People v. Campbell, No. 71335

CourtSupreme Court of Illinois
Writing for the CourtFREEMAN
Parties, 166 Ill.Dec. 932 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Charles A. CAMPBELL, Appellee.
Docket NumberNo. 71335
Decision Date30 January 1992

Page 1261

586 N.E.2d 1261
146 Ill.2d 363, 166 Ill.Dec. 932
The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,
v.
Charles A. CAMPBELL, Appellee.
No. 71335.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
Jan. 30, 1992.

Page 1263

[146 Ill.2d 368] [166 Ill.Dec. 934] Neil F. Hartigan and Roland W. Burris, Attys. Gen., Springfield, and Edward A. Burmila, Jr., State's Atty., Joliet (Kenneth R. Boyle, John X. Breslin, and Jay Paul Hoffman of the office of the State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.

[146 Ill.2d 369] Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Verlin R. Meinz, Asst. Defender, of the office of the State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, for appellee.

Justice FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Will County, defendant, Charles A. Campbell, was convicted of residential burglary (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 19-3) and sentenced to five years' imprisonment.

The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, reversed defendant's conviction, holding that he was not found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (205 Ill.App.3d 591, 151 Ill.Dec. 126, 563 N.E.2d 1232). We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill.2d R. 315(a)).

The singular issue presented for our review, as framed by the State, is whether shoeprint evidence, standing alone, is sufficient to convict. We answer the inquiry in the affirmative. Therefore, we reverse.

FACTS

Jeffrey Miller testified that on March 9, 1989, he resided at 308 Willard in Joliet, Illinois, a house also occupied by Susan Lewis Buchanan. On the morning of the 9th, he and Buchanan left for work together. That evening, shortly after 9 p.m., when Miller returned home from work, he found that the front door to the house was wide open, most of the lights inside the home were on, the house was in disarray, and there were wet, muddy footprints throughout the living room and kitchen. Bills, which had been on the kitchen table that morning, were scattered over the kitchen and living room floors. When Miller and Buchanan left home, however, only a small lamp in the living room had been left burning. Miller noticed also that a television and VCR [146 Ill.2d 370] were missing. He then summoned the police. At about 10:30 p.m., after police completed their investigation, Miller left the house and picked up Buchanan from work.

On cross-examination, Miller testified that when he arrived there were wet, muddy prints on the linoleum kitchen floor and on the living room carpet. However, he could not testify as to whether a shoeprint on an Illinois Bell Telephone envelope, which one of the investigating officers found lying on the floor, was wet or dry. Miller testified that he did not know defendant and that he had not given anyone permission to enter the house on March 9.

Officer Rex Provensale, an evidence technician with the Joliet police department, was one of the officers who responded to Miller's summons. During his investigation, Provensale found an empty, Illinois Bell Telephone bill "window" envelope lying on the floor in the living room/dining room area of the house. There was a

Page 1264

[166 Ill.Dec. 935] shoeprint on the envelope. Provensale examined Miller's shoes, as well as those of the other investigating officers at the scene. From his examination, Provensale determined that their shoes did not match the print on the envelope.

Provensale also retrieved a latent fingerprint from a videotape container which he found lying on the floor. The parties stipulated at trial that the fingerprint revealed no identification.

Provensale further testified that there was mud on the carpeting, but he did not recall whether there was mud anywhere else in the house. On cross-examination, he stated that he did not recall whether the shoeprint on the envelope was wet.

Officer Richard Fonck testified that on March 12, 1989, he was on duty as an evidence technician at the Joliet police station. While on duty, he encountered defendant, who was at the station on an unrelated matter. Fonck observed that defendant was wearing tennis [146 Ill.2d 371] shoes, which when compared to a photograph taken by Provensale of the print on the telephone bill envelope, appeared similar in design. Fonck obtained defendant's shoes, which were subsequently sent to the State crime laboratory for examination.

Officer James Klancer testified that while he was on patrol on May 24, 1989, he observed defendant walking along a residential street with a group of individuals. Klancer stopped his vehicle, and without specifying the charge, informed defendant that he had a warrant for his arrest. After a foot chase, defendant was apprehended at his home.

Walter Sherk, a forensic scientist employed by the Illinois State Police crime laboratory in Joliet, testified that he had been with the forensic bureau of the crime lab for about 14 1/2 years, working in the specific area of firearms, tool marks and shoeprints. Sherk further testified that he received a bachelor's degree in forensic science, and two years' on-the-job training in his field of expertise. Additionally, Sherk testified that he had attended a Federal Bureau of Investigation course in shoeprint identification, and that he attends annual lectures and meetings regarding shoeprint identification. In his career, Sherk testified, he has performed approximately 300 shoeprint comparisons and testified in approximately 15 cases on his shoeprint analyses.

Sherk testified that, for purposes of shoeprint analysis, class characteristics refer to the size and pattern of the shoe, and individual characteristics refer to such things as nicks, cuts, and scratches, which are picked up after the shoe has been worn over a period of time. In comparing shoeprints, an examiner looks for both types of characteristics.

Sherk stated that the Illinois Bell envelope bore two separate shoe impressions made by what appeared to be dust or dirt. He performed a comparison of the Nike [146 Ill.2d 372] brand tennis shoes taken from defendant with the prints on the envelope. On the basis of dissimilar patterns, he concluded that the smaller of the two prints on the envelope could not have been made by defendant's shoes.

Sherk made a "test print" from defendant's right shoe for comparison with the larger print on the envelope. The "test print" was made by inking the sole of the shoe and stepping on white paper. The larger print showed two-thirds of the middle portion of a shoe. Based upon his comparison, Sherk found the shoe size and "patterns" consistent with defendant's shoe. Additionally, he identified six matching individual class characteristics. From this analysis, Sherk testified that he could positively identify defendant's right shoe as having made the larger shoeprint on the envelope.

