People v. Cain
| Decision Date | 20 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 301492. |
| Citation | People v. Cain, 299 Mich.App. 27, 829 N.W.2d 37 (Mich. App. 2012) |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. CAIN. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, John J. Bursch, Solicitor General, Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Margaret Gillis Ayalp, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Neil J. Leithauser, Huntington Woods, and Darryl W. Cain, in propria persona, for defendant.
Before: SAAD, P.J., and KIRSTEN FRANK KELLY and M.J. KELLY, JJ.
A jury convicted defendant of carjacking, MCL 750.529a, unlawfully driving away a motor vehicle (UDAA), MCL 750.413, two counts of receiving and concealing a stolen motor vehicle, MCL 750.535(7), being a felon in possession of a firearm (felon-in-possession), MCL 750.224f, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. Defendant appeals and, for the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
This case arises from a carjacking that occurred in Detroit on June 4, 2010. Courtney Spires was driving home in his mother's 1995 gold Saturn. When he stopped at a red light at the intersection of East Grand Boulevard and Mack, a van pulled up next to Spires on the driver's side of his vehicle. Spires could not see the driver of the van, but he testified that defendant appeared at his window, pointed a silver revolver at him, and told him to get out of the car. Defendant ordered Spires to take off his pants and boots and stole them, along with Spires's wallet and cell phone. Defendant then sat in the driver's seat of the Saturn, a woman got into the front passenger seat, and they drove away as the van followed. Shortly thereafter, Spires reported the crime to the police and described the perpetrators as a black male and a black female.
On June 7, 2010, at about 12:40 p.m., Sergeant Frank Carroll of the Detroit Police Department was driving in an unmarked car near 11908 Wayburn in Detroit. Carroll worked with a multijurisdictional task force focused on automobile theft in Detroit and other nearby communities, including Grosse Pointe. As he was driving past 11908 Wayburn, Carroll noticed a gold Saturn in the backyard of an apparently vacant home. Two black males, one of whom was defendant, were standing near the car's raised hood. Using binoculars, Carroll was able to see the car's license plate number. He called the license plate number in to the Grosse Pointe Park police dispatcher and discovered that the Saturn was a carjacked vehicle.
Carroll called other officers and, when they arrived, they walked into the backyard. At that time, Carroll saw a third man near the front of the Saturn. He also saw a gray Ford Explorer in the backyard, which he learned was also a stolen vehicle. In addition, Carroll saw tools in the yard, including a lug wrench that was attached to a wheel of the Ford Explorer. Carroll and his team placed defendant and the two other men, Denzel Walker and William Johnson, under arrest. The officers searched defendant and found a key for the Saturn and two bullets. They impounded and searched the van that had been used in the carjacking and found a wallet and several cell phones, including Spires's.
Carroll took defendant, Walker, and Johnson to the Grosse Pointe Park police station for processing. Carroll informed defendant of his rights, asked defendant questions, and wrote down defendant's responses. Defendant said that someone had told him about the stolen cars and he denied ever carjacking any. He said that he was taking parts off the Ford Explorer to scrap them. Defendant denied owning a handgun and said that he found the bullets that were in his pocket. He then refused to sign the statement.
On June 8, 2010, officers called Spires to tell him they had recovered his mother's car. Spires went to the Grosse Pointe Park police station to identify the perpetrator in a photographic lineup. Although defendant was in custody at the station, Carroll explained that the station did not have enough young black men or the facilities required to conduct a live lineup. To conduct the photographic lineup, Sergeant Cregg Hughes compiled six mug shots, one of defendant and five others of men of similar age, with similar complexions, facial hair, and haircuts. When Spires saw the photographs, he immediately identified defendant from the array.
