People v. Caddell

• Decision Date: 09 April 2020
• Docket Number: No. 343993,No. 343750,343750
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Antonio CADDELL, Defendant-Appellant. People of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ricco Rafeal William-Salmon, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

332 Mich.App. 27

955 N.W.2d 488

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Antonio CADDELL, Defendant-Appellant.

People of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Ricco Rafeal William-Salmon, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 343750

No. 343993

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted February 5, 2020, at Detroit.

Decided April 9, 2020, 9:05 a.m.

Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Deborah K. Blair, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

Phillip D. Comorski and Gabi D. Silver, Detroit, for Antonio Caddell.

Jonathan B. D. Simon, Bloomfield Hills, for Ricco R. William-Salmon.

Before: Murray, C.J., and Swartzle and Cameron, JJ.

Murray, C.J. Defendants Antonio Caddell and Ricco William-Salmon were tried jointly before separate juries. The charges against Caddell arose from two separate cases that were joined for trial. In LC No. 16-007204-01-FC, the jury convicted Caddell of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, MCL 750.157a and MCL 750.316, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b, related to the shooting death of Corey Reed. In LC No. 16-007144-01-FC, the jury convicted Caddell of first-degree premeditated murder for the death of Ben Keys,¹ conspiracy to commit first-degree murder involving Keys and Laura Zechman, solicitation of the murders of Keys and Zechman, MCL 750.157b, and felony-firearm. The trial court sentenced Caddell to life in prison without parole for the murder and conspiracy to commit murder convictions, 30 to 60 years in prison for the solicitation of murder conviction, and two years in prison for each felony-firearm conviction. Caddell appeals as of right in Docket No. 343750.² We vacate Caddell's convictions and remand for retrial.

In Docket No. 343993, William-Salmon appeals as of right his jury-trial convictions of first-degree premeditated murder for the death of Reed, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and felony-firearm. The trial court sentenced William-Salmon to life in prison without parole for the murder and conspiracy convictions and to two years in prison for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.

Defendants’ convictions arise from their participation in the hired murders of three victims, Reed, Keys, and Zechman, allegedly in retaliation for an earlier "Eastside Barbershop shooting" on November 6, 2013. Reed was killed on Hull Street in Detroit on November 23, 2013. Keys and Zechman were killed inside a vehicle in Detroit on April 30, 2014. In LC No. 16-007204-01-FC, the prosecutor charged both Caddell and William-Salmon with first-degree premeditated murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and felony-firearm in connection with Reed's death. In LC No. 16-007144-01-FC, the prosecutor charged Caddell with two counts of first-degree premeditated murder, conspiracy to commit murder, solicitation of murder, and felony-firearm in connection with the deaths of Keys and Zechman.

William-Salmon initially pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and felony-firearm in exchange for a sentence agreement of 13 to 22 years’ imprisonment for the murder conviction and two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction and his agreement to cooperate and testify truthfully against other codefendants. William-Salmon testified at Caddell's first trial in May 2017. The jury was unable to reach a verdict, and the court declared a mistrial. Thereafter, the trial court granted the prosecution's motion to vacate William-Salmon's plea on the ground that he violated his plea agreement to cooperate and provide truthful testimony at Caddell's trial. Defendants were later tried jointly in February 2018 and convicted of the crimes specified above.

Within two hours of submitting the case to the jury, the trial court received a note indicating that the Caddell jury felt deadlocked and expressing concerns about Juror No. 3. Despite the court's repeated instructions to the jury to "share your opinions and the reasons for them" and to "keep[ ] an open mind with regards to what each other has to say" without "giving up your own opinion just for the sake of reaching a decision or just because other people disagree with you," the jury, less than two hours later, sent another note to the court about the "completely closed off" juror who refused to articulate reasonable doubt. All of the other jurors later approved a note that stated as follows:

(1) Juror No. 3 was not participating in deliberations.

(2) Juror No. 3 stated that she had her mind "made up before [she] came in here."

(3) Juror No. 3's emotions and beliefs, not the facts, were her "driving force."

(4) Juror No. 3 would not provide factual, rational support for her beliefs.

(5) Juror No. 3 would not even acknowledge actual evidence or the smallest of facts.

(6) Juror No. 3 frequently put her head down and closed her eyes.

(7) Juror No. 3 was disrespectful to other jurors.

(8) Juror No. 3 had said, "[Y]ou're not from the hood. You just don't understand."

