People v. Camden, 5-84-0765

CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois
Writing for the CourtHARRISON; WELCH; KARNS
Citation94 Ill.Dec. 835,488 N.E.2d 1082,140 Ill.App.3d 480
Parties, 94 Ill.Dec. 835 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Julie CAMDEN, Defendant-Appellant.
Docket NumberNo. 5-84-0765,5-84-0765
Decision Date28 January 1986

Page 1082

488 N.E.2d 1082
140 Ill.App.3d 480, 94 Ill.Dec. 835
PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Julie CAMDEN, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 5-84-0765.
Appellate Court of Illinois,
Fifth District.
Jan. 28, 1986.

Page 1083

[140 Ill.App.3d 482] [94 Ill.Dec. 836] Law Offices of Robert L. Douglas, Ltd., Robert L. Douglas, Fred W. Johnson, Robinson, for defendant-appellant.

Jon C. Anderson, State's Atty., Robinson, Kenneth R. Boyle, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, Raymond F. Buckley, Jr., Staff Atty., State's Attys. Appellate Service Com'n., Mt. Vernon, for plaintiff-appellee.

HARRISON, Justice:

Defendant was charged by information with the offense of attempt murder based upon an incident which occurred in a tavern in Crawford County, Illinois. The defendant affirmatively raised the defense of diminished capacity along with other affirmative defenses prior to trial. The case proceeded to trial on June 25, 1984, a jury was sworn, and the State presented its evidence, and then rested. Thereafter, defendant began presentation of its case in chief. On June 28, 1984, during a meal recess, one of the jurors indicated to the Sheriff of Crawford County, Richard Hunnicutt, that he was concerned over his ability to render an impartial verdict in the case because of a prior drinking problem. The Sheriff reported the incident to the trial judge, A. Hanby Jones, who thereafter held a hearing in his chambers.

Judge Jones first examined Sheriff Hunnicutt, who testified that he had just been with the jurors during a luncheon recess at the Elk's Club in Robinson. In the Sheriff's words, a juror by the name of Hatton told him that "[h]e could not give a partial [sic] judgment because of his drinking problem in later years". The Sheriff added that the juror told him that because he had been a heavy drinker, he could not be impartial. The Sheriff went on to state that the other jurors overheard[140 Ill.App.3d 483] every word of this conversation, which prompted some discussion among them.

The judge next examined the juror, Donald D. Hatton, who confirmed that he told the Sheriff that because of his problem, he had reservations about his ability to be fair. Hatton stated that the other jurors overheard him. In particular, the alternate juror told him: "You're going to stick it to me yet." The judge thanked Hatton for his honesty, and commented that his only concern was whether Hatton's remarks influenced any of the other jurors. The court then inquired if the State's Attorney had any questions of the juror and the following colloquy ensued:

"STATE'S ATTORNEY: You're saying that you had a prior drinking problem?

JUROR HATTON: Yes, definitely. Really did.

STATE'S ATTORNEY: Why would a prior drinking problem affect your deliberation?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, I object. That's just improper. You've conducted your inquiry. We've got our record--

THE COURT: Do you have any questions?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Absolutely no questions."

At the conclusion of Juror Hatton's testimony, the following exchange occurred:

"DEFENSE COUNSEL: Thank you, Mr. Hatton. I think Jon [State's Attorney] and I ought to talk. It might save the county a lot of money.

STATE'S ATTORNEY: Put that on the record.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Put that on. Ten minutes to talk?

THE COURT: Yes, sir."

Page 1084

[94 Ill.Dec. 837] Following the recess, the court informed the jury that it was declaring a mistrial. In the wake of this announcement, the following discussion took place between the State's Attorney and defense counsel:

"STATE'S ATTORNEY: Your Honor, I don't believe we ever had any problem with the Speedy Trial Act. I don't know if the--or what his schedule is; and I would probably suggest that this cause be set for trial in what, September?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: We just got a mistrial. It may be even assigned to another judge's docket.

THE COURT: I would say that would probably be the case.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: There is no demand for speedy trial on file. I will advise the Court.

STATE'S ATTORNEY: Yes, there is. There is one on file.

[140 Ill.App.3d 484] DEFENSE COUNSEL: We waive it.

STATE'S ATTORNEY: Okay, then I want you to waive it on the record.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I waive it. The speedy trial demand is waived."

On July 19, 1984, the case was set again for jury trial, by agreement, for November 13, 1984. On August 30, 1984, the defendant filed a motion for substitution of judge.

