People v. Campbell

• Decision Date: 05 October 1987
• Docket Number: No. 2-86-0414,2-86-0414
• Citation: 161 Ill.App.3d 147,514 N.E.2d 241,112 Ill.Dec. 775
• Parties: , 112 Ill.Dec. 775 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frank CAMPBELL, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 241

514 N.E.2d 241

161 Ill.App.3d 147, 112 Ill.Dec. 775

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frank CAMPBELL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-86-0414.

Appellate Court of Illinois Second District.

Oct. 5, 1987.

G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, Steven E. Wiltgen (argued), Asst. Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for Frank Campbell.

Paul A. Logli, Winnebago County State's Atty., Rockford, William L. Browers, Deputy Director, State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, Robert J. Biderman, State's Attys. Appellate Service Com'n, Peter C. Drummond, Staff Atty., State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Springfield, for the People.

Justice DUNN delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Frank Campbell, was convicted by a jury of burglary (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 19-1) and was sentenced to a six-year term of imprisonment. Three issues are raised on appeal: (1) whether the investigative detention and pat-down search of defendant was illegal; (2) whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed a felonious intent at the time of entry; and (3) whether the trial court erred in ruling that certain testimony sought to be introduced by the defendant was inadmissible hearsay. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand.

Defendant was charged with burglarizing the private office of Luann Poole which was located on the third floor of the Rockford Trust office building (Trust building) in Rockford. Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress physical evidence seized from his person at the time of his arrest. At the suppression hearing, the following pertinent facts were revealed.

Officer Gary Reffett, a 16-year veteran of the Rockford police department, testified that on December 27, 1985, at 12:56 p.m., he was advised by the dispatcher to investigate a suspicious person report conveyed to police by David Mayfield, an attorney whose office was located on the fourth floor of the 12-story Trust building. Reffett had worked as a security guard at the Trust building on his off hours during the previous six to eight months. Reffett was hired on account of numerous reports of property being stolen from the building. One month earlier, a purse had been reported stolen from a third-floor office. Reffett arrived at the building within one minute of the dispatch and proceeded by elevator to the fourth floor. There he spoke with Mayfield, who advised Reffett that he had observed a "Negro" male in the hallway outside his office acting "suspiciously." Mayfield described the man as having a medium build, with a dark complexion and some facial hair. The man was wearing a brown cap with flaps, a brown suede jacket and Levi's. The man had walked past his office and proceeded down the hallway toward a storage area. Mayfield indicated he did not believe the man was one of the workers who periodically retrieved tools from the storage area. After talking to Mayfield, Reffett checked the storage area on the fourth floor and found nothing. Reffett then radioed the description provided by Mayfield to the dispatcher and advised that the suspect was no longer on the fourth floor.

Meanwhile, Officer Augustine Hernandez had arrived at the lobby of the building. Upon hearing that the suspect had left the fourth floor, Hernandez proceeded up the building's staircase. Between the third and fourth floors, Hernandez suddenly observed a man in front of him who fit the description provided by Mayfield which had previously been relayed by the dispatcher. The first thing defendant did was place his hands in the pockets of his jacket. Hernandez asked defendant for his name, but defendant did not answer. Hernandez then turned the defendant around and told him to put his hands up on the wall. When defendant failed to do so, Hernandez pulled defendant's hands out of his pockets and placed them on the wall. Hernandez again asked defendant for his name, but defendant did not respond. Hernandez then started patting down defendant for weapons. Defendant again tried to place his hands in his jacket pockets, and Hernandez again put defendant's hands on the wall. At this juncture, Reffett arrived on the scene. Hernandez continued patting down defendant and again attempted to ascertain defendant's identity. Defendant apparently provided the officers with two or three different identifications, none of which was correct. In defendant's lower jacket pockets, Hernandez observed a checkbook folder protruding from one pocket and a coin purse protruding from the other pocket. Hernandez removed the items from the pockets and gave them to Reffett. Hernandez then completed the pat-down search. No weapons were found. On cross-examination, Hernandez admitted the checkbook and coin purse did not look or feel like a gun or knife or any other kind of weapon.

