People v. A.C. (In re A.C.)
| Decision Date | 18 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 1–15–3047.,1–15–3047. |
| Citation | 54 N.E.3d 952,403 Ill.Dec. 811 |
| Parties | In re A.C., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner–Appellee, v. A.C., Respondent–Appellant). |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
54 N.E.3d 952
403 Ill.Dec. 811
In re A.C., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner–Appellee, v. A.C., Respondent–Appellant).
No. 1–15–3047.
Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fifth Division.
May 18, 2016.
Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Mysza, and Caroline E. Bourland, all of State Appellate Defender's Office, Chicago, for appellant.
Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Veronica Calderon Malavia, and Mary L. Boland, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Scott F. Main and Elizabeth A. Ullman, both of the Children & Family Justice Center, Chicago, and Marsha L. Levick, Riya Saha Shah, and Jean Strout, all of the Juvenile Law Center, Philadelphia, PA, for amici curiae.
OPINION
Justice BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
¶ 1 Following a hearing in Juvenile Court, the circuit court adjudicated respondent, A.C., delinquent of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and he was ordered to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) ( 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2014)). Respondent appeals, contending that the provisions of SORA and the Sex Offender Community Notification Law (Notification Law) (730 ILCS 152/101 et seq. (West 2014)) which are applicable to juveniles, violate federal and state substantive due process and procedural due process. In addition, respondent contends that both of these statutes violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment and the proportionate penalties clause of the federal constitution. This court subsequently
allowed the Children & Family Justice Center of the Bluhm Legal Clinic at Northwestern University School of Law1 and the Juvenile Law Center to file a joint amicus curiae brief on behalf of A.C.2
¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 On May 11, 2013, the date the incident occurred, respondent was 16 years of age and K.J. was 8 years of age. The State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship on March 31, 2014, against respondent for aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/11–1.60(c)(2)(i) (West 2014)) against K.J.
¶ 4 At the adjudicatory hearing, K.J. testified that on the evening of May 11, 2013, she was at her home in Chicago with her two half-brothers and one of the half-brother's grandmother, D.W. Respondent and a few friends of her half-brother's came over that evening to spend the night. Respondent was best friends with one of K.J.'s half-brothers and K.J. had seen him before. The friends went into the basement and K.J. went to her room upstairs and watched television for a few hours. She fell asleep in her bed wearing shorts and a T-shirt. K.J. awoke at 1 or 2 a.m.; the plastic on her mattress was moving. She was on her stomach and her shorts and underwear were pulled down under her buttocks. K.J. testified that she felt respondent going up and down on her from behind. After he stood up, he told K.J. that she had “white stuff” on her. He went to the bathroom across the hall and obtained a tissue and used it to wipe the “clear stuff” or “clear crust” off of her and then he threw it in the bathroom trash and returned downstairs. K.J. woke up D.W. and told her what happened.
¶ 5 D.W. testified that around 2 a.m., K.J. asked if she could sleep with her and climbed into bed.3 K.J. then asked if she could tell D.W. something. K.J. stated, “that boy A* * * was freaking on me” and that “the bed was moving.” K.J. stated that respondent used a tissue on “some white stuff.” D.W. testified that K.J. was crying and shaking.
¶ 6 K.J–H., K.J.'s mother, testified that D.W. was watching the three children while she was away that weekend. When K.J–H. returned on May 13, 2013, she spoke with K.J. and then retrieved a tissue from the garbage in the upstairs bathroom, which she placed in a paper bag. She also retrieved K.J.'s pajamas, underwear, and the sheets from K.J.'s bed, and placed these items in two paper bags. She took K.J. to the Lurie Children's Hospital, where a criminal sexual assault kit examination was performed. Chicago police evidence technician Carla Rodriguez subsequently retrieved the bagged items from K.J–H.'s home on May 14, 2013, and inventoried and secured them for DNA testing.
