People v. Campbell

• Decision Date: 17 July 2002
• Docket Number: No. 4-01-0551.,4-01-0551.
• Citation: 265 Ill.Dec. 856,332 Ill. App.3d 808,773 N.E.2d 218
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard D. CAMPBELL, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

773 N.E.2d 218

332 Ill. App.3d 808

265 Ill.Dec. 856

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard D. CAMPBELL, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 4-01-0551.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

July 17, 2002.

Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender (Court-appointed), Gary R. Peterson, Assistant Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for Richard D. Campbell, Jr.

John C. Piland, Champaign County State's Attorney, Urbana, Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Robert J. Biderman, Deputy Director, Jeffrey K. Davison, Staff Attorney, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Springfield, for the People.

Justice STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In March 2001, the State charged defendant, Richard D. Campbell, Jr., with residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-3 (West 2000)). In May 2001, a jury convicted defendant of the lesser included offense of criminal trespass to a residence (720 ILCS 5/19-4 (West 2000)), and the trial court later sentenced him to 364 days in jail.

Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) he was denied his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him when his lawyer stipulated without defendant's knowing consent to the testimony of the key prosecution witness and (2) the trial court erred at sentencing by imposing the maximum sentence based on its finding that defendant's conduct "threatened serious harm." We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In March 2001, the State charged defendant with residential burglary, alleging that he knowingly and without authority entered the dwelling place of Blake M. Hoerr and Griff P. Powell, located at 1001 South First Street in Champaign (hereinafter the residence).

At defendant's May 2001 jury trial, Powell testified that on March 13, 2001, he was a student at the University of Illinois (University) living at the residence with Hoerr and six other men. Spring break at the University had started a few days earlier and Powell and Hoerr both planned to leave Champaign that day.

The mailbox next to the front door of the residence contained four or five names, and on March 13, 2001, there were no signs on the front of the residence indicating that there was a room for rent. Around 10:15 a.m. that day, Powell was in his room on the second floor of the residence and Hoerr was sleeping on the couch in the first-floor living room when Powell heard a loud, banging noise on the front door. Powell knew Hoerr was in the living room, so Powell did not go downstairs to answer the front door. However, the loud knocking continued for a few minutes and then Powell heard talking. Powell then started down the stairs to the first floor and saw defendant speaking to Hoerr as defendant made his way out the door.

After defendant left, Powell and Hoerr both thought it would be a good idea to call the police because they both planned to leave town that day and "these empty houses are easy to break into." Powell and Hoerr both thought that defendant's entry into the residence was strange. Powell did not authorize defendant to come into the residence and had never seen him before.

Dennis Thomas testified that he had been a Champaign police officer for 27 years and in March 2001, he was assigned to the University campus area. Spring and winter breaks are significant to police officers working that area because, due to the absence of students, the burglary rate goes up tremendously. Around 10:17 a.m. on March 13, 2001, he was dispatched to the area near the residence, and based upon the description he received, he stopped defendant a few blocks away.

Defendant first told Thomas that he had not been in the residence. When Thomas informed defendant of a report that a person fitting his description had been there, defendant said that he had been there and was looking for someone. However, when Thomas asked whom he was looking for, defendant could not provide a name. Thomas then arrested defendant.

Powell and Thomas were the only witnesses for the State on the first day of trial. After they testified, the prosecutor requested a continuance until the following day because the State's third and last witness, Hoerr, who was under subpoena, had not appeared that morning for trial as he had promised. The trial court agreed to continue the case until the following morning. When court reconvened the next day, the prosecutor informed the trial court that the parties had reached a stipulation regarding Hoerr's testimony and that after the court accepted the stipulation, the State would rest. The attorneys then presented the court with a written stipulation signed by each of them. The stipulation the court read to the jury stated as follows:

"Blake Hoerr currently lives in Maryland pursuant to his employment and is not present to testify. It is stipulated by the parties that if called as a witness, Blake Hoerr, would testify as follows:

That on March 3, [sic] 2001[,] at approximately 10:15 a.m., he was sleeping on a couch in the living room when he was awakened by someone knocking on the front door. After hearing several knocks, he heard the interior wooden front door open. He sat up and looked over the back of the couch and saw the defendant, Richard D. Campbell, Jr., in the hallway. When the [d]efendant saw him, the defendant asked him if he had a room for rent. He would testify that he told the defendant that he did not and the defendant then left the residence. The defendant did not have his permission to enter the residence. After the defendant left the residence, Blake Hoerr called 911 and reported that a white male had entered the residence without authority. He provided a description of the defendant to the 911 dispatcher.

