People v. C.L.S., 10CA1980.
| Decision Date | 23 November 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 10CA1980.,10CA1980. |
| Citation | 313 P.3d 662 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner–Appellee, In the Interest of C.L.S., a Child, and Concerning T.V., Respondent–Appellant, and T.R.S., Respondent–Appellee. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Christine K. Eigel, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Petitioner–Appellee.
Davide C. Migliaccio, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Respondent–Appellant.
Deanne M. Cain, P.C., Deanne Cain Fischlein, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Respondent–Appellee.
Opinion by Judge BERNARD.
When two men seek to be declared the father of a child, Colorado's paternity statutes establish a process to resolve their claims and to declare which man will be the child's father under the law. The statutes accomplish this end by creating presumptions of paternity. These presumptions may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. If two men each establish a presumption that is not rebutted, the statutes prescribe a method for resolving the conflict between them: the trial court determines which presumption should control based on the weightier considerations of policy and logic. Our supreme court addressed this method in N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 359–65 (Colo.2000), concluding that it must include consideration of the child's best interests.
In this case, two men each established presumptions of paternity that were not rebutted. To resolve these competing presumptions, the magistrate applied the statutory method and, as a result, named one of them the child's legal father. In doing so, the magistrate did not articulate the burden of proof he used to resolve the conflict.
On review, the district court held that the burden of proof used to resolve competing presumptions is the preponderance standard. On appeal, we are asked to reverse this legal conclusion because, one party asserts, the correct burden of proof is the clear and convincing standard. We disagree with that assertion, and, as a result, we affirm.
S.V. (mother) and T.V. (husband) had been married a short time when a son, C.L.S., was conceived in early 2006. Mother also had a short, intimate relationship with T.R.S. (boyfriend) at the same time.
Mother filed for dissolution of marriage later in 2006, before the son was born. Mother and husband executed a separation agreement a few days before the son's birth, which did not refer to any children or a pregnancy. The dissolution decree, issued in February 2007 after the son was born at the end of 2006, also does not refer to any children.
At the time of the son's birth, his birth certificate did not list a father.
Mother and boyfriend began dating again in the spring of 2007, about three months after the son was born. Genetic testing was performed a short time later. It excluded boyfriend as the son's biological father. However, although he was aware of these results, boyfriend acted as the son's father, signed an acknowledgement of paternity, and added his name to the son's birth certificate as the son's father.
Mother did not notify husband that boyfriend had been listed on the birth certificate as the son's father. Husband did not know that boyfriend had formally acknowledged being the son's father.
Boyfriend, mother, and the son then began to live together. Mother and boyfriend had another child. They ended their relationship in the summer of 2008. Boyfriend then asked a court to grant him parental responsibilities for the son. The court awarded him some parenting time. He paid mother child support, and maintained health insurance on both children.
In the course of applying for governmental benefits, mother worked with the local child support enforcement unit. Based on information that mother provided, the enforcement unit sought an order establishing husband as the son's legal father and requiring him to pay mother a regular amount to support the son. In October 2008, genetic testing established a 99.99% probability that husband was the son's biological father.
Once the enforcement unit learned that boyfriend had signed an acknowledgement that he was the son's father and that boyfriend's name had been placed on the son's birth certificate, the unit filed this case to determine the son's legal father, naming both husband and boyfriend. Husband then sought an allocation of parental responsibilities for the son.
After a hearing, the magistrate entered a series of findings. First, he found that there were competing statutory presumptions of paternity. On the one hand, husband was presumed to be the son's legal father because he was married to mother when the child was conceived and born, and genetic testing indicated that he was the son's biological father. On the other hand, boyfriend was presumed to be the son's legal father because he voluntarily acknowledged that he was the son's father, and he held the son out as his child.
