People v. Canedos

• Citation: 77 Cal.App.5th 469,292 Cal.Rptr.3d 543
• Decision Date: 13 April 2022
• Docket Number: B308433
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ronald Reyes CANEDOS, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals

77 Cal.App.5th 469

292 Cal.Rptr.3d 543

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Ronald Reyes CANEDOS, Defendant and Appellant.

B308433

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

Filed April 13, 2022

Randall Conner, Oakland, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

In 2020, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 1950 (Stats. 2020, ch. 328) (Assembly Bill No. 1950), which reduced the maximum duration of probation in most felony cases to two years, and in misdemeanor cases to one year. Under principles first established in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948 ( Estrada ), courts have held unanimously that the law applies retroactively to the benefit of defendants serving probation terms in excess of the maximum under the new law. ( People v. Quinn (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 874, 879–884, 273 Cal.Rptr.3d 770 ( Quinn ); People v. Sims (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 943, 955–964, 273 Cal.Rptr.3d 792 ( Sims ); People v. Lord (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 241, 244–246, 278 Cal.Rptr.3d 642 ( Lord ); People v. Stewart (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 1065, 1070–1074, 277 Cal.Rptr.3d 247 ( Stewart ), review granted June 30, 2021, S268787.)

This case requires us to determine how far the retroactive application of Assembly Bill No. 1950 extends. Defendant and appellant Ronald Reyes Canedos, unlike the defendants in the cases cited above, had violated the terms of his probation before Assembly Bill No. 1950 became effective on January 1, 2021. Canedos contends that the statute nevertheless applies retroactively to him. He argues that because he violated probation more than two years after the court imposed probation, we must reverse the sentence of 32 months in prison that the trial court imposed following the violation.

We agree, as we see no principled basis for denying retroactive relief to defendants in Canedos's position. Although Canedos had violated the terms of his probation before Assembly Bill No. 1950 became effective, neither the trial court's finding of a violation nor his original conviction was yet final for purposes of retroactivity under Estrada . (See People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 678, 279 Cal.Rptr.3d 659, 487 P.3d 974 ( Esquivel ); see also People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, 47–48, 259 Cal.Rptr.3d 224, 459 P.3d 25.) Unless the Legislature specifies otherwise, it is a matter of "presumed legislative intent" that an ameliorative criminal statute applies retroactively to all defendants whose convictions were not yet final when the law became effective. ( Esquivel , supra , 11 Cal.5th at p. 680, 279 Cal.Rptr.3d 659, 487 P.3d 974.) We see no indication in the text or legislative history of Assembly Bill No. 1950 that the Legislature meant to limit its retroactive application. Under the new law, Canedos's probation expired in 2018, more than a year before he committed the violation. Thus, the court no longer had the authority to revoke Canedos's probation and sentence him to prison. (See People v. Butler (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 216, 220–221, 291 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ( Butler ), petn. for review pending, petn. filed Mar. 25, 2022, S273773.)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

On January 12, 2016, Canedos pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon ( Pen. Code,¹ § 29800, subd. (a)(1) ), one count of possession of body armor by a violent felon (§ 31360, subd. (a)), and one count of possession of ammunition by a felon (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court sentenced him to four years in prison and suspended execution of the sentence pending the completion of four years of probation.

More than three years later, on December 17, 2019, Canedos became involved in an argument with his wife, O.S. According to statements from family members, Canedos pulled a knife on O.S., moved it back and forth in front of her face, and threatened to kill O.S. and her mother. Three days later, on December 20, Canedos pleaded not guilty to several charges related to the incident, including assault with a deadly weapon ( § 245, subd. (a)(1) ), and the trial court summarily revoked his probation.

At a trial on the new charges, a jury convicted Canedos in September 2020 of assault with a deadly weapon, and the court found him in violation of his probation term requiring him to obey all laws. The court imposed an aggregate sentence of 6 years 8 months in prison. The sentence consisted of the upper term of four years for assault with a deadly weapon, plus consecutive terms of eight months—one third the middle term—for each of the four 2016 counts. In a prior opinion, we affirmed the conviction of assault with a deadly weapon. (See People v. Canedos (Oct. 21, 2021, B307948) 2021 WL 4901795 [nonpub. opn.].)