On cross-examination, Sherk testified that there is no requisite number of characteristics necessary for an identification. Each identification depends on the uniqueness of the individual characteristics. Depending on what the marks look like, an identification could possibly be made based on two or three marks. Sherk testified that he could say neither where the envelope was when the print was made, nor when the print was made.

Page 1265

[166 Ill.Dec. 936] Sherk testified that if a shoe is worn for some period of time after the shoeprint is placed on an exhibit, some change in the shoe's characteristics could occur. Further, on cross-examination, the following colloquy occurred:

"Q. [Defense attorney]: Are there any dissimilar points in the shoe and in the print on the envelope?

A. There are points, yes. There are dissimilarities, obviously, that may not show up on the test print or the evidence.

* * * * * *

Q. I'm saying did you find some dissimilar points, some things that were on the envelope that weren't on the shoe?

[146 Ill.2d 373] A. Well, there may be, but I didn't look for dissimilarities. I mean. It's granted that there are dissimilarities in the shoe. There are points that are not going to possibly match up. You're talking about the wear, after the shoe print was on the shoe. And there may be--

THE COURT: * * * How can you know if a dissimilarity is wear or how can you know if a dissimilarity was there before or after the offense?

A. There are a number of factors that come into play. There could be dirt on the portion of the shoe that is not there when I have the shoe, that was there at the time the shoe print was made.

THE COURT: But how would you know that?

A. I don't know that, if there was or there wasn't.

THE COURT: Would you presume that if there was a dissimilarity?

A. I would presume it could be that, or it could be the fact that the shoe was worn after the shoe impression was made, and therefore it changed.

* * * * * *

If you have the correspondence of individual characteristics that are present on both, then you have to assume that the areas, the one little nick or something that may not show up on the test print, then that area was possible [sic ] distorted after the original impression was made, or there may be dirt or something that was present at the time the shoe print or the test print with the impression on the evidence with the sufficient correspondence of individual characteristics that are present on both that are present and you can see them, then those are identifying marks that enable you to positively identify that shoe.

Q. So, you can't tell us here now whether there is any dissimilar things on the print on the envelope and the shoe print?

A. Well, again, I didn't mark and specifically identify any dissimilarities. There may well be some though."

Further, during cross-examination, the trial judge asked Sherk whether he meant that the second print on [146 Ill.2d 374] the envelope was smaller because it was a smaller size shoe or just a smaller print because of the way it was on the envelope. Sherk stated it was just a smaller print; to distinguish it from the...

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468 practice notes
  • People v. C.B. (In re C.B.), Docket No. 107750
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • 30 Junio 2011
    ...When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, a reviewing court applies a reasonable doubt standard. People v. Campbell, 146 Ill. 2d 363, 374 (1992). The reasonable doubt standard applies in delinquency proceedings, requiring the State to prove the elements of the substantive......
  • People v. Baugh, No. 1-03-2551.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • 18 Julio 2005
    ...of the trier of fact on questions involving the weight to be assigned the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. People v. Campbell, 146 Ill.2d 363, 375, 166 Ill.Dec. 932, 586 N.E.2d 1261 (1992). Defendant's argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is unpersuasive because the w......
  • People v. Tabb, No. 1-05-1640.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 14 Junio 2007
    ...Where the evidence allows conflicting inferences, resolving such conflicts is within the province of the jury. People v. Campbell, 146 Ill.2d 363, 380, 166 Ill.Dec. 932, 586 N.E.2d 1261 (1992). Likewise, the determination of a defendant's intent from circumstantial evidence is a task best s......
  • People v. Walensky, No. 1-95-1533
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 31 Diciembre 1996
    ...resolve questions involving weight of the evidence, credibility of witnesses or resolution of conflicting testimony. People v. Campbell, 146 Ill.2d 363, 166 Ill.Dec. 932, 586 N.E.2d 1261 (1992); People v. Jimerson, 127 Ill.2d 12, 129 Ill.Dec. 124, 535 N.E.2d 889 (1989); People v. Carrasquil......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
469 cases
  • People v. C.B. (In re C.B.), Docket No. 107750
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • 30 Junio 2011
    ...When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, a reviewing court applies a reasonable doubt standard. People v. Campbell, 146 Ill. 2d 363, 374 (1992). The reasonable doubt standard applies in delinquency proceedings, requiring the State to prove the elements of the substantive......
  • People v. Baugh, No. 1-03-2551.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • 18 Julio 2005
    ...of the trier of fact on questions involving the weight to be assigned the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. People v. Campbell, 146 Ill.2d 363, 375, 166 Ill.Dec. 932, 586 N.E.2d 1261 (1992). Defendant's argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is unpersuasive because the w......
  • People v. Tabb, No. 1-05-1640.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 14 Junio 2007
    ...Where the evidence allows conflicting inferences, resolving such conflicts is within the province of the jury. People v. Campbell, 146 Ill.2d 363, 380, 166 Ill.Dec. 932, 586 N.E.2d 1261 (1992). Likewise, the determination of a defendant's intent from circumstantial evidence is a task best s......
  • People v. Walensky, No. 1-95-1533
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 31 Diciembre 1996
    ...resolve questions involving weight of the evidence, credibility of witnesses or resolution of conflicting testimony. People v. Campbell, 146 Ill.2d 363, 166 Ill.Dec. 932, 586 N.E.2d 1261 (1992); People v. Jimerson, 127 Ill.2d 12, 129 Ill.Dec. 124, 535 N.E.2d 889 (1989); People v. Carrasquil......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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