Second, the magistrate made findings about husband's and boyfriend's conduct. Husband knew mother was pregnant when they separated and before their marriage was dissolved; however he did not take any action to claim the son as his child. Boyfriend knew that he was not the son's biological father, but he decided to have his name entered on the son's birth certificate as the son's father, and he cared for the son as his own child while he lived with mother.
Third, the magistrate resolved the competing presumptions of paternity by finding that it was in the child's best interests to declare boyfriend to be the son's legal father.
Husband asked the district court to review the magistrate's order. He asserted that the facts did not establish the statutory presumption that boyfriend voluntarily acknowledged that he was the son's father. Then, he argued that the magistrate did not articulate the burden of proof that he used to resolve the competing presumptions of paternity, and that the clear and convincing standard should apply.
The district court concluded that the magistrate's finding that boyfriend satisfied the statutory presumption that he voluntarily acknowledged paternity “appear[ed] to be error.” This statutory presumption requires that any other man presumed to be the father must consent in writing to the acknowledgement. That did not happen here. However, the district court concluded that this error was “ultimately harmless” because boyfriend had also established a second presumption of paternity.
The district court then held that the proper burden of proof to be employed when resolving competing presumptions of paternity is the preponderance standard. The court reasoned that (1) the statute establishing the method for resolving competing paternity presumptions is ambiguous; (2) applying the clear and convincing evidence standard would lead to absurd results; (3) the language describing the resolution method uses language “impl[ying]” that the preponderance standard should apply; and (4) because the resolution method requires that the presumptions be balanced against each other and with the child's best interests, “a preponderance standard seems to be the only rational standard to apply.” Reviewing the magistrate's order based on the preponderance standard, the district court upheld the magistrate's decision.
On appeal, husband contends that the district court committed reversible error by rejecting the clear and convincing standard in favor of the preponderance standard. We disagree.
Boyfriend submits that husband did not argue to the magistrate that he should employ the clear and convincing standard when determining the weightier considerations of policy and logic. Therefore, he continues, we should not consider the issue on appeal.
However, husband raised the issue in the district court. See People in Interest of K.L–P., 148 P.3d 402, 403 (Colo.App.2006)(“a party seeking review of a magistrate's decision must raise a particular issue in the district court”). And there is no indication in the record that boyfriend informed the district court that the issue was not raised before the magistrate. Rather, the record shows that boyfriend only contested husband's arguments on the merits. We therefore conclude that boyfriend waived this objection to our consideration of this issue because he did not object in the district court. See C.S. v. People, 83 P.3d 627, 635 (Colo.2004).
We must interpret Colorado's paternity statutes to resolve this appeal. Statutory interpretation raises an issue of law that we review de novo. Specialty Restaurants Corp. v. Nelson, 231 P.3d 393, 397 (Colo.2010).
When interpreting a statute, our goal is to determine, and then carry out, the legislature's intent. People v. Hickman, 988 P.2d 628, 634 (Colo.1999). We presume that the legislature “intends a just and reasonable result when it enacts a statute, and a statutory construction that defeats the legislative intent will not be followed.” Kauntz v. HCA–Healthone, LLC, 174 P.3d 813, 816 (Colo.App.2007).
In our analysis, we first look at the statute's language and give effect to the words and phrases according to their plain and ordinary meanings. People v. McIntier, 134 P.3d 467, 472 (Colo.App.2005). In doing so, we employ rules of grammar and common usage. Jefferson County Bd. of Equalization v. Gerganoff, 241 P.3d 932, 935 (Colo.2010).
We consider the statute as a whole and interpret it in the way that gives “consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect” to all its parts. McIntier, 134 P.3d at 472. We do not interpret a statute in a way that would render parts of it meaningless or absurd. Id. If the statute's language is clear, and we can discern the legislature's intent with certainty, we do not resort to other rules of statutory interpretation. W. Fire Truck, Inc. v. Emergency One, Inc., 134 P.3d 570, 573 (Colo.App.2006).
Because the paternity statutes at issue here are part of the Colorado Children's Code, we must liberally construe them “to serve the...
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