People v. Cahill

Citation777 N.Y.S.2d 332,2 N.Y.3d 14,809 N.E.2d 561
PartiesTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. JAMES F. CAHILL, III, Appellant.
Decision Date25 November 2003
CourtNew York Court of Appeals

Kevin M. Doyle, Capital Defender, New York City (Ann M. Parrent, Claudia Van Wyk and Sean J. Bolser of counsel), for appellant.

William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (James P. Maxwell, Victoria M. White, Gary T. Kelder, Domenic F. Trunfio, Christopher J. Bednarski, Molly A. Cappuccilli, Matthew J. Doran, David A. Rothschild and Bridget A. Scholl of counsel), for respondent.

Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General, New York City (Peter B. Pope, Michael S. Belohlavek, Robin A. Forshaw and Luke Martland of counsel), in his statutory capacity under Executive Law § 71.

Christopher Dunn, New York City, Arthur N. Eisenberg and Donna Lieberman for New York Civil Liberties Union, amicus curiae.

Stewart F. Hancock, Jr., Syracuse, Alan J. Pierce and Lily K. Lok for Thomas Aloi and others, amici curiae.

Chief Judge Kaye and Judge Ciparick concur with Judge Rosenblatt; Judge

G.B. Smith concurs in result in a separate opinion in which Judge Ciparick concurs insomuch thereof as addresses deadlock jury instructions; Judge Graffeo concurs in part and dissents in part in another opinion in which Judge Read concurs; Judge Read concurs in part and dissents in part in an opinion in which Judge Graffeo concurs.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROSENBLATT, J.

Under New York's capital punishment scheme, a person who commits an intentional (second degree) murder is eligible for a death sentence if any one of 13 aggravating factors is proved (see Penal Law § 125.27 [1] [a] [i]-[xiii]), and if within 120 days after arraignment the prosecution files a notice of intention to seek the death penalty (CPL 250.40 [2]). In the case before us, a jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first degree murder, based on two aggravating factors (witness elimination murder, Penal Law § 125.27 [1] [a] [v], and intentional murder in the course of and in furtherance of second degree burglary, Penal Law § 125.27 [1] [a] [vii]). At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury determined that defendant should be sentenced to death on both counts. For reasons that follow, we conclude that neither of the aggravating factors was proved. This being so, the penalty phase was conducted without legal foundation and the resulting death sentences must be vacated. Defendant's guilt for intentional murder, however, was proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and we therefore reduce defendant's conviction to murder in the second degree and remit the case to the trial court for resentencing.

In early April 1998, defendant and his wife, Jill, signed a separation agreement but continued to live under the same roof at their home in Spafford, Onondaga County. On April 21, during a predawn heated argument, defendant struck Jill repeatedly on the head with a baseball bat. The couple's two young children were nearby and Jill called out, urging them to call the police because their father was trying to kill her. After the attack, defendant phoned his parents for help. They soon arrived at the Cahill residence, along with defendant's brother and a family friend who was a physician. Having been summoned to the scene, the police found Jill lying on the kitchen floor. She was covered in blood, writhing in pain and moaning incoherently. Her left temple was indented from the injury.

Defendant and victim were taken to different hospitals. After hospital personnel treated defendant for minor injuries, the police brought him to the station house for questioning. At first, he stated that Jill had instigated the argument and attacked him with a knife, causing some cuts and scratches on his body. He claimed he struck her in self-defense. Defendant later admitted that he struck Jill with the bat when she was unarmed and that he cut himself, making it look like self-defense. Defendant added that after the assault, he taped a length of garden hose to the tailpipe of his car in order to poison himself with carbon monoxide, but decided against suicide when he saw a rosary in his vehicle.

In June 1998, a grand jury indicted defendant for assault in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. In the months that followed, he and his attorney prepared for trial. In the meantime, there were custody proceedings in Onondaga Family Court, which placed the children with their maternal grandparents and aunt. In addition, Family Court and Onondaga County Court issued orders of protection prohibiting defendant from seeing his children or entering University Hospital, where Jill was confined.

