People v. C.B. (In re C.B.)

• Decision Date: 30 August 2016
• Docket Number: A146277
• Citation: 2 Cal.App.5th 1112,206 Cal.Rptr.3d 785
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: IN RE C.B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. C.B., Defendant and Appellant.

2 Cal.App.5th 1112

206 Cal.Rptr.3d 785

IN RE C.B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.The People, Plaintiff and Respondent

v.C.B., Defendant and Appellant.

A146277

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

Filed August 30, 2016

Anne Mania, Alameda: By appointment of the Court of Appeal under the First District Appellate Project's independent-case system, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General; Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General; Jeffrey M. Laurence Senior, Assistant Attorney General; Donna M. Provenzano, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Aileen Bunney, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Jenkins, J.

This is an appeal from a juvenile court order denying a request by defendant C.B. (minor) to expunge his DNA samples from the state's database following the juvenile court's grant of his simultaneous request to redesignate his admitted felony offense as a misdemeanor. Minor brought these requests under Penal Code section 1170.18, a measure enacted following passage of Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, which reduced the classification of certain crimes from felony to misdemeanor.¹ According to minor, his DNA samples should be expunged because, had his offense been classified as a misdemeanor at the time he admitted committing it, the juvenile court would have, in the first instance, lacked authority to order him to submit the samples.

However, as explained below, Proposition 47 construed in conjunction with the DNA and Forensic Identification Data Base and Data Bank Act of 1998 (DNA Database Act), section 295 et seq., supports the juvenile court's decision to deny minor's expungement request in this case. Moreover, and confirming this conclusion, our Legislature recently enacted Assembly Bill No. 1492 (2015–2016 Reg. Sess.) (Bill No. 1492), which clarifies that, pursuant to section 299, a trial court is not authorized to order expungement of a defendant's DNA sample when granting relief under section 1170.18 to redesignate a felony offense as a misdemeanor. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court's order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 20, 2013, a petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging that minor committed second degree robbery in violation of sections 211 and 212.5 (count one), and first degree residential burglary in violation of sections 459 and 460, subdivision (a) (count two). This petition was amended on October 1, 2013, to add allegations that minor also committed felony grand theft from the person (§ 487, subd. (c)) (count three), and misdemeanor burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a)) (count four).² On the same date, minor admitted the amended allegations (counts three and four) and the remaining allegations (counts one and two) were dismissed.

On October 15, 2013, the juvenile court adjudged minor a ward of the court with no termination date, ordered his out-of-home placement and, among other things, ordered him to submit DNA samples for the state DNA database.

On July 6, 2015, minor filed a petition for relief under section 1170.18, requesting that his felony grand theft adjudication be redesignated as a misdemeanor, that the order requiring submission of DNA samples be vacated, and that his DNA samples be expunged from the state DNA database. Following a hearing, on July 21, 2015, the juvenile court granted minor's request to redesignate his felony offense as a misdemeanor, but denied his requests to vacate the order to submit DNA samples and to expunge his samples from the state DNA database. On September 14, 2015, minor filed a timely notice of appeal of this order.³

DISCUSSION

Minor raises one argument on appeal—to wit, that the juvenile court misconstrued Proposition 47 when finding that he was not entitled to have his DNA samples expunged from the state database after reclassifying his felony offense as a misdemeanor. The standard of review is not in dispute.

We review de novo questions of statutory or voter-initiative interpretation. (Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1212, 246 Cal.Rptr. 629, 753 P.2d 585 [rules of statutory interpretation apply to voter initiatives]; Argaman v. Ratan (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1176, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 917.) The fundamental rule of statutory (or voter-initiative) construction is that we must ascertain the intent of the drafters so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. (Preston v. State Bd. of Equalization (2001) 25 Cal.4th 197, 213, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 407, 19 P.3d 1148.) “To determine the intent of legislation, we first consult the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.” (DaFonte v. Up–Right, Inc . (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 601, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 238, 828 P.2d 140.) “We do not, however, consider the statutory language in isolation; rather, we look to the entire substance of the statutes in order to determine their scope and purposes. [Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question in context, keeping in mind the statutes' nature and obvious purposes. [Citation.] We must harmonize the various parts of the enactments by considering them in the context of the statutory frame work as a whole. [Citation.] If the statutory language is unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls. If, however, the language supports more than one reasonable construction, then we may look to extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history.” (People v. Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 975, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 261, 135 P.3d 669.)

