People v. Caldwell

Decision Date10 December 1895
Citation65 N.W. 213,107 Mich. 374
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
PartiesPEOPLE v. CALDWELL.

Exceptions from circuit court, Hillsdale county; Victor H. Lane, Judge.

Henry W. Caldwell was convicted of keeping a place where intoxicating liquors were unlawfully sold, and brings exceptions. Affirmed.

Guy M. Chester, Pros. Atty., for the People.

Frankhauser Bros., for defendant.

LONG J.

Respondent was convicted of keeping a place where intoxicating liquors were sold as a beverage, in violation of the local option law in Hillsdale county. It is contended:

1. That the justice acquired no jurisdiction to issue the warrant for the reason that there was no evidence before him that the local option law was in force in that county. In the examination a motion was made to discharge the respondent for that reason, and such motion was again made in the circuit court at the time respondent was arraigned. Respondent contends that the only evidence of that fact before the justice was the examination of one George Taylor, and that he had no such knowledge of the existence of local option in that county that enabled him to so testify; that the only competent proof of such fact was the record of the proceedings of the board of supervisors, or a certified transcript thereof; that the local option statute provides how that fact shall be established. Section 17 of the act provides: "Upon the trial for any violation of the provisions of section one of this act, it shall be competent to introduce the record, or a certified transcript thereof of the preamble and resolution of the board of supervisors of such county, required by section thirteen of this act, and such record and transcript shall be evidence that the provisions of this act are in full force within such county and that the manufacture, sale, keeping for sale, giving away or furnishing of any liquors herein designated, and the keeping of a saloon or any other place for the manufacture, sale or storing for sale or giving away or furnishing of the same, is prohibited and unlawful, and shall also be the evidence of the suspension and superseding of the provisions of the general laws of this state for the taxation and regulation of the business of manufacturing, selling keeping or offering for sale, giving away or furnishing of any of the liquors hereinbefore designated, so far as relates to the territory and municipalities within the limits of such county, so long as such resolution remains unrepealed." The record here does not contain the warrant issued by the justice. The complaint is returned, but none of the other proceedings or papers had before the justice. The warrant may have recited that oral proofs were also taken, and that the proceedings of the board of supervisors were before the justice. Unless the contrary be shown, we must presume that the justice had the legal evidence before him which authorized the issuing of the warrant. He had no authority to try and determine the case, and the complaint need not be in writing. The mere fact that a written complaint was taken does not exclude the presumption that he had other evidence before issuing the warrant. It is true that, if the warrant recites that it was issued upon the examination contained in the complaint, we may then look into the complaint to ascertain whether the facts therein stated confer jurisdiction upon the justice to issue the warrant; but where no showing is made as to what the evidence was, and all the evidence which the justice had before him, we must presume that sufficient evidence was adduced. The evidence so taken before the warrant issues need not be taken down by the justice, and need not be returned to the court when the party is held for trial. These proceedings are entirely ex parte, and are for the purpose of satisfying the justice that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed. People v. Bechtel, 80 Mich. 630, 45 N.W. 582, and cases there cited.

2. It is contended that the court was in error in ruling out the question put to one of the jurors in his examination on voir dire. He was asked: "Which way would you desire to give your verdict if the evidence was all in and you found that it was just even,-as much one way as the other? Which way would you want to give your verdict-desire to give it? Which way would you lean,-for the people or for the defendant?" By the Court: "I think the court ought to say here that a question of this kind ought not to assume that a man would have a desire to go one way or the other under those circumstances, because, if he does, it makes the juror incompetent always. If he manifests a desire to go either way, of course he is an incompetent juror in the case. I think the question ought not to suggest that he would have a desire, and simply require the witness to give an answer that he would go one way or the other. The question ought to be amended by incorporating that idea, or the witness not be required to answer." We need not determine whether the question was proper, under the rule laid down in Monaghan v. Insurance Co., 53 Mich. 245, 18 N.W. 797, and cases there cited. As explained by the trial court, the question suggested that the witness would have a desire to go one way or the other; and all that the court asked of counsel was to frame his question so that this suggestion would be eliminated, and the juror required to answer whether he would have a desire to go one way or the other, or which way he would find. In People v. Keefer, 97 Mich. 19, 56 N.W. 105, the question was asked a juror: "If the evidence in this case, as between the people and the defendant, was equally balanced, which way would you give a verdict on the charge of engaging in the saloon business,-for the people or for the defendant?" The exclusion of this question was held to be error. Under the suggestion of the court in the present case, counsel would have had an opportunity to ascertain the state of the juror's mind in reference to the saloon business,...

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