By one medical estimate, Jill had been hit at least four times in the skull. At the hospital, she underwent emergency surgery to remove a blood clot from her brain. In the ensuing weeks, Jill suffered from brain swelling and a number of life-threatening infections. She began to improve and eventually moved from intensive care to the coma rehabilitation unit, and later to the general rehabilitation unit. Her recovery was slow and by no means complete. By October of 1998—six months after the assault —Jill was able to recall the names of her children and had regained some ability to speak, but could use only short, simple words.

On October 27, 1998, after the hospital was closed to visitors, defendant entered the premises, in disguise. According to several members of the staff, defendant wore a wig and glasses, posing as a maintenance worker, complete with a mop and falsified name tag.1 Shortly after 10:00 P.M., a nurse detected a strong odor in the room and saw Jill having trouble breathing. The nurse also observed a waxy-looking substance on Jill's chest and that Jill's hospital gown caused a burning sensation when touched. Despite efforts to revive her, Jill died the next morning. She had been poisoned. An autopsy revealed that potassium cyanide was administered through her mouth or feeding tube.

Police promptly arrested defendant for Jill's murder. Employing search warrants, they recovered data from the hard drive of the Cahill home computer revealing Internet searches that used the words "cyanide" and "ordering potassium cyanide." The "slack"2 also yielded letters composed on the computer. The letters were purportedly sent from an East Syracuse company called General Super Plating to Bryant Laboratories, placing orders for potassium cyanide. In the area near the shed on the Cahill property police found a half-burned wig and a bottle containing potassium cyanide. Further investigation produced eyewitnesses who saw defendant intercept the delivery of cyanide in the vicinity of General Super Plating in July of 1998.

On November 19, 1998, while the assault charges were pending, a grand jury indicted defendant on two counts of first degree murder and related offenses. One murder count charged defendant with having murdered Jill to prevent her from testifying against him at his trial for the April 1998 assault (Penal Law § 125.27 [1] [a] [v]), the other with intentionally murdering Jill in the course of and in furtherance of a burglary (Penal Law § 125.27 [1] [a] [vii]). The grand jury also indicted defendant on two counts of murder in the second degree, burglary in the second degree, aggravated criminal contempt and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. On December 30, 1998, the District Attorney filed a CPL 250.40 (2) notice of intention to seek the death penalty. In addition, the prosecution moved to consolidate the murder and assault indictments.3 The trial court granted the motion in January 1999.

Pursuant to CPL 400.27, the court conducted the jury trial in two phases.4 In the first phase, the jury found defendant guilty of both counts of first degree murder, first degree assault (based on the April 1998 beating) and related charges. The penalty phase followed, in which the jury returned with verdicts of death under both first degree murder counts. Pursuant to article VI, § 3 (b) of the State Constitution and CPL 450.70 (1), defendant has appealed directly to our Court.

Although we address several of the 38 points briefed by defendant, our determination turns on three primary issues: jury selection, weight of the evidence supporting first degree (witness elimination) murder under Penal Law § 125.27 (1) (a) (v) and legal sufficiency of first degree murder (based on burglary) under Penal Law § 125.27 (1) (a) (vii). We conclude that the trial court erred in its rulings concerning potential jurors Nos. 23 and 855; that the first degree murder conviction based on witness elimination was against the weight of the evidence; and that the first degree murder conviction premised on burglary was legally insufficient to support a conviction.

I. Pretrial Issues
A. Pretrial Publicity

Defendant argues that extensive, prejudicial pretrial publicity denied him a fair trial before an impartial jury. He contends that the adverse publicity warranted a change of venue, either before or during voir dire. We disagree.

CPL 230.20 authorizes a change of venue when either party shows "reasonable cause to believe that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in such county" (CPL 230.20 [2]). A motion for change of venue must be made before the Appellate Division department embracing the county in which the superior court is located. In the exercise of its discretion, the Appellate Division can order removal to the superior court of another county (CPL 230.20 [2] [a]) or direct the commissioner of jurors (in consultation with the administrative judge of the judicial district in which the county is located) to expand the jury pool to include people from jury lists of geographically contiguous counties within the judicial district (CPL 230.20 [2] [b]).

It is imperative that prospective jurors be open-minded and unbiased, but they need not "be totally ignorant...

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