People v. Caldwell

• Decision Date: 14 June 1984
• Docket Number: Cr. 22557
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 681 P.2d 274 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ernest Edward CALDWELL et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Page 433

203 Cal.Rptr. 433

36 Cal.3d 210, 681 P.2d 274

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ernest Edward CALDWELL et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Cr. 22557.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

June 14, 1984.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 30, 1984.

Edward T. Fogel, Jr., Christine C. Franklin, Deputy Attys. Gen., Los Angeles, for plaintiff and respondent.

Therene Powell, Deputy State Public Defender, Los Angeles, for defendant and appellant.

Michael S. Magnuson, Los Angeles, for defendant and appellant Washington.

REYNOSO, Justice.

Convicted of robbery and murder, ¹ defendants Ernest Edward Caldwell and Warren Edwin Washington appeal, claiming that they should not have been found guilty of the murder of a co-felon killed by police in the course of a shootout. Defendants claim that the co-felon's death proximately resulted from his own provocative conduct, for which, under our decisions, they cannot be held vicariously liable. More broadly, they wish us to reconsider the now settled rule that, though the felony-murder rule does not extend to killings by victims or police, such killings which proximately result from provocative conduct by one of the felons which exhibits a conscious disregard for life and a high probability of resulting in death constitute murder without the necessity of any "imputation" of malice. The record discloses substantial evidence of malicious conduct by the defendants themselves, and we decline their invitation to reconsider settled decisional law. Accordingly, we will affirm.

I

At about 7:15 p.m. on January 28, 1980, a man wearing a gray overcoat and dark glasses, subsequently identified as Anthony Belvin (the murder victim), approached the patio window of a Church's Fried Chicken outlet and placed an order, indicating that a companion would pay. The latter was wearing a blue jacket and was later identified as defendant Washington. Washington approached the window, then walked to the rear of the building, returned to speak to Belvin, and then walked to another window as though intending to pay for the order. Belvin then revealed a sawed-off shotgun, pointed it at one of the employees, and announced a holdup. Belvin ordered the employees to lie down on the ground and forced one of them to open one of the cash registers and hand over the contents ($24). While the employee attempted to open a second register at Belvin's behest, Washington entered the building through one of the counter windows and approached the manager's office carrying a handgun. The manager was already in telephone contact with the sheriff's department, having retreated to his office when he saw the robbers (whom he thought he recognized from a previous robbery) approaching the place. When the manager failed to open his door, Washington returned to the front of the establishment and left with Belvin.

Within seconds after the men fled, a patrol car containing Deputies Morris Boothroyd and Ronald Trujillo arrived. After one of the employees indicated in which direction the robbers had gone, Deputy Boothroyd saw a man in a blue jacket entering a brown automobile, which pulled away from the curb very rapidly, so much so that the tires lost traction on the road's surface. The deputies activated their lights and siren and gave chase.

The brown car, driven without headlights, was pursued by an increasing number of patrol cars over a twisting course for 5 to 10 miles, at speeds up to 70 miles per hour. During the chase, it drove through several stop signs and red lights, once skidded out of control, and nearly collided with another car. At an intersection, the suspects' auto struck a sheriff's vehicle coming from a side street and continued. Two more radio cars containing Deputies Steven Maggiora and Robert Lopez and Deputies Milkey and Bruton, joined the pursuit.

A fourth sheriff's vehicle, carrying Deputies James McSweeney and Patrick Hunter, came on the scene in front of the suspects' car, traveling in the opposite direction. The brown car initially veered toward the patrol car, then slowed almost to a stop and pulled toward the opposite curb. Suddenly the deputies noticed that the passenger in the right front seat (Washington) was pointing a shotgun at them. Instinctively, Deputy Hunter accelerated and rammed the suspects' car head-on. The shotgun discharged and flew out of Washington's hands, skidding away from the auto. Deputy Boothroyd pulled up directly behind the brown car, which rolled backward a short distance and came to rest against the patrol car's front bumper. The other sheriffs' cars parked a little behind and to the right of Boothroyd's and Trujillo's car.

