People v. Campa

• Decision Date: 13 September 1984
• Citation: 686 P.2d 634,206 Cal.Rptr. 114,36 Cal.3d 870
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 686 P.2d 634 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Jeffrey Michael CAMPA, Defendant and Respondent. Crim. 23195.

Page 114

206 Cal.Rptr. 114

36 Cal.3d 870, 686 P.2d 634

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Jeffrey Michael CAMPA, Defendant and Respondent.

Crim. 23195.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Sept. 13, 1984.

John K. Van de Kamp, Former Dist. Atty., and Robert H. Philibosian, Dist. Atty., Donald J. Kaplan and Roderick W. Leonard, Deputy Dist. Attys., for plaintiff and appellant.

Wilbur F. Littlefield, Public Defender, Laurence M. Sarnoff, Leslie Falick, Leighton A. Nugent and John Hamilton Scott, Deputy Public Defenders, for defendant and respondent.

GRODIN, Justice.

Defendant Jeffrey Michael Campa was arrested in his home pursuant to warrant on charges of murder and attempted murder (Pen.Code, §§ 187 and 664/187) ¹ and taken to a police station where, after extensive interrogation, he made a statement admitting complicity in the crime. In a pretrial proceeding pursuant to section 1538.5, ² the trial court ordered his statement suppressed on the grounds that the arrest was illegal because the affidavit in support of the warrant failed to establish probable cause. The trial court also ruled that the statement should in any event be suppressed at trial because the interrogation was conducted in violation of defendant's rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. When the People conceded that they had no other evidence to sustain a conviction, the trial court dismissed the charges on its own motion ( § 1385), and the People have appealed.

Since the alleged crime occurred prior to the adoption of Proposition 8 (initiative measure, June 1982 Primary Election), we have no occasion to consider the impact of that measure upon otherwise applicable principles of California constitutional law. (People v. Smith (1983) 34 Cal.3d 251, 262, 193 Cal.Rptr. 692, 667 P.2d 149.) Under those principles, as we shall explain, the trial court's suppression ruling based upon the insufficiency of the warrant affidavit was correct, and we shall affirm.

On April 4, 1981, a green van pulled alongside a blue Camaro on Figueroa near Avenue 41 in Los Angeles. After a brief exchange of words between a passenger in the van and the driver of the Camaro, the van passenger fired at least four shots into the Camaro, wounding the driver and killing a passenger.

Subsequent investigation led, on April 26, 1981, to the arrest and detention of Richard Martinez, whose parents owned a van matching the description of the one involved in the shooting. Martinez was informed that he was under arrest for murder, and under police questioning, he admitted his participation in the incident, but stated that Jeffrey Campa had actually done the shooting. Prior to Martinez's statement, the police had no information implicating Campa in the shooting.

The same day, April 26, 1981, the police obtained an arrest warrant for Campa. Juan Villanueva of the Los Angeles Police Department completed the affidavit in support. The affidavit explained the shooting incident, then continued:

"On April 26, 1981 your affiant executed the above Search Warrant and recovered the vehicle used by the suspects in the shooting death of Edward Nunez. Your affiant also arrested Richard Martinez within the residence for 602 W.I.C. 187 P.C. (Murder). After waiving his Constitutional Rights at Central Police Facilities Richard Martinez admitted his participation in the above crime being investigated and also advised your affiant that the person who actually shot Edward Nunez was known to him (Martinez) as Jeff Campa who is approximately 18 years of age. Your affiant obtained a photograph of a person known to your affiant as Jeffrey Michael Campa, a male Mexican with a DOB of 7-4-62 (18 years) who resides at 2625 Carleton Avenue, Los Angeles. Upon viewing this photograph of Jeffrey Michael Campa, Richard Martinez advised your affiant that the person depicted in the photograph was the same Jeff Campa who shot Edward Nunez on April 4, 1981 from within the vehicle which Richard Martinez was driving...."

Attached to the affidavit were a crime report, a death report, and a photo of Campa. The only description of the gunman on the crime report is "a male Latin 17-20 years old brown hair wearing a white T-shirt."

Campa was arrested at his home at approximately 4:30 p.m. on April 26, 1981. He was placed in a holding tank for about 15 minutes. He was then moved to an interview room.

