People v. Camp, 1-87-3802

• Decision Date: 29 June 1990
• Docket Number: No. 1-87-3802,1-87-3802
• Citation: 201 Ill.App.3d 330,559 N.E.2d 26
• Parties: , 147 Ill.Dec. 26 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard Owen CAMP, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 26

559 N.E.2d 26

201 Ill.App.3d 330, 147 Ill.Dec. 26

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.Richard Owen CAMP, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-87-3802.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, First Division.

June 29, 1990.

Public Defender of Cook County, Chicago (Randolph N. Stone and Bruce C. Landrum, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

State's Attorney of Cook County, Chicago (Cecil A. Partee, Renee G. Goldfarb and Jane E. Loeb, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

Justice MANNINGdelivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Richard Owen Camp, was charged by indictment with the offenses of burglary and criminal damage to property; the latter charge was dismissed by the State.Following a trial before a jury in the circuit court of Cook County, the defendant was found guilty of burglary (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 19-1(a)), and subsequently was sentenced to a term of twelve years.¹

Defendant now appeals his conviction and sentence, asserting three grounds for reversal: (1) that the trial court's refusal to give the jury his tendered instruction on voluntary intoxication as a defense deprived him of a fair trial; (2) that he was prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to grant his request for a continuance in order to secure witnesses who would establish his defense of voluntary intoxication; and (3) that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to twelve years imprisonment.

Prior to trial defendant was evaluated for admittance in the Treatment Alternative to Street Crime Program ("T.A.S.C.").Although the evaluation found defendant to be an addict, it determined that he was unacceptable for the T.A.S.C. program.

At trial, the following facts were adduced.On Saturday, May 11, 1986, at approximately 12:45 a.m., Victor Lownes of 120 North Oak Park Avenue parked his automobile in the municipal lot and walked towards his apartment when he heard the sound of breaking glass coming from the Tasty Dog restaurant.The Tasty Dog was on the southwest corner of the intersection of Euclid and Lake Streets which was about 200 or 300 feet from where Lownes lived and between 50 and 100 feet from where he parked his car.He turned and saw the right profile of a white male of average build, in his twenties, who was wearing a blue shirt and looking into the Tasty Dog through the broken glass window.Lownes observed the man step into the restaurant through the six foot square window.Lownes then walked home, which took approximately two minutes, and called the Oak Park Police to report the incident.

Officer Keenan Williams was on patrol that night.He was in an unmarked squad car at the intersection of Chicago and Ridge Streets when he received a radio dispatch at about 12:49 a.m. reporting a burglary in progress at 701 West Lake Street.He arrived at the scene about one minute later at which time he observed a man, whom he later identified in court as the defendant, standing behind the cash register.When the man noticed Williams, he moved toward the rear of the restaurant.Williams yelled "[p]olice, halt," but the man exited through the rear door and commenced to run.

Following an 80-yard chase, Williams tackled the man and knocked him to the ground.With the assistance of Officer Edward Hadac, who had arrived at the scene and paralleled the foot pursuit in his patrol car, Williams handcuffed the man.He noticed cuts and bruises on the man's face, and that his breath exhaled a "strong odor" of alcohol.Officer Hadac also observed some facial injuries and bleeding but noticed "[n]othing at all unusual about his [defendant's] breath."

The parties stipulated that if called as a witness, the emergency nurse, Sandra Watson, would testify that she smelled an "odor" of alcohol on the defendant's breath while he was being treated at West Suburban hospital on the morning of May 11, 1986, for facial cuts.

During the instruction conference, the trial court denied the defense's motion to submit a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication which states: "[a]n [intoxicated][a drugged] person is criminally responsible for his conduct unless his [intoxication][drugged condition] renders him incapable of acting [knowingly][intentionally].(I.P.I. CriminalNo. 24-25.02.)Thereafter, the jury returned a verdict of guilty, the trial court denied defendant's post-trial motion for a new trial and sentenced defendant to an extended term of twelve years in the Illinois Department of Corrections and two years mandatory supervised release.

Defendant first contends on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on his defense of voluntary intoxication.It is well settled in Illinois that voluntary intoxication does not excuse criminal conduct and generally is no defense to a criminal charge.(People v. Lion(1957), 10 Ill.2d 208, 214, 139 N.E.2d 757.)However voluntary intoxication is a defense if it negatives the existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 6-3(a)), based upon the rationale a defendant can not be said to be guilty if he was intoxicated to such such a degree as to be unable to form an intent.People v. Klemann(1943), 383 Ill. 236, 239, 48 N.E.2d 957.