As noted, on October 27, 2010, a jury convicted defendant of carjacking, UDAA, two counts of receiving and concealing a stolen motor vehicle, felon-in-possession, and felony-firearm.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly vouched for Spires's credibility during her rebuttal argument. “ ‘Review of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is precluded unless the defendant timely and specifically objects, except when an objection could not have cured the error, or a failure to review the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice.’ ” People v. Unger, 278 Mich.App. 210, 234–235, 749 N.W.2d 272 (2008), quoting People v. Callon, 256 Mich.App. 312, 329, 662 N.W.2d 501 (2003). Defendant did not object when the prosecutor made the statements at issue during her rebuttal argument. Therefore, this issue is unpreserved. Generally, this Court reviews unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct for plain error. Unger, 278 Mich.App. at 235, 749 N.W.2d 272. “ ‘Reversal is warranted only when plain error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ” Id., quoting Callon, 256 Mich.App. at 329, 662 N.W.2d 501. In addition, there is no error if “ ‘a curative instruction could have alleviated any prejudicial effect.’ ” People v. Bennett, 290 Mich.App. 465, 476, 802 N.W.2d 627 (2010), quoting Callon, 256 Mich.App. at 329, 662 N.W.2d 501.
We hold that the prosecutor's statements did not amount to plain error requiring reversal. When considering a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the prosecutor's statements should be considered in context, which includes defense counsel's arguments. People v. Seals, 285 Mich.App. 1, 22, 776 N.W.2d 314 (2009); see also Bennett, 290 Mich.App. at 475, 802 N.W.2d 627. It is improper for prosecutors to comment on their personal knowledge or belief with respect to a witness's credibility. Bennett, 290 Mich.App. at 478, 802 N.W.2d 627. It is also improper for a prosecutor to “ ‘vouch for the credibility of his witnesses to the effect that he has some special knowledge concerning a witness' truthfulness.’ ” People v. Meissner, 294 Mich.App. 438, 456, 812 N.W.2d 37 (2011), quoting People v. Bahoda, 448 Mich. 261, 276, 531 N.W.2d 659 (1995).
Although a prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of a witness, a prosecutor may argue and make reasonable inferences from the evidence to support a witness's truthfulness. Bennett, 290 Mich.App. at 478, 802 N.W.2d 627. In addition, a prosecutor is generally “given great latitude to argue the evidence and all inferences relating to his theory of the case.” People v. Thomas, 260 Mich.App. 450, 456, 678 N.W.2d 631 (2004). When a defendant argues that the prosecution's witnesses testified dishonestly, the prosecutor may respond by arguing that the witnesses had no motive to lie. See id.
Defendant argues that the following statements by the prosecutor improperly bolstered Spires's credibility:
I don't, I don't think he would even come in—I don't think he would come in here and lie. Absolutely not. He was brave coming in here and indicating that because stuff gets around in this city and, and he wouldn't have done it unless it was absolutely what had happened to him.
* * *
You know, I would say to you that this—I think he was very honest about everything. He tried, you know, to be very honest. And the young man was very brave in coming here. And I ask that you find [defendant] guilty on all charges in the information.
These statements did not amount to plain error. The prosecutor's comments were made in response to defense counsel's numerous challenges to Spires's credibility during his closing argument. Again, a prosecutor's statements should be viewed in the context of the defendant's arguments. See Seals, 285 Mich.App. at 22, 776 N.W.2d 314. After defendant argued that Spires was not a credible witness, the prosecutor could permissibly argue in response that Spires had no motive to lie. See Thomas, 260 Mich.App. at 456, 678 N.W.2d 631. In essence, this was the prosecutor's argument when she said that Spires was brave to come in and testify, presumably because he could be retaliated against for testifying against defendant.
Further, the prosecutor's comments did not imply that she had special knowledge about Spires's truthfulness. Rather, the prosecutor made logical inferences from the evidence that a person generally does not go to the trouble of fabricating a carjacking and lying about who did it. The jury heard that Spires reported the carjacking to the police the night of June 4, 2010, and went to the police station on June 8, 2010, to view a photo array of suspects and give another statement. In addition, the jury heard Spires testify at trial. From this evidence, the prosecutor could reasonably infer that Spires would go to these lengths only if he had actually been carjacked.
Moreover, were we to find any impropriety in the prosecutor's remarks, any alleged prejudice was cured by the trial court's jury instructions. “Curative instructions are sufficient to cure the prejudicial effect of most inappropriate prosecutorial statements, and jurors are presumed to follow their instructions.” Unger, 278 Mich.App. at 235, 749 N.W.2d 272 (citations omitted). The trial court reminded the jurors that they took an oath to return a verdict based only on the evidence and the court's instructions on the law. It further instructed the jurors...
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