, 372 N.E.2d 641; People v. Butler (1976), 64 Ill.2d 485, 490, 1 Ill.Dec. 204, 356 N.E.2d 330; People v. Hayes (1972), 52 Ill.2d 170, 172, 287 N.E.2d 465; People v. Eubank (1970), 46 Ill.2d 383, 394, 263 N.E.2d 869; People v. Nelson (1968), 41 Ill.2d 364, 368, 243 N.E.2d 225; People v. Caldwell (1968), 39 Ill.2d 346, 355-56, 236 ... ...
  • People v. Turner, 1-89-3000
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 10 december 1992
    ...to be imposed than is a court of review. Perruquet, 68 Ill.2d at 154, 11 Ill.Dec. 274, 368 N.E.2d 882; People v. Butler (1976), 64 Ill.2d 485, 490, 1 Ill.Dec. 204, 356 N.E.2d A reasoned judgment as to a proper sentence must be based upon the particular facts and circumstances of each indivi......
  • People v. Pryor
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 22 maart 2007
    ... ... Our supreme court long ago distinguished King, explaining that crimes committed against separate victims constitute separate criminal acts. People v. Thomas, 67 Ill.2d 388, 389-90, 10 Ill.Dec. 515, 367 N.E.2d 1281 (1977), citing People v. Butler, 64 Ill.2d 485, 1 Ill.Dec. 204, 356 N.E.2d 330 (1976). Where a single act injures multiple victims, the consequences affect, separately, each person injured. Thus, there is a corresponding number of distinct offenses for which a defendant may be convicted. People v. Gard, 236 Ill.App.3d 1001, ... ...
  • People v. Shum
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 2 april 1987
    ... ... 891, 363 N.E.2d 838.) In the instant cause of action there were two distinct victims of the defendant's single action, Gwendolyn Whipple and her unborn child. In Illinois it is well settled that separate victims require separate convictions and sentences. People v. Butler (1976), 64 Ill.2d 485, 488-89, 1 Ill.Dec. 204, 356 N.E.2d 330 ... Page 1202 ...         [111 Ill.Dec. 565] In addition, the crime of feticide is not a lesser included offense of murder. "In order to be classified as a lesser included offense, 'all the elements of the lesser must be ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT