People v. C. Betts Realtors, Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 March 1977
• Docket Number: No. 48359--64,48359--64
• Parties: , 5 Ill.Dec. 258 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. C. BETTS REALTORS, INC., et al., Appellees. cons.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 581

361 N.E.2d 581

66 Ill.2d 144, 5 Ill.Dec. 258

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. C. BETTS REALTORS, INC., et al., Appellees.

No. 48359--64 cons.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 23, 1977.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Chicago (James B. Zagel and Jayne A. Carr, Asst. Attys. Gen., and Laurence J. Bolon and Renee G. Goldfarb, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.

F. Willis Caruso, La Grange, Marie Sanon, and Horace Fox, Jr., Chicago, for appellees.

Arthur C. Thorpe, of Klein, Thorpe, Kasson & Jenkins, Chicago, for amicus curiae Village of Oak Park. John S. Meany, Jr., Themis N. Karnezis, and Peter B. Carey, Chicago, for amicus curiae Beverly Area Planning Commission.

GOLDENHERSH, Justice.

In four separate complaints filed in the circuit court of Cook County defendants Carolyn L. Stevenson and C. Betts Realtors, Inc., her employer, were charged with two separate offenses of unlawful solicitation for the sale of residential property after receiving notice that the owner did not desire to sell or be solicited for such sale (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, par. 70--51(d) (2)). In two separate complaints defendants Jesse T. Jones and Ebony Real Estate, Inc., her employer, were charged with one violation of the same statute. Alleging that the statute was unsonstitutional, defendants, in separate motions, moved to dismiss each complaint. Holding the statute unconstitutional, the circuit court dismissed the complaints, and the People appealed directly to this court. (58 Ill.2d R. 603.) The cases have been consolidated for oral argument and opinion.

Section 1 of 'An Act to prohibit the solicitation or inducement of sale or purchase of real estate on the basis of race, color, religion or national origin or ancestry' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, par. 70--51 Et seq.) provided that it shall be unlawful knowingly to 'solicit for sale, lease, listing or purchase any residential real estate within the State of Illinois, on the grounds of loss of value due to the present or prospective entry into the vicinity of the property involved of any person or persons of any particular race, color, religion or national origin or ancestry' (ch. 38, par. 70--51(a)); 'distribute or cause to be distributed, written material or statements designed to induce any owner of residential real estate in the State of Illinois to sell or lease his property because of any present or prospective changes in the race, color, religion or national origin or ancestry, or residents in the vicinity of the property involved' (ch. 38, par. 70--51(b)); or 'create alarm, among residents of any community, by transmitting in any manner including a telephone call whether or not conversation thereby ensues, with a design to induce any owner of residential real estate in the State of Illinois to sell or lease his property because of any present or prospective entry into the vicinity of the property involved of any person or persons of any particular race, color, religion or national origin or ancestry' (ch. 38, par. 70--51(c)).

Paragraph (d) of section 1 in pertinent part provided:

'It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation knowingly:

'(d) To solicit any owner of residential property to sell or list such residential property at any time after such person or corporation has notice that such owner does not desire to sell such residential property or does not desire to be solicited to sell or list for sale such residential property. For the purpose of this paragraph, a person has such notice * * * (2) when he has been notified in writing that the owner does not desire to sell or list for sale such residential property.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, par. 70--51(d)(2).

In People v. Tibbitts, 56 Ill.2d 56, 305 N.E.2d 152, we held invalid, as an unconstitutional grant to that agency of an arbitrary power, the provision is paragraph (d) which delegated to the Human Relations Commission the authority to issue notice not to solicit for the sale of real estate from listed owners (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 38, par. 70--51(d)(1)). We declined, however, to pass on the validity of section 1(d)(2) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 38, par. 70--51(d) (2)).

In each complaint it is charged that on the date and at the address alleged the named defendant committed the offense of unlawful solicitation for sale of real estate 'in that he did solicit the above-named complainant, an owner or residential property, to sell such residential property after said defendant had notice that said owner did not desire to sell said residential property or be solicited for sale of said residential property, in violation of Chapter 38 Section 70--51(d).'

Defendants' motions to dismiss alleged: (1) that section 1(d)(2) is 'an unconstitutional limitation of the right of free speech, the right to engage in commerce and to earn a living, is an unlawful investiture of legislative power, and is otherwise unconstitutional' under the Illinois Constitution; (2) that the statute is violative of the Federal Constitution and, 'as applied, in violation of statutes of the United States of America, 42 U.S.C. secs. 3601 et seq. and 42 U.S.C. sec. 1981, sec. 1982 and sec. 1983'; (3) that it violates the Illinois Constitution 'with respect to discrimination as it relates to housing based on race'; (4) that the notice was not proper because it was not signed; (5) that the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (6) that the statute is vague and indefinite and to the extent that it 'gives to a private party not a homeowner the arbitrary and unrestricted power to determine what the law shall be and to whom the law shall apply' it is unconstitutional under People v. Tibbitts. No evidence was taken at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, and apparently the circuit court found the statute unconstitutional on its face.

The People contend that subparagraph (d)(2) of section 1 'is a rational and proper means, developed by the legislature, to carry out the general purpose of the act' and is not violative of either the United States or Illinois constitutions. Defendants' contentions on appeal are substantially the same as the grounds set forth in their motions to dismiss the complaints. Briefs urging reversal have also been filed by Amici curiae, the village of Oak Park and Beverly Area Planning Association, a not-forprofit corporation 'organized to maintain and promote the welfare of the Beverly Hills and Morgan Park neighborhoods on the Southwest side of the city of Chicago.'

Portions of the arguments of defendants and Amicus Beverly Area Planning Association are based on assertions of fact made in their respective briefs but not contained in the records. The orders of the circuit court were based upon the complaints and the motions to dismiss, and factual matters Dehors the record are not before us.

Prior to reaching the constitutional questions presented, we must determine whether, as contended by defendants, the complaints 'fail to state a cause of action.' We hold that the complaints meet the requirements of section 111--3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, par. 111--3) and are sufficient to charge the offense of unlawful solicitation of the sale of real estate.

The parties agree that the primary purpose of the Act is to prevent 'blockbusting' or 'panic peddling' and the constitutionality of such legislation is on longer open to question. (See Chicago Real Estate Board v. City of Chicago, 36 Ill.2d 530, 224 N.E.2d 793.) Defendants argue, however, that while subparagraph (a) of the section is 'explicit,' contains 'safeguards' and 'standards' and 'gets at the heart of a problem which is real and must be remedied,' subparagraph (d) is not 'ex...