Villanueva testified that at some time shortly after entering the interview room, Campa asked, "Do I have a right to a lawyer?" Villanueva responded that Campa did have a right to a lawyer, but that Villanueva would first explain to him why he had been arrested, then advise him of his constitutional rights, then interrogate him. Villanueva then told Campa that he was under arrest in connection with a murder, that Martinez had told the police Campa had done the shooting, and that, based on the evidence he had, Villanueva believed that Campa had done the shooting.

Campa and Villanueva then listened to the Martinez tape. Afterwards, Campa asked, "Can I go to YA, if I talk?" By "YA" Villanueva understood him to mean Youth Authority.

Up to this point, other than in response to Campa's direct inquiry whether he had the right to a lawyer, the police had not advised him of or obtained waivers of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination or his Sixth Amendment right to counsel as required by Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. Villanueva responded to Campa's question about the Youth Authority by stating that, as a police officer, he had no authority to say where he would go but if Campa wished Villanueva would request that a representative of the district attorney's office come to the police station to talk to him. Campa agreed. The police escorted Campa back to the holding tank for approximately 40 minutes. Shortly before 6 p.m., Deputy District Attorney Peter Berman arrived at central station.

Campa asked if he would go to prison if he talked. Berman replied that he could be considered for California Youth Authority but that such an outcome was unlikely. Berman asked, "Do you want to make a statement at this time?" Campa replied, "Um, yeah." At this point, at Berman's suggestion, Villanueva advised Campa of his constitutional right to remain silent, and gave him the other warnings required by Miranda. Campa stated that he understood his rights and waived them and made a statement in which he admitted doing the shooting in the April 4 incident.

The trial court granted Campa's section 1538.5 motion to suppress his statement as fruit of an unlawful arrest on the basis that there was insufficient probable cause for the issuance of the arrest warrant. The court noted that the affidavit presented unreliable hearsay information from an untested informant. We agree with the court's determination.

Section 1538.5, subdivision (i), endows the defendant with the right to obtain a determination by the superior court as to "the validity of a search or seizure de novo on the basis of the evidence." On review, we apply the same standard which governed the trial court: "The magistrate's order issuing the warrant may be set aside only if the affidavit, as a matter of law, does not establish probable cause." (People v. Superior Court (Corona) 30 Cal.3d 193, 203, 178 Cal.Rptr. 334, 636 P.2d 23, emphasis added.)

We note at the outset that defendant was arrested at his home. It was undoubtedly for this reason that the police obtained an arrest warrant in this case. As a general matter, "[a] peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has committed a felony." (People v. Fein (1971) 4 Cal.3d 747, 752, 94 Cal.Rptr. 607, 484 P.2d 583, citing § 836, subd. 3.) However, in People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 127 Cal.Rptr. 629, 545 P.2d 1333, we held that article I, section 13 of the California Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the federal Constitution prohibit warrantless arrests within the home, even upon probable cause, in the absence of exigent circumstances. Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court adopted the same position in Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639. "It is axiomatic that 'the physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.' " (Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) --- U.S. ----, ----, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2097, 80 L.Ed.2d 732, quoting United States v. U.S. District Court (1972) 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L.Ed.2d 752.)

Whether an arrest is made pursuant to or in the absence of a warrant, however, it must be upon a showing of probable cause. The Fourth Amendment provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation ...." California Constitution, article I, section 13, and Penal Code section 813 contain similar provisions. An arrest warrant which is not supported by a showing of probable cause must fail, and an arrest made pursuant to it is illegal. (People v. Sesslin (1968) 68 Cal.2d 418, 424-425, 67 Cal.Rptr. 409, 439 P.2d 321.)

"In determining the sufficiency of an affidavit for the issuance of a ... warrant the test of probable cause is approximately the same as that applicable to an arrest without a warrant, ... namely, whether the facts contained in the affidavit are such as would lead a man of ordinary caution or prudence to believe, and conscientiously to entertain, a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused." (Skelton v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.3d 144, 150, 81 Cal.Rptr. 613, 460 P.2d 485.) ³

"A ... warrant is issued without probable cause, and therefore in violation of constitutional proscriptions, when the affidavit upon which it is based contains no competent evidence sufficient to support the finding of the magistrate. [Citations.] The indicated questions of competency and...