On September 11, 1984, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the mistrial had been declared without affording her an opportunity to object. A hearing was held on this motion on October 31, 1984, and the matter was taken under advisement. In an order filed November 7, 1984, Judge Robert M. Keenan, Jr., who was not the trial judge, denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that she consented to the mistrial. In making this determination, Judge Keenan stated:

"While defendant did not request the mistrial, I deem the record to show consent. After the court heard evidence, the State's Attorney and Defense Counsel apparently had a discussion. After that talk, the content of which is not part of the record, the court announced a mistrial and discharged the jury.

Defendant, although present with counsel, did not object to the declaration. Perhaps, she had no duty to object, although that question is also not before the court. What did occur is that Mr. Anderson [State's Attorney] asked the court to set a new trial date. Mr. Douglas [defense counsel] obviously anticipated going to trial again and stated that the case might be assigned to another judge. Mr. Douglas with Defendant present then waived the prior demand for a speedy trial.

Under these circumstances, there having been no objection to the granting of a mistrial and Defendant, through counsel, having waived the speedy trial demand, Defendant consented to the allowance of a mistrial and may not now raise the issue. * * *"

Defendant thereafter filed an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(f) (87 Ill.2d R. 604(f)) from the denial of her motion to dismiss on the grounds of double jeopardy.

The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy represents a policy of finality in criminal prosecutions to protect defendants from being forced to go through a trial more than once. (United States v. Jorn (1971), 400 U.S. 470, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543.) In the case at bar, where the jury had already been impaneled and evidence[140 Ill.App.3d 485] taken, jeopardy had clearly attached at the time the first trial ended. (People v. Johnson (1983), 113 Ill.App.3d 368, 374, 69 Ill.Dec. 285, 290, 447 N.E.2d 502, 507.) A second trial, however, is not necessarily barred merely because jeopardy had attached in the first proceedings. It depends upon the circumstances of each case. (People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey (1979), 74 Ill.2d 527, 534-35, 25 Ill.Dec. 669, 672, 387 N.E.2d 325, 328, cert. denied (1979), 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306.) Where a mistrial has been declared on defendant's motion or is attributable in some manner to the defendant, reprosecution is not barred, as defendant cannot, by his or her own act, avoid the original jeopardy and then assert it as a

Page 1085

[94 Ill.Dec. 838] bar to subsequent proceedings. (People v. Johnson (1983), 113 Ill.App.3d 367, 375, 69 Ill.Dec. 285, 290, 447 N.E.2d 502, 507.) If the defendant has either initiated or consented to the declaration of a mistrial, even where the alleged error necessitating the mistrial was the prosecutor's or the judge's, reprosecution may be permissible absent prosecutorial or judicial over-reaching or bad faith. (People v. Rogers (1984), 123...

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8 cases
  • People v. Escobar, 84-2210
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • March 10, 1988
    ...his silence, before the trial judge declared the mistrial, did not constitute consent. Defendant relies on People v. Camden (1986), 140 Ill.App.3d 480, 94 Ill.Dec. 835, 488 N.E.2d 1082, where the Appellate Court for the Fifth District held, as a matter of law, that mere silence does not con......
  • Camden v. Circuit Court of Second Judicial Circuit, Crawford County, Ill., 89-1196
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • September 20, 1989
    ...that the trial court's mistrial declaration was neither supported by manifest necessity nor consented to by Camden. People v. Camden, 140 Ill.App.3d 480, 488 N.E.2d 1082, 94 Ill.Dec. 835 (5th Dist.1986). In a dissenting opinion, Justice Karns found that Camden had impliedly consented to the......
  • People v. Cooper, 1-88-0132
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • March 1, 1991
    ...(Jorn, 400 U.S. at 483, 91 S.Ct. at 556.) We judge the contrary to be true in this case. Defendant also cites People v. Camden (1986), 140 Ill.App.3d 480, 94 Ill.Dec. 835, 488 N.E.2d 1082, rev'd on other grounds (1987), 115 Ill.2d 369, 105 Ill.Dec. 227, 504 N.E.2d 96 and People v. Campbell ......
  • People v. Camden, 63174
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • January 30, 1987
    ...Ill.2d R. 604(f)). A majority of the appellate court reversed and remanded the cause with directions that the defendant be discharged (140 Ill.App.3d 480, 488, 94 Ill.Dec. 835, 488 N.E.2d 1082). We allowed the People's petition for leave to appeal under Rule 315 (87 Ill.2d R. The issues pre......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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