People v. Cantrell

Decision Date17 January 1973
Docket NumberCr. 16036
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties, 504 P.2d 1256 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Samuel Dwane CANTRELL, Defendant and Appellant. In Bank

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Alexander B. McDonald, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

McCOMB, Justice.

In this case, where a judgment imposing sentence of life imprisonment followed jury trials on guilt, sanity and penalty of defendant who was charged with murder in the first degree and was prosecuted on two theories, felony murder and premeditated murder, a hearing was granted by this court, after decision by the Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division One, 98 Cal.Rptr. 13, for the purpose of giving further study to the problem whether it was prejudicial error to give CALJIC Instruction No. 806 concerning 'irresistible impulse' during the guilt phase of the trial where diminished capacity was an issue.

After such study, we have concluded that the opinion of the Court of Appeal, prepared by Mr. Justice Ault, in all other respects correctly treats and disposes of the issues involved; that the giving of the instruction was error but was not prejudicial under article VI, section 13, of the California Constitution; that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed; and that with certain charges, the opinion of the Court of Appeal is adopted as and for Samuel Dwane Cantrell was indicted for the murder of Denny ( ) (W.). He entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. A jury, by separate verdicts, found him guilty of first degree murder, sane at the time he committed the offense, and fixed his punishment at confinement in the state prison for life. His motion for new trial was denied, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. He appeals from the judgment of conviction.

[504 P.2d 1259] the opinion of this court. Such opinion (with appropriate deletions and additions as indicated) * is as follows:

On appeal, Cantrell raises the following contentions:

1. His extrajudicial statements and confessions should have been excluded because the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti for the crime of murder.

2. His extrajudicial statements concerning his acts of sexual misconduct with the 12-year-old victim should have been excluded because the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti for the underlying felony (child molesting, Pen.Code, § 288), thereby precluding it from proceeding under the felony murder doctrine.

3. Even if his extrajudicial statements concerning his sexual misconduct with the victim were admissible, the evidence failed to establish a violation of Penal Code section 288 as a matter of law.

4. The jury was not properly instructed on the intent necessary to establish the crime of child molesting.

5. The trial court erred in not giving a sua sponte instruction limiting the effect of the incriminating statements he made to examining psychiatrists.

6. The trial court gave erroneous and improper instructions on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.

7. The trial court prejudicially limited the examination of the psychiatric experts regarding his diminished mental capacity.

8. It was prejudicial error to give CALJIC Instruction No. 806 concerning 'irresistible impulse' during the guilt phase of the trial where diminished capacity was an issue.

FACTS

Danny ( ) (W.), age 12, lived in Oceanside with his parents, three brothers and a sister. On Friday, August 15, 1969, he left his home at 6:55 p.m., saying he intended to see a friend at the beach. When he left he was wearing a jacket and a silver-colored chain bracelet. Insofar as is known, he was never seen alive again by anyone except the defendant Cantrell.

Cantrell spent the evening of Saturday, October 18, and the early morning hours of Sunday, October 19, with his close friend Edward Stringer, first driving to San Diego and then visiting some girls in Oceanside and having a few drinks. On the way home, Cantrell became very quiet and put his head down. When Stringer asked what was the matter, Cantrell said, 'I think I have killed a kid.' Stringer didn't believe him. Cantrell then related he had picked up a boy named Danny ( ) (W.) in Oceanside, had taken him for a ride in the Camp Pendleton area, had played with him and had strangled him. Stringer testified: '. . . he told me that he was queering with the kid.' '. . . the kid got disturbed and shook up and started struggling, screaming, and he strangled him.'

[504 P.2d 1260] Cantrell then took Stringer to a spot in the Del Dios area where he said he had thrown the body. They could see nothing from the road and they did not go down the incline. Stringer told Cantrell he was going to call the police and suggested Cantrell talk to Stringer's friend in the sheriff's office to see if what he said was true. Cantrell agreed.