DISCUSSION

A. Retroactivity of Assembly Bill No. 1950

In September 2020, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 1950, which reduced the maximum duration of probation in cases in which the court suspends the execution of a sentence pending the successful completion of probation. Previously, section 1203.1, subdivision (a) allowed courts to impose up to five years of probation in cases where the suspended sentence was five years or less. Under the new law, which became effective January 1, 2021, the maximum period of probation is two years.

"Generally, a statute applies prospectively unless otherwise stated in the language of the statute, or when retroactive application is clearly indicated by legislative intent." ( People v. Winn (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 859, 872, 257 Cal.Rptr.3d 885.) Beginning with its opinion in Estrada , however, our Supreme Court has recognized an exception to this rule in ameliorative criminal statutes. The court explained that "[w]hen the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment it has obviously expressly determined that its former penalty was too severe and that a lighter punishment is proper as punishment for the commission of the prohibited act. It is an inevitable inference that the Legislature must have intended that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply. The amendatory act imposing the lighter punishment can be applied constitutionally to acts committed before its passage provided the judgment convicting the defendant of the act is not final. This intent seems obvious, because to hold otherwise would be to conclude that the Legislature was motivated by a desire for vengeance, a conclusion not permitted in view of modern theories of penology." ( Estrada , supra , 63 Cal.2d at p. 745, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948.)

In People v. Francis (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66, 75 Cal.Rptr. 199, 450 P.2d 591, the court held that this presumption of retroactivity applies where a new law merely allows for a possibility of reduced punishment by giving the trial court discretion to impose a lesser sentence. ( Id. at p. 76, 75 Cal.Rptr. 199, 450 P.2d 591.) In subsequent years, the court has reaffirmed this doctrine numerous times and applied it to a wide range of ameliorative criminal laws. (See Esquivel , supra , 11 Cal.5th at pp. 675–676, 279 Cal.Rptr.3d 659, 487 P.3d 974 [listing cases].)

In People v. Burton (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 272 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 ( Burton ), the court applied this doctrine to Assembly Bill No. 1950 and held that the law applies retroactively because it is an ameliorative statute that reduces a criminal defendant's potential punishment. Although " ‘[p]robation is neither "punishment" [citation] nor a criminal "judgment" [citation]’ " ( Burton , supra , 58 Cal.App.5th Supp. at p. 16, 272 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 ), the court recognized that probation is a restriction on liberty and increases the likelihood that the probationer will be found in violation of probation and incarcerated. In addition, the court recognized that the Legislature, in enacting Assembly Bill No. 1950, intended to prevent probationers from further involvement in the criminal justice system because of probation violations that do not involve new criminal conduct. ( Burton , supra , 58 Cal.App.5th Supp. at p. 15, 272 Cal.Rptr.3d 797.) With no evidence of legislative intent to the contrary, the court concluded that the ameliorative changes of Assembly Bill No. 1950 should " ‘extend as broadly as possible’ " ( Burton , supra , at p. 16, 272 Cal.Rptr.3d 797, quoting People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 657, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 622, 373 P.3d 435 ( Conley )), including to defendants already on probation. Several subsequent cases that have considered the issue reached the same conclusion (see, e.g., Quinn , supra , 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 879–884, 273 Cal.Rptr.3d 770 ; Sims , supra , 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 955–964, 273 Cal.Rptr.3d 792 ; Lord , supra , 64 Cal.App.5th at pp. 244–246, 278 Cal.Rptr.3d 642 ; Stewart , supra , 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1070–1074, 277 Cal.Rptr.3d 247, review granted), and we see no reason to disagree.

B. Retroactive Application to Defendants with Existing Violations

The Attorney General does not take issue with the analysis above, but contends that Assembly Bill No. 1950 does not apply retroactively to Canedos because the court had already found that he violated probation before the law became effective. This was not the situation in the cases cited above, where the defendant challenged the probation order as part of a direct appeal of a conviction. (See Quinn , supra , 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 878, 273 Cal.Rptr.3d 770 ; Stewart , supra , 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1069–1070, 277 Cal.Rptr.3d 247, review granted; Sims , supra , 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 946–947, 273 Cal.Rptr.3d 792 ; Lord , supra , 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 243, 278 Cal.Rptr.3d 642.) In two recent cases, People v. Faial (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 738, 290 Cal.Rptr.3d...