Blake Hoerr would testify that he was transported to the intersection of First Street and Springfield Avenue at 10:30 a.m. and positively identified the defendant as the person who entered his residence.

The [p]arties agree to the above [s]tipulation."

Both parties then rested, and the trial court, at defendant's request, instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass to a residence. The jury convicted defendant of that offense, and the court sentenced defendant as stated. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Must a Defendant Knowingly and Personally Consent to His Lawyer's Agreement To Stipulate to the Testimony of a Prosecution Witness?

Defendant first argues that he was denied his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him because his lawyer stipulated to the testimony of a key prosecution witness, Hoerr, without defendant's knowing consent. Specifically, he contends that because the record is devoid of any personal, knowing, and voluntary waiver by him of his confrontation rights, the stipulation regarding Hoerr's testimony was improper and violated his confrontation rights.

In support of his argument, defendant cites People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill.2d 127, 138, 246 Ill.Dec. 97, 729 N.E.2d 470, 477 (2000), for the proposition that "[t]rial by affidavit is the primary evil that the confrontation clause was designed to prevent." Defendant also cites Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 339, 39 L.Ed. 409, 411 (1895), which held that the primary object of the constitutional right of confrontation was to prevent the use of depositions or affidavits.

We disagree with defendant's arguments and conclude that the authority he cites is inapposite to the question he raises on appeal—namely, when a defense counsel stipulates to prosecution testimony, may he do so without the defendant's knowing consent? We hold that the answer is yes. Resolution of this issue requires examination of the role played by defense counsel and the extent to which a defendant must personally be involved in decisions affecting his defense or trial. In People v. Ramey, 152 Ill.2d 41, 54, 178 Ill.Dec. 19, 604 N.E.2d 275, 281 (1992), the supreme court discussed four decisions that are ultimately for a criminal defendant to personally make after consulting with his attorney: (1) what plea to enter; (2) whether to waive a jury trial; (3) whether to testify in his behalf; and (4) whether to appeal. The supreme court discussed those decisions in the context of the defense counsel's authority and wrote as follows:

"Beyond these four decisions, however, trial counsel has the right to make the ultimate decision with respect to matters of tactics and strategy after consulting with his client. Such matters include what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike and what trial motions should be made." (Emphasis added.) Ramey, 152 Ill.2d at 54, 178 Ill.Dec. 19, 604 N.E.2d at 281.

At issue in Ramey, a capital murder case, was the defendant's claim that he was denied his constitutional rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel presented a defense of self-defense against defendant's wishes. The supreme court rejected that argument, concluding that defense counsel's assertion of self-defense did not deny defendant due process. Ramey, 152 Ill.2d at 54, 178 Ill.Dec. 19, 604 N.E.2d at 281.

A few years after Ramey, in People v. Brocksmith, 162 Ill.2d 224, 229-30, 205 Ill.Dec. 113, 642 N.E.2d 1230, 1233 (1994), the supreme court added a fifth decision to the list of those which a criminal defendant must personally make. In that case, the supreme court concluded that a defendant in a criminal case, not his counsel, must make the ultimate decision whether to tender a lesser included offense instruction to the trial court with the request that the jury be so instructed. The court explained that

"Because it is defendant's decision whether to initially plead guilty to a lesser charge, it should also be defendant's decision to submit an instruction on a lesser charge at the conclusion of the evidence. In both instances the decisions directly relate to the potential loss of liberty on an initially uncharged offense." Brock

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