Juror No. 3 also appeared late to court and engaged in a shouting match with other jurors in which she used profanity. After discussing the situation with counsel and reviewing federal caselaw³ addressing this situation, the trial court decided to question Juror No. 3 separately from the other jurors. Juror No. 3 was brought out for questioning and was properly cautioned not to disclose her or any other juror's vote on any of the counts. After making a sarcastic comment under her breath (that was apparently heard only by the trial court and prosecutor), Juror No. 3 denied the allegations by the other jurors. She stated that she read from the notes she took during trial to her fellow jurors when supporting her view of the evidence. When confronted with the other jurors’ allegation that she did not provide the facts and reasons supporting her position, she stated:

I have shared. I've read from my notes why I answered certain questions, you know, what is my opinion, why I feel that way.

I even came in here yesterday and wrote about the things on the paper that I had been thinking about all weekend long. I gave it to them, the head guy back there to read. He read them or maybe he read some of it. I think that not agreeing with–in the courtroom they told us to come up with reasonable doubt, and that is what I'm working toward because what I heard here.

She also denied initiating the shouting match overheard by the court. In deciding to remove Juror No. 3, the trial court stated,

I think in light of her answers in terms of what she said that, you know, presumably everybody else is wrong except her, and I think it really in essence does boil down to the notion of do I think that juror number three is being truthful with regards to her answers, and I do not believe that she is.

Juror No. 3 was then removed from the jury, and an alternate was placed onto it. The jury subsequently convicted Caddell as noted above.

I. DOCKET NO. 343750 (DEFENDANT CADDELL)

A. JURY DELIBERATIONS AND REMOVAL OF JUROR No. 3

With respect to the trial court's removal of Juror No. 3, Caddell makes two separate but related arguments. First, he argues that the trial court should have declared a mistrial instead of removing Juror No. 3. Second, Caddell argues that the trial court erred in removing Juror No. 3 and that by removing Juror No. 3, his constitutional rights to a unanimous jury⁴ and due process of law were violated.

1. MOTION FOR MISTRIAL

Caddell argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant a mistrial at several points during jury deliberations. This Court reviews a trial court's decision regarding a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. People v. Dennis , 464 Mich. 567, 572, 628 N.W.2d 502 (2001). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court ‘chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of principled outcomes.’ " People v. March , 499 Mich. 389, 397, 886 N.W.2d 396 (2016) (citation omitted).

"A mistrial should be granted only where the error complained of is so egregious that the prejudicial effect can be removed in no other way." People v. Gonzales , 193 Mich. App. 263, 266, 483 N.W.2d 458 (1992). A mistrial may be granted if a jury is unable to reach a verdict. See People v. Riemersma , 104 Mich. App. 773, 777-779, 306 N.W.2d 340 (1981) ; Arizona v. Washington , 434 U.S. 497, 509-510, 98 S. Ct. 824, 54 L. Ed. 2d 717 (1978). "[T]rial courts are to exercise caution in discharging the jury before a verdict is reached[.]" People v. Lett , 466 Mich. 206, 216, 644 N.W.2d 743 (2002). Recently, in People v. Walker , 504 Mich. 267, 276-278, 934 N.W.2d 727 (2019), our Supreme Court explained:

When a jury indicates it cannot reach a unanimous verdict, a trial court may give a supplemental instruction—commonly known as an Allen^[5] charge—to encourage the jury to continue deliberating. People v. Sullivan , 392 Mich. 324, 329, 220 N.W.2d 441 (1974). The goal of such an instruction is to encourage further deliberation without coercing a verdict. People v. Hardin , 421 Mich. 296, 314, 365 N.W.2d 101 (1984). See Allen v. United States , 164 U.S. 492, 501, 17 S. Ct. 154, 41 L. Ed. 528 (1896) ("While undoubtedly, the verdict of the jury should represent the opinion of each individual juror, it by no means follows that opinions may not be changed by conference in the jury room. The very object of the jury system is to secure unanimity by a comparison of views ...."). "If the charge has the effect of forcing a juror to surrender an honest conviction, it is coercive and constitutes reversible error." Sullivan , 392 Mich. at 334 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

In Sullivan , this Court adopted a standard deadlocked-jury instruction that has since been incorporated into our model jury instructions. Id. at 341 ; M. Crim. JI 3.12.^[6] Although the

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