Stringer reported the matter to the sheriff's office shortly after Sunday midnight. Early Monday morning, October 20, 1969, Deputy Sheriff Ring and Sergeant Norton, homicide detectives in the sheriff's department, went to Cantrell's residence to investigate. As soon as Ring said he had talked with Stringer, Cantrell stated he thought he may have killed a boy. Ring immediately advised him of his constitutional rights. Cantrell said he understood about his rights, having been a military policeman, and that he was willing to talk. He repeated the same story to Ring, but with more details. He told of going for a ride with Danny, who he thought was 13 or 14 years old. He said they parked, got out of the car and somehow, he couldn't recall how, Danny had his clothes off. He said he fondled the boy's penis with his hands and that the boy began to scream. He said, 'This must have triggered me because I took my hands and choked him. I then took a rag or a T-shirt and tied it around his neck.' He said he put the nude body in his car and drove around Del Dios area, where he finally threw the body down a bank. He stated he had thought it was all a nightmare when he awoke the next morning until he found some weeds in his car. He recalled he had returned to Del Dios area to look for the body, but found nothing.

Cantrell did not testify during any part of the trial. At the guilt phase, he presented several character witnesses and the testimony of three of the four psychiatrists who had examined him. All of the psychiatrists who testified agreed Cantrell was functioning under a diminished capacity at the time of the homicide. Basically, all agreed he did not have the mental capacity to deliberate or intend to take human life at the time he strangled Danny ( ) (W.). ( ) (The) psychiatrists testified Cantrell's strangling of Danny was a compulsive reaction to the boy's yelling and struggling which, due to his mental condition, Cantrell had no power to control.

CORPUS DELICTI

A prima facie showing of the corpus delicti of the crime charged must be made before a defendant's extrajudicial statements, admissions or confessions may be received in evidence (People v. Cooper ((1960)) 53 Cal.2d 755, 765, 3 Cal.Rptr. 148, 349 P.2d 964). To establish the corpus delicti in the instant case, it was only necessary for the People to show a reasonable probability the criminal act of another caused the death of Danny ( ) (W.). (People v. Ives ((1941)) 17 Cal.2d 459, 464, 110 P.2d 408; People v. Small ((1970)) 7 Cal.App.3d 347, 354, 86 Cal.Rptr. 478.) The corpus delicti may be established by circumstantial evidence, and by the reasonable inferences to be drawn from such evidence (People v. Miller ((1969)) 71 Cal.2d 459, 477, 78 Cal.Rptr. 449, 455 P.2d 377). While slight evidence is sufficient to establish the corpus delicti, it must be proved entirely independent of and without considering the defendant's extrajudicial statements (People v. Mehaffey ((1948)) 32 Cal.2d 535, 544--545, 197 P.2d 12).

The evidence introduced at the trial before the defendant's extrajudicial statements were received was sufficient to make a prima facie showing Danny ( ) (W.) had met his death through a criminal agency. It showed: Danny, age 12, left his home in Oceanside to see a friend at the beach at 6:55 p.m. August 15, 1969, and was never seen alive again. He was wearing a jacket and was dressed for the weather. He was also wearing a silver-colored chain link bracelet without a metal plate on it. He was in good health and not given to fainting spells or stumbling of any kind. Officer Ring, on October 20 1969, found the remains of a human being consisting of a skull, five or six of the twelve long bones from the victim's arms and legs, hair and some mummified skin, at the base of a culvert in a remote area of San Diego County, approximately 26 miles from Danny's home. None of the long bones found had any fractures or breaks. Ring had had occasion to examine the remains of approximately thirty persons who had been struck on the highway by automobiles. In such cases the long bones and other bones of the body were fractured severely. No clothing was found in the area where the remains were discovered; in Ring's experience it was unusual not to find clothing of a decedent who had died by accidental means. There were no skid marks on the road in the area where the remains were found nor any broken vehicular glass. A silver-colored chain link bracelet was found around the end of two long bones of the skeleton. Danny's father testified the bracelet was similar to the one Danny was wearing at the time he left home. The teeth found in the skull were unusual and appeared to Danny's father and to a dentist to be those of the boy.

Tested by the rules announced above, we believe the sufficiency of the proof of the corpus delicti is not open to serious dispute. The court properly permitted the...

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