¶ 7 Illinois State Police forensic biologist Jennifer Wagenmaker testified that she received the inventoried items and identified semen on the toilet paper and two semen stains on the underwear, of which she prepared cuttings and stored for later DNA testing. She did the same for the blood samples collected from respondent and K.J.
¶ 8 Lisa Kell, Illinois State Police forensic biologist and DNA analyst, analyzed and compared the DNA profiles from the various samples. She testified that the DNA profile on the toilet paper matched respondent. Kell also identified respondent's DNA in a semen stain on the back of the underwear. The stain from the crotch area of the underwear matched K.J.'s DNA profile.
¶ 9 Chicago police sergeant Athena Mullen interviewed respondent with his mother present on November 26, 2013, at the police station. Following his acknowledgement of his Miranda warnings, respondent told Mullen that “he didn't penetrate that girl.” When Mullen asked what respondent meant, “[l]ike a hotdog in a bun?” Respondent stated, “[s]omething like that.” Respondent stated that the girl had been lying on her stomach. The interview was terminated at that point and respondent told Mullen that he wanted to obtain some help.
¶ 10 Following closing arguments, the circuit court held that the State proved respondent committed aggravated criminal sexual abuse and entered a finding of delinquency.
¶ 11 On August 10, 2015, respondent filed a motion to declare SORA and the Notification Law unconstitutional as applied to him. Following a hearing, the circuit court denied respondent's motion.
¶ 12 The record reflects that respondent underwent a forensic psychological evaluation by Dr. Michael Fogel in October 2014 to assess respondent's risk for sexually reoffending. Based on this assessment, Dr. Fogel opined that respondent was at a low risk of sexually reoffending. In addition, probation officer Claire Johnson was assigned to perform a juvenile sex offender evaluation. Johnson's letter to the court dated June 29, 2015, indicated that she reviewed Dr. Fogel's evaluation and interviewed respondent and his mother, and opined that respondent was at a low risk to sexually reoffend and that sex offender registration could have an aggravating effect on his risk level as it could have consequences related to respondent's pursuit of higher education. A social investigation and supplemental social investigation of respondent also occurred.
¶ 13 At the dispositional hearing on October 9, 2015, the circuit court sentenced respondent to three years' probation, 50 hours of community service, and juvenile sex offender counseling. Respondent registered as a sex offender on October 9, 2015. This appeal followed.
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 A. Statutory Provisions
¶ 16 On appeal, defendant challenges the constitutionality of the following provisions of SORA and the Notification Law: 730 ILCS 150/2, 3, 3–5, 6, 8, and 10 (West 2014); 730 ILCS 152/121 (West 2014).
¶ 17 Respondent's adjudication for aggravated criminal sexual abuse qualifies him a “sexual offender” under SORA. 730 ILCS 150/2(A)(5), (B)(1) (West 2014); 720 ILCS 5/11–1.60(c)(2)(i) (West 2014). Respondent also falls within the more specific definition of a “sexual predator” under SORA, which includes “any person who, after July 1, 1999, is: * * * Convicted of a violation or attempted violation of * * * 11–1.60 or 12–16 (aggravated criminal sexual abuse).” 730 ILCS 150/2(E)(1) (West 2014).
¶ 18 Section 3 requires sexual offenders to register with the chief of police in the municipality where he resides, providing appropriate identification and proof of residence, in addition to other information such as telephone number, e-mail addresses, and Internet communications identities,
and he also must pay a registration fee. 730 ILCS 150/3(a)(1), (c)(5) (west 2014). If the sexual offender also attends a university, he must also register with the chief of police or sheriff where the school is located and the public safety or security director at the school. 730 ILCS 150/3(a)(i), (ii) (West 2014). Pursuant to section 7, a sexual offender must register for a period of 10 years after conviction or adjudication or, in the case of a sexual predator, for his or her natural life. 730 ILCS 150/7 (West 2014).
¶ 19 Section 3–5 applies these registration requirements to adjudicated delinquent juveniles. 730 ILCS 150/3–5(a), (b) (West 2014). For felonies, the juvenile may petition for termination of registration after five years. 730 ILCS 150/3–5(c)...
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