People v. Campa

• Decision Date: 01 October 2004
• Docket Number: No. 1-03-0923.,1-03-0923.
• Citation: 288 Ill.Dec. 852,818 N.E.2d 787,353 Ill. App.3d 178
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Benjamin CAMPA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

818 N.E.2d 787

353 Ill. App.3d 178

288 Ill.Dec. 852

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.Benjamin CAMPA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-03-0923.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Sixth Division.

October 1, 2004.

Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, County of Cook(Renee Goldfarb, Manny Magence, Amit Trivedi, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for Appellee.

Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, Kimberly Jansen, Steven W. Becker, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for Appellant.

Justice TULLYdelivered the opinion of the court:

Following a bench trial, defendant, Benjamin Campa, was found guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2)(West 2000)), driving without a license (625 ILCS 5/6-101(West 2000)), and operating an uninsured motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/3-707(West 2000)).The trial court sentenced defendant to 24 month's supervision and fined defendant a total of $555.Defendant appeals contending, inter alia, that the trial court erred when it denied his petition for discharge based on a violation of the speedy-trial provision of section 103-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963(the Code)(725 ILCS 5/103-5(West 2000)) because the trial court incorrectly held that he was not "in custody" while participating in the Cook County sheriff's day reporting program.We reverse.

BACKGROUND

The relevant facts are not in dispute.Defendant was arrested on August 19, 2001.The record is unclear, but he was apparently placed on electronic home monitoring shortly after his arrest.The parties do not dispute that defendant was "in custody" for a period of 15 days while on electronic home monitoring.On September 5, 2001, defendant signed a document entitled "Agreement Governing Transfer to the Day Reporting Center."The agreement provided:

"This document constitutes an agreement between the above named participant, who has been released under the Cook County Department of Corrections administrative furlough, and the Department of Community Supervision and Intervention, Day Reporting Program.The agreement specifies the terms and conditions by which the undersigned is released to the Day Reporting Program.

PROGRAM CONDITIONS

Report to the DRC as scheduled.

Shall not leave the State of Illinois without permission of the court.

Attend all portions of the DRC program as determined and abide by program rules.

Attend all scheduled court dates and inform DRC personnel of any changes in dates or court status.

Submit to urinalysis as scheduled and participate in outpatient and/or residential drug and alcohol counseling/treatment as determined.

Report any changes in address and living arrangements within 24 hours.

If employed or in school, attend as reported.

Upon request of DRC personnel, furnish proof of school and/or employment, if applicable.

Notify DRC personnel immediately of any new arrests or outstanding warrants.

Refrain from use of alcohol and/or illicit substances.

Refrain from possessing a firearm or other dangerous weapons.

I have read or have had the above conditions read and explained to me and understand them.I understand that I am under the supervision of the DCSI Day Reporting Center as a condition of my release under administrative furlough and agree to abide by all DRC conditions and rules.I understand that my failure to comply with the above and any additional conditions shall result in the revocation of this agreement and return to the Cook County Department of Corrections."

Before trial, defendant petitioned for discharge arguing that he was "in custody" and that more than 120 days had elapsed.The State responded, arguing that participation in the day reporting program was no different from being out on bond.The trial court held that defendant was not "in custody" within the meaning of the Code's speedy-trial provision and denied the petition for discharge.Defendant was subsequently tried and convicted.The State does not contest defendant's calculation that 157 days, not attributable to him, elapsed before trial.

In a posttrial motion, defendant again raised his speedy-trial challenge to his conviction.The trial court again held that defendant was not in custody.Defendant requested the trial court to make a finding regarding whether defendant was released on bail or recognizance, but the trial court refused to rule on the issue.Defendant timely appeals.

DISCUSSION

Defendant first contends that the trial court erred when it denied his petition for discharge because he was "in custody" within the meaning of the Code while participating in the day reporting program.This contention requires us to interpret the meaning of the phrase "in custody" in the Code.The construction of a statute presents a question of law that we may review de novo.People v. Belk,203 Ill.2d 187, 192, 271 Ill.Dec. 271,784 N.E.2d 825(2003).

