People v. Carlisle

• Decision Date: 13 September 1988
• Docket Number: No. 4-88-0186,4-88-0186
• Citation: 528 N.E.2d 1029,174 Ill.App.3d 454,124 Ill.Dec. 138
• Parties: , 124 Ill.Dec. 138 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Arnold CARLISLE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1029

528 N.E.2d 1029

174 Ill.App.3d 454, 124 Ill.Dec. 138

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Arnold CARLISLE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 4-88-0186.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Fourth District.

Sept. 13, 1988.

Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, Office of State Appellate Defender, Jeffrey D. Foust, Asst. Defender, Springfield, for defendant-appellant.

Jeffrey K. Davison, State's Atty., Decatur, Kenneth R. Boyle, Director, State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Robert J. Biderman, Deputy Director, Michael K. Blazicek, Staff Atty., Springfield, for plaintiff-appellee.

Presiding Justice GREEN delivered the opinion of the court:

On February 18, 1988, defendant Arnold Carlisle filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court of Macon County. That court considered the petition to be for post-conviction relief. The trial court, in dismissing the petition, indicated the complaints "in this third post-conviction proceeding" were "frivolous and patently without merit to the point of harassment" and ordered the petition dismissed without general docketing. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch 38, par. 122-2.1(a).) Defendant appeals. We affirm.

A brief procedural history of this cause indicates that, following a jury trial in the circuit court of Macon County, defendant was convicted of four counts of armed robbery, three counts of aggravated battery, and one count of armed violence. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal to this court. (People v. Evans (1979), 75 Ill.App.3d 949, 31 Ill.Dec. 508, 394 N.E.2d 710.) On May 9, 1980, defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was heard in January 1983. The trial court denied the petition, and an appeal to this court was later dismissed on defendant's motion. On January 16, 1986, defendant filed a second petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied. This court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of that petition. People v. Carlisle (1986), 149 Ill.App.3d 1165, 112 Ill.Dec. 947, 514 N.E.2d 610 (order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

Defendant maintains the trial court erred in dismissing his petition without first addressing the allegation that he had been denied his constitutional rights under Bruton v. United States (1968), 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476. Defendant claims certain statements and confessions given by codefendants were entered into evidence, and he was not given an opportunity to confront or cross-examine his accusers as required by Bruton. He further claims that his prior counsels' failure to raise this issue on direct appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding or appeal therefrom rises to the level of incompetent assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.

The supreme court has recognized that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, pars. 122-1 through 122-8) contemplates the filing of only one post-conviction petition. (People v. Free (1988), 122 Ill.2d 367, 375, 119 Ill.Dec. 325, 329, 522 N.E.2d 1184, 1188.) Consistent with that Act, the court has held that a ruling on a post-conviction petition has res judicata effect with respect to all claims that were raised or could have been raised in the initial petition. ( Free, 122 Ill.2d at 376, 119 Ill.Dec. at 329, 522 N.E.2d at 1188.) This is not to be taken as an "ironclad bar" to multiple post-conviction petitions, however, and subsequent post-conviction petitions may be filed where the original petitions were fundamentally deficient or where "fundamental fairness" requires a court to allow a second petition. People v. Hollins (1972) 51 Ill.2d 68, 70, 280 N.E.2d 710, 712.

In People v. Mitchell (1985), 134 Ill.App.3d 1075, 89 Ill.Dec. 893, 481 N.E.2d 736, as here, a defendant had (1) been tried and convicted; (2) appealed to the appellate court, which had affirmed; (3) filed a post-conviction petition in the trial court, which dismissed the petition; (4) appealed the dismissal to the appellate court; and (5) filed an additional post-conviction petition in the trial court, which again dismissed the petition. In Mitchell, the...