People v. Campa

• Decision Date: 01 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. 99501.,99501.
• Citation: 840 N.E.2d 1157
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Benjamin CAMPA, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 1157

840 N.E.2d 1157

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Benjamin CAMPA, Appellee.

No. 99501.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

December 1, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, Renee Goldfarb, Michelle Katz, Brian Monico, James E. Fitzgerald, Annette Collins, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, Steven W. Becker, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for appellee.

Justice FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

At issue is whether defendant, Benjamin Campa, received a speedy trial as required by section 103-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2000)). The appellate court held that he did not. 353 Ill.App.3d 178, 288 Ill.Dec. 852, 818 N.E.2d 787. We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill.2d R. 315(a)). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

Defendant was arrested on August 19, 2001, following a traffic accident. He was eventually charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2000)), driving without a license (625 ILCS 5/6-101 (West 2000)), and driving without insurance (625 ILCS 5/3-707 (West 2000)). At his arraignment on August 20, 2001, defendant filed a demand for a speedy trial in accordance with the speedy-trial provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2000)). The circuit court of Cook County set bail at $5,000, but defendant was unable to post the money required to make bail.

On August 21, 2001, the Cook County sheriff's office placed defendant in its "Electronic Home Monitoring Program." However, on September 5, 2001, the Cook County sheriff's office transferred defendant to the Day Reporting Center. In connection with the transfer, defendant signed a document entitled "Agreement Governing Transfer to the Day Reporting Center." The agreement specified certain terms and conditions for defendant's participation in the Day Reporting Center program, including the requirements that defendant report to the Day Reporting Center as scheduled; attend all portions of the Day Reporting Center program; and abide by all program rules.¹ Lastly, the agreement warned that defendant's failure to comply with the conditions contained therein "and any additional conditions shall result in the revocation of this agreement and return to the Cook County Department of Corrections." During the time that defendant participated in the Day Reporting Center program, he reported to the Day Reporting Center² Monday through Friday from 8 a.m. until 1:30 p.m.

By agreement, the trial court scheduled defendant's trial for December 21, 2001. On that day, the State represented to the court that the arresting officer was in court, but the State's complaining witnesses were not. The State requested a continuance. Defense counsel made both an oral and a written demand for a speedy trial. Defense counsel informed the court that defendant was not free on bond, but had to report every day to the Day Reporting Center. Because the court indicated its willingness to reconsider the amount that had been set for defendant's bail, defense counsel moved for a bond reduction. The court realized, however, that the court file on another DUI case pending against defendant was missing. The court then stated that it could not reduce the amount of bail without reviewing the other file. Although defense counsel insisted that he was ready to proceed to trial and demanded trial, the court continued the case to January 31, 2002. The court indicated on the court file that the complaining witness was not in court.

On January 31, 2002, the State indicated that it was not ready to proceed. Having filed a written demand for a speedy trial, defendant stated that he was ready for trial and that he was demanding trial. The trial court asked the State to check "term" and indicated that the trial would be set to "term." The State requested that the court continue the case to May 3, 2002, and the court granted the continuance.

On May 3, 2002, defendant filed a petition for discharge pursuant to section 103-5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2000)). Defendant stated that he had been in continuous custody at the Cook County Department of Corrections through the Cook County sheriff's Day Reporting Center program since the date of his arrest. Since he had not caused, contributed to, or acquiesced in any delay since December 21, 2001, and since more than 120 days had elapsed from that date to the date of trial, defendant maintained that he must be discharged.

At the hearing on the petition, defendant cited People v. Moss, 274 Ill.App.3d 77, 210 Ill.Dec. 949, 654 N.E.2d 248 (1995), as controlling authority. Pointing to the holding in Moss that a defendant on electronic home monitoring is in custody, defendant argued that he was likewise in custody. The State distinguished Moss, arguing that electronic home monitoring is custody, but day reporting is not. The trial court agreed with the State. The court held that defendant was not in custody within the meaning of the speedy-trial provision and denied the petition for discharge.

