People v. C.Y.

• Decision Date: 16 February 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11CA0604.,11CA0604.
• Citation: 275 P.3d 762,2012 COA 31
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner–Appellant,In the Interest of C.Y., Juvenile–Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

2012 COA 31

275 P.3d 762

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner–Appellant,In the Interest of C.Y., Juvenile–Appellee.

No. 11CA0604.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. VII.

Feb. 16, 2012.

Peter Hautzinger, District Attorney, Curtis L. Fleming, Deputy District Attorney, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Petitioner–Appellant.

Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Mark A. Backstrom, Deputy State Public Defender, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Respondent–Appellee.

Opinion by Judge BERNARD.

¶ 1 This case involves C.Y., a boy charged with having committed sex-related delinquent acts. A magistrate found that he was incompetent to stand trial and that he could not be restored to competency. As a result, the law allowed the magistrate to fashion a management plan. As part of that plan, the magistrate ordered the boy to undergo a psychosexual evaluation. The evaluation's purpose was to determine whether he presented a risk to the community's safety and what steps should be taken to ensure his safety and future development.

¶ 2 On review, the district court decided that the boy should not be required to undergo the psychosexual evaluation as part of the management plan. The prosecution appeals this decision.

¶ 3 We must resolve two issues. First, did the magistrate's order requiring this evaluation violate the boy's right to be free from compelled self-incrimination? Second, did this order violate his due process rights? We answer the first question “no” because a statute bars the prosecution from using any statements the boy makes during the evaluation in subsequent criminal proceedings. Our answer to the second question has two parts: (1) the magistrate's order did not unconstitutionally undercut the presumption of innocence; and (2) we will not address the boy's argument that results of the psychosexual evaluation may be used to further limit his liberty because his argument is premature.

¶ 4 As a result of these conclusions, we reverse the district court's order, and we remand to the district court to reinstate the psychosexual evaluation as part of the management plan.

I. Background

¶ 5 The boy suffers from significant mental and developmental disorders, including a serious brain injury, due in part to complications at his birth. He lives with his mother and sister, and he receives extensive therapy and special education for his cognitive disabilities.

¶ 6 In January 2010, he was eleven years old. His nine-year-old sister reported to the police that he had grabbed her “butt” and “privates.” His sister claimed that he had touched her in this way many times over a four-month period.

¶ 7 The boy was charged with having committed three delinquent acts that would constitute the adult offenses of aggravated incest, unlawful sexual contact, and assault in the third degree. He was released on bond to live at home with his mother in order to continue his therapy. His sister was initially removed from the home. But after a safety plan was worked out, the Mesa County Department of Human Services allowed her to return.

¶ 8 The magistrate handling the case granted the request of the boy's lawyer to have him evaluated to determine whether he was competent to stand trial. The competency evaluator stated that the boy was incompetent to proceed and that “he may never attain competency.”

¶ 9 Neither the prosecution nor the boy's attorney contested the results of the competency evaluation. The magistrate then found that the boy was “incompetent to proceed to adjudication in this matter and cannot be restored to competency.” The magistrate then set a hearing to work out the details of a management plan covering the boy's treatment and placement.

¶ 10 A plan was produced, and it was discussed at the hearing. The prosecution and the defense agreed on all of it except for one part. That part required the boy to undergo a psychosexual evaluation.

¶ 11 A licensed clinical social worker, who had never met the boy, testified about what the psychosexual evaluation would consist of, how it would be conducted, and its usefulness. Because she was aware of the boy's disabilities, she recommended a modified version that would be more appropriate for him. She added that “[t]he evaluation was not intended to be used to determine guilt or innocence in any way.” Rather, it provided a “sexual offense specific focus” to determine what the boy's appropriate “structure and supervision” should be.

¶ 12 Several therapists and teachers who worked with the boy testified about his condition and prognosis. They were concerned that he would not understand the evaluation or that he would not be able to respond appropriately to questions asked during it. Based on this testimony, the boy's attorney argued that the evaluation would be inappropriate because of his cognitive limitations.

¶ 13 The magistrate decided that the boy should undergo the psychosexual evaluation as part of the management plan to determine what risk he posed to the community and for “his own personal safety and his own personal development in the future.”

