People v. Capoldi
| Decision Date | 24 January 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 33960,33960 |
| Citation | 139 N.E.2d 776,10 Ill.2d 261 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Andrew CAPOLDI, Plaintiff in Error. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Gerald W. Getty, Public Defender, Chicago (John M. Flaherty and Jack G. Stein, Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.
Latham Castle, Atty. Gen., and John Gutknecht, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach, Decatur, Edwin A. Strugala, Irwin D. Bloch, John T. Gallagher, Rudolph L. Janega, William L. Carlin, Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
This is a writ of error to the criminal court of Cook County to review a judgment finding Andrew Capoldi, hereinafter called the defendant, to be a criminal sexual psychopath.
The record discloses that on November 20, 1936, the defendant was indicted for the murder of a five-year-old Chicago girl, but that at a pretrial sanity hearing, he was adjudged feebleminded and committed by the court to the Illinois Security Hospital. Thereafter, the indictment was stricken with leave to reinstate and no further action was taken until October, 1953, at which time the murder indictment was reinstated and a new psychiatric examination ordered for the defendant. At the sanity hearing which followed, it was determined that defendant was then sane and that he should be arraigned under the prior indictment. However, on February 9, 1954, a petition was filed by the State's Attorney of Cook County to have the defendant declared a criminal sexual psychopath, and hearing thereon was had before a jury on March 26, 1954. Subsequently, a verdict was returned which found the defendant to be so incapacitated, and as a result thereof, he was ordered committed to the Psychiatric Division at Menard until such time as he recovers from such psychopathy. The present writ of error seeks review of such order.
Defendant does not question the sufficiency of the evidence. He contends, however, that incompetent evidence was admitted, and that in permitting evidence of alleged crimes committed prior to its effective date the act violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Before discussing the merits it is necessary first to consider a contention by the State that this court is without jurisdiction on direct review.
The Criminal Sexual Psychopathic Act, now known as the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1955, chap 38, pars. 820.01 to 825e), was passed in 1938 to provide a means by which it may be determined whether a defendant's mental condition is such as to require him to plead to an indictment and be placed upon trial for the crime with which he is charged. People v. Redlich, 402 Ill. 270, 83 N.E.2d 736. If upon hearing, and after examination by two qualified psychiatrists, the accused is found to be a sexually dangerous person, he must then be committed to the custody of the Director of Public Safety until his recovery. Originally, the statute did not provide a means by which the trial court's finding could be appealed, and for that reason, it had previously been held that no such right existed. People v. Ross, 407 Ill. 199, 95 N.E.2d 61; People v. Ross, 344 Ill.App. 407, 101 N.E.2d 112. However, in 1955, the act was amended by adding section 3.01 (par. 822.01), which now provides that: Thus, appeal may now be taken as in any other civil case.
Looking to the language of the amendment, the People contend that this court is without jurisdiction to consider the cause, first, because defendant has proceeded by writ of error rather than by appeal, and, second, because there are no grounds, within the meaning of section 75(1) of the Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1955, chap. 110, par. 75(1)), upon which to base a direct appeal. We find no merit to either contention. Rule 28 of this court (Ill.Rev.Stat.1955, chap. 110, par. 101.28) provides, in part, that 'If a writ of error be improvidently sued out in a case in which the proper method of review is by appeal, * * * this alone is not a ground for dismissal, but if the issues of the case sufficiently appear upon the record before the court of review, the case shall be considered as though the proper method of review had been employed.' The record here presented is more than sufficient to allow the rule to apply.
In support of the contention that a direct appeal will not lie to this court, it is the position of the People that defendant failed to either raise or preserve a constitutional question in the trial court. We find, however, that the record is sufficient to show that the defendant raised in the trial court the question of whether the Criminal Sexual Psychopathic Act violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, that the trial court passed upon such issue, and that it was properly preserved for review. Thus, although the People are correct in saying that appeals under the act should normally be taken to he Appellate Court, the constitutional question presented confers jurisdiction upon us in this case.
In support of his constitutional objection, the defendant points out that the People were allowed to show that certain crimes were committed by him prior to the passage of the Criminal Sexual Psychopathic Act, and argues that as a result thereof, he has been burdened with an added penalty which did not exist at the time the crimes occurred. The position cannot be upheld. A trial on the question of mental disorder as defined in the statute is no part of the criminal proceedings and has nothing to do with guilt or innocence. Its sole object is to ascertain the mental condition of the accused. People v. Redlich, 402 Ill. 270, 83 N.E.2d 736. The past crimes which the statute...
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State ex rel. Fulton v. Scheetz
...653 (1964) and McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40, 45 S.Ct. 16, 17, 69 L.Ed. 158 (1924). Of special import is People v. Capoldi, 10 Ill.2d 261, 139 N.E.2d 776, which deals with a case brought under the Illinois Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act, and the court informatively stated at 139 N.......
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Nau, In re
...Health Code are civil, not criminal, in nature. Respondent nevertheless argues that this court's decision in People v. Capoldi (1957), 10 Ill.2d 261, 139 N.E.2d 776, requires that the trial court hold a hearing on the voluntariness of a statement prior to admitting it at a civil commitment ......
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People v. Allen
... ... 1020, 103 S.Ct. 385, 74 L.Ed.2d 516; In re Matthews (1980), 46 Or.App. 757, 762, 613 P.2d 88, 91, cert. denied (1981), 450 U.S. 1040, 101 S.Ct. 1757, 68 L.Ed.2d 237; Moss v. State (Tex.Civ.App.1976), 539 S.W.2d 936, 945-48 ... The appellate court believed that People v. Capoldi (1957), 10 Ill.2d 261, 139 N.E.2d 776, applied the privilege against self-incrimination to these proceedings. (123 Ill.App.3d 669, 671, 78 Ill.Dec. 957, 463 N.E.2d 135.) This interpretation is erroneous, especially since English, decided after Capoldi, specifically held that the privilege did ... ...
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People v. Mahoney
... ... (People v. Redlich, 402 Ill. 270, 83 N.E.2d 736.) The purpose was to ascertain whether the accused's mental state was such as to require that he plead to an indictment and be placed on trial. People v. Capoldi, 10 Ill.2d 261, 139 N.E.2d 776; People v. McDonald, 44 Ill.App.2d 348, 194 N.E.2d 541 ... Here, there is no contention that defendant was not competent to stand trial, to enter a plea or to commit the offense. See People v. Hedenberg, 9 Ill.App.3d 597, 291 N.E.2d 848. The ... ...