At trial, the State presented the testimony of the arresting officer as its only evidence. Defendant did not call any witnesses and presented only the evidence elicited in cross-examination of the arresting officer. The court found defendant guilty of all charges.

Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, again arguing that he should have been tried within 120 days of December 21, 2001, because he was in custody and not on bail or recognizance. Defendant also argued that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court denied the motion. The court opined that the State had met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to all the charges. On the speedy-trial challenge, the court ruled that defendant was not in custody and was properly tried within 160 days of his December 21, 2001, demand for trial. When defendant asked that the court make a finding as to whether defendant was on bail or recognizance, the court refused to do so. Instead, the court explained: "[W]hat I'm saying is that for purposes of the speedy trial demand, which would be made for someone who is in custody, that my finding is that because he was on daily reporting, he was not in custody for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act in determining and requiring the State to proceed to trial within 120 days. That's my ruling. Okay."

Subsequently, the court sentenced defendant to 24 months of supervision, and fines totaling $425 on the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol; supervision and a fine of $75 on the charge of driving without insurance; and supervision and a fine of $55 on the charge of driving without a license. The periods of supervision on the charge of driving without insurance and the charge of driving without a license were satisfied by the 15 days that defendant spent on electronic home monitoring.

The appellate court reversed. 353 Ill.App.3d 178, 288 Ill.Dec. 852, 818 N.E.2d 787. Initially, the court rejected the State's argument that the conditions placed on defendant as a result of his participation in the day reporting program were analogous to those imposed on a defendant on bail or recognizance, and, consequently, the 160-day limit of section 103-5(b) should apply. The court noted that the circuit court is responsible for either admitting a defendant to bail or placing him on recognizance. 353 Ill.App.3d at 183, 288 Ill.Dec. 852, 818 N.E.2d 787. In the present case, "the trial court had no involvement in the decision to place defendant in the day reporting program. The decision was made entirely by the sheriff's department, and the sheriff's department alone determined the conditions of defendant's `release' into the program." 353 Ill.App.3d at 183, 288 Ill.Dec. 852, 818 N.E.2d 787. For this reason, the appellate court rejected "any suggestion that defendant was `on bail or recognizance' within the meaning of the statute." 353 Ill.App.3d at 183, 288 Ill.Dec. 852, 818 N.E.2d 787.

The appellate court considered next defendant's contention that he was "in custody" within the meaning of the speedy-trial provision. While recognizing that the conditions of day reporting noted above were far less onerous than physical confinement in the Cook County Department of Corrections, the court concluded that defendant was nevertheless in the custody of the sheriff's department and "in custody" within the meaning of the speedy-trial statute. 353 Ill.App.3d at 184, 288 Ill.Dec. 852, 818 N.E.2d 787. The court reasoned: "[I]t is unclear what legal recourse, if any, defendant would have had if the sheriff's department had unilaterally decided that he was no longer eligible for the day reporting program or decided to discontinue the program entirely. Accordingly, we must conclude that defendant remained under the control of the sheriff's department, which retained the power to imprison defendant. We are reluctant to find that the sheriff's release of defendant, unauthorized by the trial court, circumvented the prophylactic effect of the 120-day rule." 353 Ill.App.3d at 184, 288 Ill.Dec. 852, 818 N.E.2d 787.

The appellate court found support for its holding in this court's opinion in People v. Simmons, 88 Ill.2d 270, 58 Ill.Dec. 781, 430 N.E.2d 1032 (1981), where a prisoner, who was allowed six hours of independent day release at a shopping center, was found to have escaped from a "penal institution" when he failed to return to prison as scheduled. 353 Ill.App.3d at 184, 288 Ill.Dec. 852, 818 N.E.2d 787. The appellate court also relied on the holding in Moss, 274 Ill.App.3d at 82, 210 Ill.Dec. 949,...