¶ 14 The boy sought the district court's review of the magistrate's decision to include the psychosexual evaluation in the management plan. See § 19–1–108(5.5), C.R.S.2011 (parameters of district court review; “[a] petition for review shall be a prerequisite before an appeal may be filed with the Colorado court of appeals”); People v. S.X.G., 269 P.3d 735, 739 (Colo.2012) (if statute allows the prosecution to appeal any decision of the trial court on a question of law, then “the magistrate rules cannot be construed to bar the prosecution from seeking statutorily authorized interlocutory review of a suppression order simply because that suppression order was entered by a juvenile court magistrate instead of a juvenile court judge”). The district court agreed with the boy's argument that the inclusion of the psychosexual evaluation in the treatment plan was legal error. In doing so, it observed that it was “unaware of any authority to require a [juvenile in a delinquency case] to participate in such an evaluation [unless he or she] consent[ed] to participate in such an evaluation.”

¶ 15 The court recognized that section 19–2–1303(3)(b)(V), C.R.S.2011, gives the magistrate discretion to include “[a]ny other remedy deemed appropriate by the [magistrate]” in a management plan. However, the court concluded that the order to undergo the psychosexual evaluation was outside of the parameters of that discretion.

II. Jurisdiction

¶ 16 As a preliminary matter, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to resolve this appeal. There is no disagreement that the issue before us—whether the magistrate's order requiring the boy to submit to a psychosexual evaluation violates his right to be free from compelled self-incrimination—is a question of law. Rather, the disagreement concerns whether the magistrate's order was final for appellate purposes.

¶ 17 A magistrate's order must be final before a district court judge has the authority to review it. C.R.M. 7(a)(3); People in Interest of M.A.M., 167 P.3d 169, 173 (Colo.App.2007). Likewise, subject to a few exceptions, the court of appeals only reviews final orders. C.A.R. 1(a)(1); see also People v. Kazadi, ––– P.3d ––––, ––––, 2011 WL 724754 (Colo.App.2011)(Taubman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“certain nonfinal orders are appealable” (listing cases)).

¶ 18 In juvenile delinquency cases, the prosecution has the same right to appeal questions of law as it has in criminal cases. §§ 19–1–109(2)(a), 19–2–903(2), C.R.S.2011. The prosecution's right to appeal in criminal cases is found in section 16–12–102, C.R.S.2011, which authorizes the prosecution to appeal trial court decisions on issues of law in cases in which final judgments have been entered. People v. Guatney, 214 P.3d 1049, 1050–51 (Colo.2009) (prosecution appeals are “subject to the final judgment requirement of C.A.R. 1”).

¶ 19 A final judgment is one that “ends the particular action in which it is entered, leaving nothing further for the court pronouncing it to do in order to completely determine the rights of the parties involved in the proceedings.” Id. at 1051. This reasoning applies to delinquency proceedings. People in Interest of H.R., 883 P.2d 619, 620 (Colo.App.1994); see D.H. v. People, 192 Colo. 542, 544, 561 P.2d 5, 6 (1977) (order transferring delinquency case from juvenile court to district court was not a final judgment because it was interlocutory and did not completely determine the parties' rights).

¶ 20 Generally, orders in criminal cases finding that defendants are incompetent to stand trial are not final. See Rupert v. People, 156 Colo. 277, 279, 398 P.2d 434, 434 (1965). Such orders do not normally terminate the proceedings. Rather, they require that the proceedings be held in abeyance until the defendants' competency is restored. If their competency is restored, the criminal proceedings recommence. §§ 16–8.5–102, 16–8.5–113, 16–8.5–114, C.R.S.2011; People v. Harris, 914 P.2d 425, 429 (Colo.App.1995).

¶ 21 Similarly, as a general rule, when juveniles are found incompetent to stand trial, they cannot be tried or sentenced, and the proceedings against them are held in abeyance. § 19–2–1301(2), 19–2–1303(1), C.R.S.2011. When they are restored to competency, their delinquency cases resume. §§ 19–2–1304, 19–2–1305(1), C.R.S.2011.

¶ 22 However, section 19–2–1303(3)(a), C.R.S.2011, sets forth what courts must do when, in cases like this one, they find that juveniles are not only incompetent to stand trial, but also that they cannot be restored to competency. Upon such a finding,

the court shall determine whether a management plan for the juvenile is necessary, taking into account the public safety and the best interests of the juvenile. If the court determines a management plan is necessary, the court shall develop the management plan after ordering that the juvenile be placed in the...