People v. Butterfield
| Decision Date | 02 February 1968 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 416 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert BUTTERFIELD, Defendant and Appellant. |
Defendant, a 19-year old boy, was convicted of oral copulation in violation of Penal Code section 288a. The jury, by a special verdict, also found that the crime was accomplished by means of force and violence, thereby invoking the mandatory 3-year prison sentence prescribed by section 288a. The court denied defendant's application for probation and committed him to the California Youth Authority for the term prescribed by law. Defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction.
About 10:30 p.m. on the evening of June 14, 1966, prosecutrix left her home with a date who took her to a beach at Brannan Island State Park arriving around 11:30 p.m. Shortly thereafter several carloads of boys also arrived at the park. The boys commenced to drink. The prosecutrix then tried to get her date to take her home, but he refused. Later the prosecutrix returned to her date's car where several of the young men accosted her and made improper advances. When she tried to run away the boys threw her to the beach and ripped her clothes off. Then between five and ten of the boys began to sexually assault her; some took turns raping her and some forced their penes into her mouth.
During this outrageous sexual onslaught prosecutrix' protests were ignored and she was warned to cooperate; otherwise, she would be thrown in the river. The victim returned to her home at about 4:45 a.m. of the following morning. Her mother was awake at that hour and heard her daughter moaning and screaming as she ran across the street toward the house. She was hysterical when she entered her home, her brassiere was gone, her pants torn and she was carrying one remaining shoe. Sand was in her hair, eyes and mouth. There was a bruise visible over one eye and a scratch on her neck. A subsequent medical examination at the hospital disclosed bruises on the victim's left breast, left portion of her abdomen and above one eye. Sand and mud were also found along the entire length of her vaginal tract.
Afterwards the victim along with her mother and stepfather returned to the scene where they met an officer from the Sacramento Sheriff's Office. There they recovered numerous items of the victim's clothing from the previous night.
At the trial the victim could not identify defendant as one of the boys who had so brutally assaulted her. However, a witness, Danny Williams, testified that he saw appellant force his penis into the victim's mouth. He stated that he attempted to intervene but decided against further interference because of fear of what would happen to him if he persisted. Williams testified that after he left the area he heard the victim scream. Defendant took the stand and admitted that he knowingly and wilfully placed his penis in the victim's mouth. His defense was based entirely on the theory that the victim was actually a willing participant.
Defendant contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it admitted into evidence the statements which he made to Inspector Stanley E. Kirkman of the Sacramento County Sheriff's Office at defendant's home approximately 10 days after the crime was committed. Inspector Kirkman and his companion, Sergeant Davis, were invited into the house by defendant's mother after they had identified themselves as police officers. Kirkman advised Mrs. Butterfield that he wanted to talk to defendant alone and suggested that the interview take place in the kitchen where he could use the kitchen table to take notes. Mrs. Butterfield sought to participate in the interview but then acquiesced when Kirkman told her that he did not have to talk to defendant in her presence since defendant was over 18 years of age. Defendant's mother retired to the living room where she remained throughout the interview which lasted approximately 15 minutes. The door between the kitchen and the living room remained open.
After Mrs. Butterfield left the room Kirkman informed defendant that he was a suspect in a rape and perversion case. He also purported to advise defendant of his constitutional rights as follows:
Defendant stated that he understood his rights and that he was willing to discuss the matter with the officers. After first denying any involvement, defendant admitted that he had the prosecutrix orally copulate him but insisted that it was voluntary.
It is clear that when the officers talked to defendant at his home the investigation was no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but had focused on defendant as a suspect. It is also clear that Inspector Kirkman did not advise defendant of his constitutional rights according to the precise requirements specified by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. The officers called at defendant's home only a few days after the Miranda decision; consequently, no one told defendant that he was entitled to the presence of a lawyer during the interview. However, we nevertheless conclude that the officers did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights. The interrogation was not custodial in the sense visualized by the United States Supreme Court in the Miranda decision, nor was it conducted under circumstances fraught with the dangers that the court was seeking to eliminate. Significantly, when the court discussed the privilege against self-incrimination in Miranda, it declared:
(384 U.S. 461, 86 S.Ct. 1620.)
When the officers called at defendant's home they were not armed with warrants nor did they give any indication that an arrest was imminent or contemplated. The officers interviewed the defendant in the friendly and familiar environs of his own home with his mother seated only 15 feet away. Although Officer Kirkman asked her to leave the room, it is reasonable to believe that he made the request in deference to her feelings since the subject matter was obviously distasteful. Moreover, the kitchen door remained open at all times and neither of the officers used compulsion, threats or trickery to make the defendant talk. To the contrary, Officer Kirkman immediately informed defendant that he was a suspect in a rape and perversion case and that he could remain silent, that anything he said could be used against him, and that he was entitled to the services of a lawyer retained or appointed by the County of Sacramento. In addition, Inspector Kirkman testified that he did not contemplate arresting the defendant, or keeping him from leaving if he had chosen to remain silent, not even if he told the officers to 'go to Hell.' This testimony is corroborated by the fact that the officers did not arrest defendant at that time even though he admitted complicity in the crime. Thus, there was substantial evidence for the trial court to find that defendant was not in actual custody at the time of the questioning and that no admonition of any kind was necessary. And the trial court's finding in this respect was not palpably erroneous.
It is of course settled, in this state at least, that custodial interrogation occurs not only when a person is in fact deprived of his freedom in any significant way, but also when he is led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is so deprived (People v. Arnold, 66 A.C. 449, 58 Cal.Rptr. 115, 426 P.2d 515). Thus it is arguable and even conceivable, as defendant asserts, that defendant believed he was in custody and compelled to answer the questions which the officers asked. In fact, defendant points to his youth, the fact that he cried during the interview, and to the exclusion of his mother from the kitchen, as conclusive evidence that this was so.
We do not believe that the trial court was compelled to find, as a matter of law, that defendant was led by the officers into believing that he was in custody and, hence, that the interrogation was custodial in that sense. Defendant did not testify or even assert during the trial that he believed that he was compelled to answer the officers' questions or that he was not free to terminate the interview at any time. To the contrary, the record indicates that, although both sides argued that the determination of custody rested upon the subjective...
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...431 P.2d 691 (1967) (suspect's friends); Stout v. State, 244 Ark. 676, 426 S.W.2d 800 (1968) (suspect's wife); People v. Butterfield, 258 Cal.App.2d 586, 65 Cal.Rptr. 765 (1968) (suspect's mother); State v. Davis, 261 Iowa 1351, 157 N.W.2d 907 (1968) (doctor and nurses); People v. Allen, 28......
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...justified in concluding that defendant was not actually in custody until later in the investigation. 4 (Cf. People v. Butterfield (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 586, 590, 65 Cal.Rptr. 765.) Defendant next contends the police lacked probable cause to arrest him at the time they informed him he was un......
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