People v. Campbell

• Decision Date: 05 February 1988
• Docket Number: Docket No. 90923
• Citation: 165 Mich.App. 1,418 N.W.2d 404
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Billy CAMPBELL, Defendant-Appellant. 165 Mich.App. 1, 418 N.W.2d 404
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 404

418 N.W.2d 404

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Billy CAMPBELL, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 90923.

165 Mich.App. 1, 418 N.W.2d 404

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 17, 1987.

Decided Dec. 8, 1987.

Released for Publication Feb. 5, 1988.

[165 MICHAPP 3] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Paul L. Maloney, Pros. Atty., and David P. LaForge, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the people.

Matthew Posner, Detroit, for defendant-appellant on appeal.

Before SAWYER, P.J., and MacKENZIE and CAPRATHE, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of bank robbery, M.C.L. Sec. 750.531; M.S.A. Sec. 28.799, and unarmed robbery, M.C.L. Sec. 750.530; M.S.A. Sec. 28.798. He subsequently pled guilty to habitual offender, second offense, M.C.L. Sec. 769.10; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1082, with regard to the bank robbery conviction and habitual offender, third offense, M.C.L. Sec. 769.11; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1083, with regard to the unarmed robbery conviction. Defendant was sentenced to ten to fifty years imprisonment for bank robbery and ten to thirty years imprisonment for the unarmed robbery conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We vacate defendant's convictions and sentence for unarmed robbery and habitual offender, third offense, and affirm his convictions and sentence for bank robbery and habitual offender, second offense.

The incident giving rise to the instant case occurred on February 26, 1985, at the Old Kent Bank in Niles. Defendant approached bank teller Christine Holmes, held his arm in a manner that [165 MICHAPP 4] looked as if he had a gun, told the teller not to move, and ordered her to put $20 bills in a bag. He then left the bank. Only one teller was threatened and only the bank's money was taken.

Defendant was charged in a two-count information with unarmed robbery and bank robbery. Count I charged that defendant "did feloniously rob, steal and take from the person of another, to-wit: Chris Holmes, or in her presence, certain property, to wit: money, by force and violence or by assault or putting in fear, but not while being armed with a dangerous weapon." Count II charged that defendant "did, with intent to commit the crime of larceny, put in fear another person, to wit: Chris Holmes, for the purpose of stealing money from a bank, to-wit: Old Kent Bank, West Side Branch." Defendant was convicted as charged.

Defendant contends that his convictions for unarmed robbery and bank robbery are violative of the double jeopardy clause's protection against multiple punishment. Both the United States Supreme Court and our Supreme Court have stated that, in the context of multiple punishment at a single trial, the issue whether two convictions involve the same offense for purposes of protection against multiple punishment is solely one of legislative intent. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 678, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983); People v. Robideau, 419 Mich. 458, 485, 355 N.W.2d 592 (1984).

Legislative intent may be gleaned from the societal norms addressed by each of the crimes of which the defendant was convicted. See Robideau, supra at 487, 355 N.W.2d 592. Statutes prohibiting conduct that is violative of distinct social norms can generally be viewed as separate and amenable to permitting multiple punishments. On the other hand,

[165 MICHAPP 5] "[w]here two statutes prohibit violations of the same social norm, albeit in a somewhat different manner, as a general principle it can be concluded that the Legislature did not intend multiple punishments. For example, the crimes of larceny over $100, MCL 750.356; MSA 28.588, and larceny in a building, MCL 750.360; MSA 28.592, although having separate elements, are aimed at conduct too similar to conclude that multiple punishment was intended." 419 Mich. 458, 487, 355 N.W.2d 592.

Legislative intent may also be gleaned from the overall statutory scheme. The statutes may show an intent to create a series of offenses prohibiting different phases of conduct, with separate penalties for each. This structure indicates a legislative intent to create separate offenses, separately punishable. People v. Sturgis, 427 Mich. 392, 407, 397 N.W.2d 783 (1986). On the other hand, the Legislature may create a hierarchy of offenses, depending upon the presence or absence of certain aggravating factors. This structure is indicative of an intention to permit only a single appropriate offense and conviction. Id.

In People v. Witt, 140 Mich.App. 365, 364 N.W.2d 692 (1985), a panel of this Court found a legislative intent to permit punishment under both the bank robbery statute and the armed robbery statute, M.C.L. Sec. 750.529; M.S.A. Sec. 28.797, because the two statutes addressed protection of different societal norms. The panel found that the bank robbery statute was "apparently aimed at the protection of funds kept in a building, bank, safe, vault or other depository of money, as well as the protection of persons charged with guarding the money and those otherwise in custody of the money." 140 Mich.App. 365, 370, 364 N.W.2d 692. In contrast, according to the Witt Court, the armed robbery statute "is aimed at persons who violate social norms by taking property[165 MICHAPP 6] from the presence of another by force or threat of force while armed with a weapon."

We think Witt was wrongly decided. We base this conclusion on our belief that the bank robbery statute and the armed and unarmed robbery statutes were all intended by the Legislature to prohibit conduct violative of the same societal norm. Not unlike the Witt Court, we understand the unarmed robbery statute to be aimed at protecting persons from having property taken from them or in their presence by force or threat of force. Our disagreement with Witt lies in the characterization of the bank robbery statute.

The bank robbery statute encompasses two distinct offenses, namely bank robbery involving assaultive conduct and safecracking. People v. Adams, 128 Mich.App. 25, 30, 339 N.W.2d 687 (1983). We are of the opinion that, to the extent that the bank robbery statute addresses the type of the bank robbery at issue here, i.e., "nonsafecracking" bank robbery, it was intended to protect people rather than funds or buildings. The language of the statute makes it clear that the prohibited conduct is the threatening or injuring of another in order to take money, not the actual stealing. As codified in 1897 C.L. 11506; 1915 C.L. 15229; and 1929 C.L. 16748, the offense was classified as an offense against persons, not a property offense. The compilers described the statute as "punishment for injury or putting in fear any person for the purpose of committing bank robbery," not as a source of protection of funds in a depository. Concededly, the classifications and notations of the compilers of statutes are not binding upon us. Nevertheless, they do document the overall scheme of the robbery statutes, a...