The deputies alighted immediately, and took cover with guns drawn. A moment later, they saw the rear-seat passenger (Belvin) lean forward and put his hand out the window with a revolver in it. At the same time, Deputy McSweeney saw the driver (defendant Caldwell) open his door and crouch behind it carrying a recognizable handgun. Deputy Hunter watched Washington as he took cover behind a door post and formed the impression that he, too, had a weapon, in view of the way he kept watching the deputy, rather than seeking better cover (but it is apparently undisputed that Washington was unarmed at this point). Belvin moved his gun back and forth in a sweeping motion, ignoring repeated orders to "freeze" and "drop the gun." When Belvin took aim at two of the deputies and failed to respond to a last order to drop his weapon, Deputy Hunter fired at him, then at Washington. The rest of the deputies also fired at the car at about the same time (though Hunter is the only one of those who testified who did not state that he heard one or more shots before firing). When the shooting started, Deputy McSweeney focused his attention on Caldwell, and shot at him when, instead of dropping his gun, he looked in the direction of McSweeney's partner. Estimates of the time between the ramming of the suspects' car to the firing of the first shot ranged from 5 to 40 seconds.

After the gunfire ended, the suspects were removed from their vehicle. Belvin had been wounded, and he died the next morning. Tests indicated that Deputy Lopez' gun probably fired the fatal bullet. Belvin's revolver had not been fired, and Caldwell's was not found.

Both defendants testified in their own defense. Washington testified that he passed out from a PCP cigarette at Belvin's residence sometime before the robbery and could recall nothing further until he woke up in the hospital several days later. Caldwell testified that Belvin induced him to drive him and Washington to the fried chicken outlet with a promise to pay Caldwell some money he owed him. Caldwell assertedly had no idea that Belvin had committed a robbery until the police arrived and Belvin pointed the shotgun at him and threatened to shoot him if he did not drive away in an effort to elude the police.

II

Defendants contend that their murder convictions are not supported by substantial evidence. Although the killing of their confederate, Belvin, occurred as a culmination of their unsuccessful attempt to escape after a robbery, it is conceded that the felony-murder rule has no application here, since Belvin was not killed by defendants, but by a deputy sheriff in the pursuit of his duty. (People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 783, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130.) Defendants correctly point out that they could be found guilty of murder based on such a killing only if one or both of them were shown to have intentionally committed acts which it was highly probable would result in death, manifesting a conscious disregard of human life, or malice. (Id., at p. 782, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130; People v. Gilbert (1965) 63 Cal.2d 690, 703-705, 47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365; ² Taylor v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 578, 91 Cal.Rptr. 275, 477 P.2d 131.) They assert that it was Belvin's act of pointing a gun out the window of the car that precipitated the deputies' fire, and that they themselves did nothing which could be characterized as likely to result in death; since they are not liable for Belvin's malicious conduct (People v. Antick (1975) 15 Cal.3d 79, 90-91, 123 Cal.Rptr. 475, 539 P.2d 43), they insist the murder convictions cannot stand.

Their argument fails because the major premise is inaccurate. The fundamental problem with defendants' contention is that it requires a misapplication of the "substantial evidence" rule to sustain it. In reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court " 'must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.' [Citations.]" (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738.) " 'The test on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the conclusion of the trier of fact, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt....' ... Evidence, to be 'substantial' must be 'of ponderable legal significance ... reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.' [Citations.]" (Ibid.) A review of the record discloses substantial evidence of malicious conduct on the part of both defendants.

Washington's suggestion that he did not commit "any acts ... which were likely to cause death" seems utterly fantastic. The record reflects that he pointed a shotgun at Deputies Hunter and McSweeney as their patrol car approached from the front and was, from all that appears, prevented from shooting them only by Hunter's reflexive acceleration and ramming of the suspects' automobile. In fact, as previously noted, the shotgun discharged at about the moment of impact, though no one was hit, and it flew out of Washington's hands and skittered across the pavement. (Washington's more plausible argument that, malicious or not, his action with the shotgun was not a proximate cause of the subsequent...