Burglary is a specific intent crime because it contains, as an element of the offense, the requirement that the defendant entered the premises with the intent to commit a theft or felony.(Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 19-1(a);People v. Cabrera(1987), 116 Ill.2d 474, 492, 108 Ill.Dec. 397, 508 N.E.2d 708;See alsoPeople v. Racanelli(1985), 132 Ill.App.3d 124, 87 Ill.Dec. 187, 476 N.E.2d 1179.)In fact, intent is the gravamen of the offense of burglary.(SeePeople v. Steppan(1985), 105 Ill.2d 310, 85 Ill.Dec. 495, 473 N.E.2d 1300.)Voluntary intoxication is available as a defense to a specific intent offense where its effect is to negate the defendant's mental state where such mental state is an element of the offense.People v. Hillenbrand(1988), 121 Ill.2d 537, 555, 118 Ill.Dec. 423, 521 N.E.2d 900.

Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was evidence, however slight, and more than ample to justify the court giving the requested instruction.The evidence he refers to is the testimony of one police officer and a stipulation of facts.Conversely, the State contends that the requirement is "some" evidence which the defendant failed to present.The parties argue extensively about the degree of evidence which is necessary to justify a trial court giving an instruction on a given theory.However, we decline to engage any further in this endeavor of semantics to discern the meanings of "any" evidence, "slight" evidence or "some" evidence because the applicable principles of law are clear.While a defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed in the defense of voluntary intoxication where there is evidence on the record of intoxication, the degree of intoxication which will absolve the defendant of criminal liability must be so extreme that it entirely suspends the power of all reason.(People v. Stewart(1984), 122 Ill.App.3d 546, 550, 78 Ill.Dec. 7, 461 N.E.2d 591;People v. Feagans(1983), 118 Ill.App.3d 991, 997, 74 Ill.Dec. 442, 455 N.E.2d 871.)The same test applies if drugs are the agent allegedly depriving defendant of the capacity to commit the crime.(People v. Newlin(1975), 31 Ill.App.3d 735, 334 N.E.2d 349.)In order to avail himself of the defense of intoxication, the defendant must establish that his condition was such as to render him wholly incapable of forming the requisite intent.(SeePeople v. Gomez(1986), 141 Ill.App.3d 935, 96 Ill.Dec. 254, 491 N.E.2d 68.)The mere fact that the defendant was drugged or intoxicated does not constitute a defense of intoxication.People v. Thompson(1984), 125 Ill.App.3d 665, 676, 80 Ill.Dec. 928, 466 N.E.2d 380.

In the present case, the evidence of defendant's alleged intoxication is as follows.The arresting police officer testified on cross-examination that he smelled a strong odor of alcohol on defendant's breath as he stood close to him.Defense counsel inquired if the officer had stated during the preliminary hearing that defendant appeared to be wavering.The officer replied that he recalled stating the defendant did stagger during that time.As previously noted, the parties stipulated that Ms. Watson, the emergency room nurse, would testify that defendant had an odor of alcohol on his breath.However, we find that the testimony and stipulation alone or in light of the record as a whole do not establish a defense of voluntary intoxication.

The record also reveals that Officer Williams testified the defendant"was not staggering when I first viewed him" and explained that "he[the defendant] appeared to be wavering after apprehension was made"[because]"he was probably affected by the fall."Although the statements showed defendant had been drinking, they did not support a finding that the level of intoxication so negated his mental state as to suspend all reason.

To the contrary, the facts below fail to establish that defendant lacked the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.We believe the evidence showed that defendant acted with the requisite mental state, i.e., intent.The evidence established that defendant knew what he was doing when he picked up a three-foot, twenty pound canister and used it to bash in the window.He then entered the restaurant through the broken glass and immediately found the cash register behind the counter.When noticed by the police, he exited through the back door and ran southbound through the parking lot behind the building in an attempt to flee.All of these events occurred within a five-minute time span.

Moreover, the police officers presented testimony as to the events following defendant's apprehension.First, defendant was taken to the hospital for treatment of injuries sustained during...