Reffett testified substantially the same as Hernandez regarding the sequence of events surrounding the pat-down search. Reffett added that, when he received the checkbook and coin purse from Hernandez, he opened up the checkbook to see whose name was on the checks. Reffett discovered the name on the checks was Luann Poole. Reffett recognized the name as that of an office worker on the third floor, who had filed a stolen purse report one month earlier. Poole had stated that her purse had been removed from a drawer of her desk located in her third-floor office. The intruder had been described as a black male. Reffett added that members of the public would not normally be near Poole's office area. After looking at the checkbook, Reffett advised defendant he was under arrest.

The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress.

At trial, David Mayfield testified that at approximately 12:50 p.m. on December 27, 1985, he observed defendant, whom he had not seen before, in the hallway outside his office coming from an area where there were no offices. Mayfield's office was located adjacent to the door leading to the stairway, and across the hall from three elevators. Luann Poole testified her office was on the third floor of the Trust building. Poole's office was located approximately four steps from the door leading to the stairway. The entryway to Poole's office consisted of two seven-foot high glass openings, one for the door and another for an adjoining window. Poole's desk was situated approximately seven steps from the office entrance. Poole worked as a loan processor for a bank and did not have any client contact at her office. She stated it was unusual for anyone other than her two co-workers to enter her office. On December 27 at about 12:50 p.m., Poole left her office to go to lunch. She left her purse containing her checkbook and wallet (her description of the item referred to by the officers as a coin purse) in one of the drawers of her desk. When Poole left her office for lunch, co-worker JoAnn Andrew remained. Fifteen minutes after she left for lunch, Poole identified as hers the checkbook and coin purse obtained from defendant. JoAnn Andrew testified she observed Poole leave the office. Andrew left approximately five minutes after Poole, leaving the door unlocked. Officers Reffett and Hernandez testified as they had at the motion to suppress.

Defendant called Tharveal Johnson for purposes of presenting testimony regarding a conversation Johnson and defendant had concerning employment at the Trust building on the day of the alleged burglary. The court refused to allow Johnson to testify regarding the conversation on grounds the testimony involved inadmissible hearsay. The defendant rested his case following the court's ruling precluding Johnson's testimony.

The jury found the defendant guilty of burglary.

On appeal, defendant first argues his detention by Hernandez was illegal because the articulable facts known by Hernandez prior to detaining him in the stairway failed to create a reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in criminal activity. Defendant claims the information from the citizen's complaint did not bear a sufficient indicia of reliability, and defendant's hand movements were unremarkable. Defendant also argues factoring in Reffett's knowledge of prior burglaries in the building has no effect because the information was stale, and the description of the perpetrator was limited to "black male."

For a police officer to lawfully stop a citizen in a public place, there must be specific and articulable facts which taken together with the rational inferences therefrom create a reasonable suspicion that the person in question has committed or is about to commit a crime. (Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906; Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 107-14.) Although a mere suspicion or inarticulable hunch is insufficient to justify a warrantless stop (People v. Fox (1981), 97 Ill.App.3d 58, 62, 52 Ill.Dec. 219, 421 N.E.2d 1082), probable cause need not be present. (People v. Zielinski (1980), 91 Ill.App.3d 519, 521, 46 Ill.Dec. 960, 414 N.E.2d 1113.) Where police officers are working together, the knowledge of each is the knowledge of all. (People v. Waln (1983), 120 Ill.App.3d 73, 77, 75 Ill.Dec. 537, 457 N.E.2d 979.) Consequently, the reasonable suspicion necessary to stop a defendant may be established on the basis of the aggregated and cumulative information known to the police officers working in concert. (People v. Hobson (1983), 117 Ill.App.3d 191, 202, 72 Ill.Dec. 518, 452 N.E.2d 771.) Therefore, whether the stop of defendant by Hernandez was justified does not depend solely on the facts known to Hernandez at the time of the stop; rather, the facts known to both Hernandez and Reffett must be considered. Finally, the absence of any conclusive rules for determining whether an investigatory stop is justified requires that each case be adjudicated on its particular facts. People v. Moffitt (1985), 138 Ill.App.3d 106, 112, 92 Ill.Dec. 702, 485 N.E.2d...