The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.Belk,203 Ill.2d at 192, 271 Ill.Dec. 271, 784 N.E.2d 825, citingPeople v. Richardson,196 Ill.2d 225, 228, 256 Ill.Dec. 267, 751 N.E.2d 1104(2001).The starting point for determining the intent of the legislature is the language of the statute itself.People v. Robinson,172 Ill.2d 452, 457, 217 Ill.Dec. 729, 667 N.E.2d 1305(1996).Section 103-5 provides:

"Speedy trial.

(a) Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for fitness ordered pursuant to Section 104-13 of this Act, by a fitness hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness to stand trial, by a continuance allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of this Act after a court's determination of the defendant's physical incapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal.Delay shall be considered to be agreed to by the defendant unless he or she objects to the delay by making a written demand for trial or an oral demand for trial on the record.

* * *

(b) Every person on bail or recognizance shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 160 days from the date defendant demands trial unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for fitness ordered pursuant to Section 104-13 of this Act, by a fitness hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness to stand trial, by a continuance allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of this Act after a court's determination of the defendant's physical incapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal.The defendant's failure to appear for any court date set by the court operates to waive the defendant's demand for trial made under this subsection.

* * *

(d) Every person not tried in accordance with subsections (a), (b) and (c) of this Section shall be discharged from custody or released from the obligations of his bail or recognizance."725 ILCS 5/103-5(West 2000).

In Illinois, criminal defendants enjoy both constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial.U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV;Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 8;725 ILCS 5/103-5(a)(West 2000).Although similar, these rights are not necessarily coextensive.People v. Mayo,198 Ill.2d 530, 535, 261 Ill.Dec. 910, 764 N.E.2d 525(2002).Generally, the speedy-trial provision of the Code can be viewed as establishing a bright-line standard, which, if observed, prevents the constitutional speedy-trial issue from arising in a case.SeePeople v. Gooden,189 Ill.2d 209, 220, 244 Ill.Dec. 361, 725 N.E.2d 1248(2000).Because it enforces a constitutional right, the speedy-trial provision of the Code must be liberally construed in favor of a defendant.People v. Colson,339 Ill.App.3d 1039, 1047, 274 Ill.Dec. 558, 791 N.E.2d 650(2003).

Our resolution of this appeal turns on our determination of whether defendant was "in custody" within the meaning of the statute.Defendant argues that he was and that his conviction must be reversed because he was not tried within the 120-day limit of section 103-5(a).The State counters that the conditions placed on defendant as a result of his participation in the day reporting program were analogous to those imposed on a defendant on bail or recognizance and that the 160-day limit of section 103-5(b) should apply.Because the statute does not define the word "custody,"we must assume that the legislature intended the term to have its ordinary and popularly understood meaning.SeePeople v. Maggette,195 Ill.2d 336, 349, 254 Ill.Dec. 299, 747 N.E.2d 339(2001).One popular legal dictionary defines "custody,"inter alia, as "the detainer of a man's person by virtue of lawful process or authority."Black's Law Dictionary 347 (5th ed.1979).However the dictionary further adds "The term is very elastic and may mean actual imprisonment or physical detention or mere power, legal or physical, of imprisoning or of taking manual possession."Black's Law Dictionary 347 (5th ed.1979).The question before us is whether the legislature intended a similarly elastic meaning when it used the term "custody" in the speedy-trial statute.

Defendant argues that we must consider the meaning of "in custody" in contrast with the phrase "on bail or recognizance," and urges us to apply the rule of statutory construction that the enumeration of one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of all others.SeeBaker v. Miller,159 Ill.2d 249, 260, 201 Ill.Dec. 119, 636 N.E.2d 551(1994).Defendant further argues that if section 103-5(b) does not apply to a defendant, section 103-5(a) must.The rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not a rule of law, but a rule of statutory construction that is subordinate to a strong indication of contrary legislative intent.Baker,159 Ill.2d at 260, 201 Ill.Dec. 119, 636 N.E.2d 551.Further, we believe there may exist circumstances, the enumeration of which is unnecessary...