People v. Byrd
| Decision Date | 07 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-14-0715,2-14-0715 |
| Citation | 2017 IL App (2d) 140715,77 N.E.3d 719 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Franklin T. BYRD, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Michael J. Pelletier, Thomas A. Lilien, and Ronald C. White, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Elgin, for appellant.
Joseph P. Bruscato, State's Attorney, of Rockford (Lawrence M. Bauer and Diane L. Campbell, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.
¶ 1 Defendant, Franklin T. Byrd, appeals from the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County sentencing him to an aggregate prison term of 86 years on his convictions of intentional first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2008)) and armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(4) (West 2008)). He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to seat a potential juror as a remedy for a violation of Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and in imposing the sentence. Because the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to seat the juror or in imposing the sentence, we affirm.
¶ 3 During jury selection, the State exercised peremptory challenges on three African-American potential jurors (Nos. 1, 21, and 22). Following the challenges, defendant requested a hearing pursuant to Batson .
¶ 4 At the outset of the hearing, in chambers, the State noted that jurors 21 and 22 had not been excused and were still in the courtroom. The trial court responded that going into the courtroom to excuse the two jurors would draw unnecessary attention. Because juror 1 had been peremptorily challenged earlier that day, the court had already excused juror 1.
¶ 5 The trial court ruled that defendant did not make a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination as to either juror 1 or juror 22. As to juror 21, however, the court found that defendant made a prima facie case.
¶ 6 The State then offered its race-neutral explanation for challenging juror 21, stating that the juror's brother had been arrested for a drug crime and the juror had visited him in jail. The State maintained that the juror would closely identify with defendant's sister, who had visited defendant in jail. The State added that, when it questioned juror 21, she appeared to be defensive, in that she "had her brows knitted" and "had her arms crossed" in reaction to being asked whether the criminal justice system had been fair to her brother.
¶ 7 Before the trial court ruled regarding juror 21, the State commented that "there's no remedy [for] a Batson violation." When the court asked defense counsel if she had any response to the State's comment, she responded only that she "[thought] the Court [had] the ultimate discretion whether or not to allow the State to use a peremptory challenge to ensure someone a fair trial."
¶ 8 Before ruling on the Batson issue, the trial court gave all of the potential jurors a 15-minute break. After the jurors returned to the courtroom, the court excused jurors 21 and 22. Defendant did not object to the court excusing juror 21.
¶ 9 Upon returning to chambers, the trial court stated that it was rejecting the State's race-neutral explanation for challenging juror 21 and found a Batson violation. In doing so, the court noted that it did not observe juror 21 cross her arms or be antagonistic or hostile toward the State. The court added that, although juror 21 might not have completely understood the State's questions, the court did not interpret that as animus or hostility.
¶ 10 The State then stated that it misspoke when it earlier told the court that there was no remedy for a Batson violation. The State explained that it had found an Illinois case that stated that when there is a Batson violation "the proper remedy would be to impanel the juror." When the court asked defense counsel to respond, she stated that the State had accepted white jurors whom she had seen crossing their arms and "[t]hat's the only other thing [she would] add."
¶ 11 The trial court then discharged the entire jury pool. Defendant did not object or request that juror 21 be seated. The court then stated that it had "declared a mistrial without prejudice." After ruling on various motions in limine and other matters, the court asked defense counsel if she had anything else, and she responded no.
¶ 12 The following morning, the trial court reminded the parties that it had discharged the previous jury pool and declared a mistrial and that a new jury pool was ready. The court then noted that defendant had just handed it a motion to seat juror 21. In support of the motion, defense counsel asked that the jury commission be directed to recall juror 21 so that she could be seated. When asked for any authority for doing so, defense counsel referred to Batson . She added that the State had misinformed the court that it was not allowed to reinstate juror 21 and then, only after the court had excused the juror, the State had advised the court that it could seat her.
¶ 13 The State responded that defendant never objected when the court declared the mistrial. The State urged that, because defendant had essentially acquiesced in the mistrial, it was too late for him to object. The State noted that, when the court asked defense counsel if she wanted to say anything about the appropriate remedies for a Batson violation, she did not respond. The State added that one of the possible remedies was to discharge the jury pool.
¶ 14 The trial court denied defendant's motion to seat juror 21. In doing so, the court stated that, if defendant could provide any authority for seating juror 21, it would reconsider its decision. The record does not indicate that defendant ever did so.
¶ 15 After the trial court denied the motion to seat juror 21, defendant immediately moved to dismiss the case, contending that the Batson violation, combined with the State's misrepresentation regarding the lack of potential remedies for that violation, resulted in the denial of his right to have a fair representation of his race on the jury. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
¶ 16 Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty but mentally ill of intentional first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2008)), guilty but mentally ill of felony (armed robbery) first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3), 18-2(a)(4) (West 2008)), and guilty but mentally ill of armed robbery involving the discharge of a firearm that caused death (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(4) (West 2008)), all arising out of the shooting death of his mother. The jury also found that, in committing first-degree murder, defendant discharged a firearm that caused death (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2008)), the murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty (720 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(b) (West 2008)), and the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme, or design to take a human life (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 2008)). The trial court entered judgment on the intentional-murder and armed-robbery convictions and vacated the felony-murder conviction.
¶ 17 At sentencing, the court stated that it had considered the trial evidence, the presentence investigation report, defendant's history, character, and attitude, the arguments, defendant's allocution, the victim-impact statement, the statutory factors, and the circumstances of the offense. The court noted that it had considered all relevant aggravating and mitigating factors and stated that it would comment on some of those. In discussing the mitigating factors, the court found, based on defendant's demeanor, attitude, sincerity, remorse, and behavior after returning from treatment with the Department of Human Services, that defendant was on the road to rehabilitation and was unlikely to reoffend. Accordingly, the court gave weight to that factor. The court commented that it was very familiar with defendant's mental-health history and that it gave weight to defendant's being intellectually disabled.
¶ 18 Having balanced the mitigating factors with the seriousness of the offense, the trial court sentenced defendant to 30 years' imprisonment for intentional first-degree murder, plus the mandatory 25-year add-on penalty for defendant's having discharged a firearm causing death (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2008)). The court imposed a mandatory consecutive sentence for armed robbery of 6 years' imprisonment plus the mandatory 25-year add-on for the discharge of a firearm causing death during the armed robbery (see 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(4) (West 2008)). The court noted that, although it was authorized to impose an extended-term sentence, as a matter of discretion, it would not do so. Thus, the aggregate sentence totaled 86 years in prison.
¶ 19 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence. In denying that motion, the trial court reiterated that it had considered and given weight to defendant's mental illness. Defendant, in turn, filed a timely notice of appeal.
¶ 21 On appeal, defendant contends that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in discharging the first jury pool and refusing to seat juror 21 as a remedy for the Batson violation; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in entering judgment on the intentional-murder verdict, as opposed to the felony-murder verdict, because that opened the door to imposing the mandatory 25-year add-on for the armed-robbery conviction; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a 30-year prison sentence for first-degree murder.
¶ 22 We first address the Batson issue. It is well established that the State's use of a peremptory challenge to exclude a potential juror solely because of the...
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Byrd v. Kennedy
......Byrd did not file a brief or otherwise submit such authority to the court. Byrd appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred by declaring a mistrial rather than seating the potential juror. The state appellate court affirmed the trial court. See People v. Byrd, 77 N.E.3d 719 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2017). The Illinois Supreme Court denied Byrd's petition for leave to appeal on that issue. See People v. Byrd, 108 N.E.3d 832 (Ill. 2018). Byrd raises that issue again in his petition in this Court.Analysis When a state court has ......