People v. Campos
| Decision Date | 23 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 14CA0125 |
| Citation | 351 P.3d 553,2015 COA 47 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Evelin CAMPOS, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Kevin E. McReynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Borquez Law Office, Robert P. Borquez, Denver, Colorado; Law Office of Mark Burton, P.C., K. Mark Burton, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellant.
¶ 1 Defendant, Evelin Campos, appeals the judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding her guilty of identity theft and criminal impersonation. We affirm.
¶ 2 This case involves the unauthorized use of another person's name and social security number for employment purposes. S.A. discovered that several people, including Campos, were using her personal identifying information after the Internal Revenue Service sent her letters regarding earnings reported under her social security number at jobs where she had not worked. S.A.'s application for Medicaid benefits was also denied based on supposedly excessive income. S.A. reported the matter to the police.
¶ 3 A police investigator discovered that an employee of ABM Janitorial Services had been receiving paychecks under the name “S.A.” for approximately four years. Juan Martinez, an ABM manager who was familiar with “S.A.,” accompanied the investigator to meet the employee at her worksite. When confronted by the investigator, the employee admitted that her name was not “S.A.,” but was instead Evelin Campos. Campos was charged with identity theft, criminal impersonation, and two counts of forgery related to her hiring paperwork.
¶ 4 At trial, Campos claimed that she was one of many undocumented workers that Martinez provided with false identity in order to work for ABM. She argued that she did not forge the initial hiring paperwork because she began working for ABM a year after that paperwork was filed.
¶ 5 The jury convicted Campos of identity theft and criminal impersonation but acquitted her of the two forgery counts. The court sentenced Campos to two years supervised probation and entered judgment accordingly.
¶ 6 This appeal followed.
¶ 7 Campos first contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict her of identity theft. Specifically, she argues that there was insufficient evidence that she used S.A.'s identity to “obtain cash, credit, property, services, or any other thing of value” as required under the identity theft statute, because she only did so to obtain employment. § 18–5–902(1)(a), C.R.S. 2014. We conclude that because employment is a “thing of value” within the meaning of the identity theft statute, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.
¶ 8 Campos raised this contention at trial when she moved for a judgment of acquittal on the identity theft charge after the prosecution's case-in-chief, after the defense rested, and after the jury rendered its verdicts. The trial court denied the motions, ruling that the wages Campos received constituted “cash” for purposes of the identity theft statute. We affirm but we do so based on a different analysis of the statute. See Premier Members Fed. Credit Union v. Block, 2013 COA 128, ¶ 9, 312 P.3d 276 ().
¶ 9 We review de novo whether the evidence before the jury was sufficient both in quantity and quality to sustain a conviction. Clark v. People, 232 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Colo. 2010). We must determine “ ‘whether the relevant evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Bennett , 183 Colo. 125, 130, 515 P.2d 466, 469 (1973) ). In our analysis, we must give the People the benefit of every reasonable inference that may be fairly drawn from the evidence. Id. at 1292. The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded to various pieces of evidence rest solely within the province of the jury. People v. Sprouse , 983 P.2d 771, 778 (Colo. 1999).
¶ 10 Here, Campos' sufficiency of the evidence contention turns on a question of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. A.S. v. People, 2013 CO 63, ¶ 10, 312 P.3d 168.
¶ 11 Campos was charged with identity theft under section 18–5902(1)(a), which provides:
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 12 On appeal, Campos does not dispute that she knowingly used personal identifying information of another, namely S.A. Indeed, the identity theft statute specifically defines “personal identifying information” to include a name and social security number. § 18–5901(13), C.R.S. 2014. Campos also does not dispute that her use of S.A.'s identifying information was without permission or lawful authority. The only disputed issue on appeal is whether, by using this information to obtain employment, Campos obtained a “thing of value” within the meaning of section 18–5–902(1)(a). This is an issue of first impression in Colorado.1
¶ 13 In People v. Beck, 187 P.3d 1125, 1128–29 (Colo. App. 2008), a division of this court used the doctrine of ejusdem generis to interpret the phrase “thing of value” in the identity theft statute to hold that another person's driving record was not a “thing of value” within the meaning of section 18–5–902(1)(a).
¶ 14 The division in Beck first declined to apply the broad statutory definition of “thing of value” from section 18–1–901(3)(r), C.R.S. 2014, the statutory section that generally defines terms used in the criminal code.2 Beck, 187 P.3d at 1128–29. The division noted that the identity theft statute does not explicitly incorporate that definition and that section. Id . Instead, the division interpreted “thing of value” using the doctrine of ejusdem generis, which provides that a general term following a list applies only to things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned. Id. at 1129. The division reasoned that the items listed in the statute Id. Thus, for purposes of identity theft, the division concluded that “thing of value” means something of pecuniary value. Id. It does not include “the nonpecuniary benefits of misleading and influencing the actions of a police officer, such as obtaining the use of another person's driving record.” Id.
¶ 15 Applying Beck's rationale here, we conclude that employment is a “thing of value” under the identity theft statute.3 The primary purpose of obtaining employment is to receive the financial benefit of payment for labor performed. Thus, unlike access to another person's driving record, employment has pecuniary value in the form of salary or wages and other monetary benefits. Additionally, a job applicant demonstrates eligibility for employment by presenting personal identifying information, such as a name and social security number. Accordingly, in our view, employment has “financial or economic value and can be lawfully obtained ... through the use of a financial device or personal or financial identifying information.” Id . We conclude, therefore, that a person who uses personal identifying information of another to obtain employment obtains a “thing of value” under section 18–5–902(1)(a).
¶ 16 Our conclusion is consistent with that of courts in other states that have interpreted comparable identity theft statutes. For example, in State v. Ramirez, 246 Wis.2d 802, 633 N.W.2d 656 (App.2001), the court affirmed the identity theft conviction a defendant who used another person's social security number to obtain a job. Wisconsin's identity theft statute prohibited using the personal identifying information of another to obtain “credit, money, goods, services or anything else of value.” Id. at 658 n. 3. The defendant argued that the only thing he obtained with the social security number was the opportunity to work, which has no intrinsic value. Id. at 659. The court disagreed, reasoning that “what Ramirez ultimately sought and obtained was the compensation and other economic benefits that flowed from the employment.” Id. at 660. The court concluded that those benefits were “things of value” within the meaning of the identity theft statute. Id . Because the defendant obtained money in the form of wages as a result of his unauthorized use of another person's social security number, he committed identity theft under the Wisconsin statute. Id. at 662.
¶ 17 Similarly, in People v. Montoya, 373 Ill.App.3d 78, 311 Ill.Dec. 389, 868 N.E.2d 389 (2007), the court affirmed a defendant's conviction under Illinois' identity theft statute, which prohibited using another person's personal identifying information to “fraudulently obtain credit, money, goods, services, or other property.” Id. , 311 Ill.Dec. 389, 868 N.E.2d at 392 (internal quotation marks omitted). Citing Ramirez, the court concluded that the defendant fraudulently obtained both money and services because “had defendant not used [the victim's] name and social security number to obtain a job, she would not have been entitled to receive the wages and insurance benefits that flowed...
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