In this case, minor contends proper interpretation of Proposition 47 requires a trial court to expunge DNA samples submitted by a criminal defendant (including a juvenile) whose offense is reclassified from a felony to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 1170.18. Proposition 47, as mentioned above, “ ‘reduces penalties for certain offenders convicted of nonserious and nonviolent property and drug crimes' and ‘allows certain offenders who have been previously convicted of such crimes to apply for reduced sentences.’ (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) analysis of Prop. 47 by Legis. Analyst, p. 35 (Ballot Pamphlet).) One of those ‘nonserious and nonviolent property and drug crimes' is shoplifting, so long as the value of the stolen property is less than $950. (See Ballot Pamphlet, supra , text of Prop. 47, § 5, p. 71.)” (In re J.C. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 731.) Minor, relying on a recent decision from the Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Alejandro N. v. Superior Court (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1209, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 907 (Alejandro ), contends the juvenile court was required under Proposition 47 to grant his request to expunge his DNA record because, once his crime was reclassified as a misdemeanor, it was no longer a “qualifying offense” for purposes of the DNA Database Act. (See § 296, subd. (a).)

The People, to the contrary, contend, first, that Alejandro was wrongly decided and, second, that, even if correctly decided when published, Alejandro is no longer good law because, in enacting Bill No. 1492, the Legislative made clear that section 1170.18, properly read, does not authorize a trial court to expunge a defendant's DNA sample when granting a petition to redesignate the qualifying offense from felony to misdemeanor. We agree with the People's latter point and, thus, need not directly address the wisdom of Alejandro.

Turning first to the relevant statutory framework, section 1170.18 provides a procedure by which persons, like minor, found to have committed a felony, yet “who would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under [Proposition 47]” had it been in effect at the time of their offense, may request redesignation of the offense from felony to misdemeanor. (§ 1170.18, subd. (a).) Relevant here, section 1170.18, subdivision (f), provides that a person who has “completed his or her sentence for a conviction, whether by trial or plea, of a felony or felonies who would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under this act had this act been in effect at the time of the offense, may file an application before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case to have the felony conviction or convictions designated as misdemeanors.” Further, where the section 1170.18 applicant has satisfied the criteria in subdivision (f), the trial court “shall designate the felony offense or offenses as a misdemeanor.” (§ 1170.18, subd. (g).)

There is no dispute in this case that minor satisfied the criteria in section 1170.18, subdivision (g), such that the juvenile court was required to (and did) redesignate his offense as a misdemeanor. The dispute, rather, centers around whether the juvenile court was required, in light of this redesignation, to order expungement of minor's DNA samples from the state database pursuant to section 299, the statute governing DNA record expungement. Part of the DNA Database Act, section 299 was amended in 2004 through passage of Proposition 69, the DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime and Innocence Protection Act, which “substantially expanded the range of persons who must submit DNA samples to the state's forensic identification databank.” (Good v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1498, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 125.) Persons qualifying under this Act for submission of DNA samples include: any person, including any juvenile, who is convicted of or pleads guilty or no contest to any felony offense, or is found not guilty by reason of insanity of any felony offense, or any juvenile who is adjudicated under Section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code for committing any felony offense; any adult person arrested for or charged with one of the enumerated felony offenses; any person, including any juvenile, required to register under Section 290 or 457.1 because of the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony or misdemeanor offense; or any person, including any...