People v. Carpenter, 204051
Decision Date | 25 June 1999 |
Docket Number | 204051 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James CARPENTER, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Before: Neff, P.J., and Hood and Murphy, JJ.
Defendant appeals as of right from his bench trial conviction of first-degree home invasion, M.C.L. § 750.110a(2); MSA 28.305(a)(2), two counts of felonious assault, M.C.L. § 750.82; MSA 28.277, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, M.C.L. § 750.224f; MSA 28.421(6), possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony, M.C.L. § 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2), and resisting and obstructing a police officer, M.C.L. § 750.479; MSA 28.747. The trial court sentenced defendant to twenty-eight months to twenty years' imprisonment for the home invasion conviction, twenty-eight months to four years' imprisonment for each of the two counts of felonious assault, twenty-eight months to five years' imprisonment for the felon in possession conviction, the mandatory consecutive two years' imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction, and one to two years' imprisonment for the resisting and obstructing conviction. We affirm.
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred by requiring defendant to prove his claim of diminished capacity by a preponderance of the evidence. This claim involves statutory interpretation and is therefore reviewed de novo. People v. Givans, 227 Mich.App. 113, 124, 575 N.W.2d 84 (1997). The goal of statutory construction is to effect the intent of the Legislature. People v. Morris, 450 Mich. 316, 325, 537 N.W.2d 842 (1995).
In 1994, the Legislature amended the insanity statute to provide that the insanity defense is an affirmative defense and that "[t]he defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence." MCL 768.21a(3); MSA 28.1044(1)(3). The Legislature clearly intended to place the burden of proof of this defense on defendants. Beginning with this Court's determination in People v. Mangiapane, 85 Mich.App. 379, 395, 271 N.W.2d 240 (1978), and consistently thereafter, 1 this Court has construed the defense of diminished capacity to come within the codified definition of legal insanity and therefore has held that it is subject to the same procedural requirements that are statutorily imposed on the insanity defense. When the Legislature amends existing statutes, it is presumed to act with knowledge of appellate court statutory interpretations. People v. Borchard-Ruhland, 230 Mich.App. 166, 169, 583 N.W.2d 247 (1998). Because the Legislature had not specifically included the diminished capacity defense by name in the insanity statute prior to Mangiapane, and because the 1994 amendment did not otherwise change the definition of insanity or the procedural requirements imposed by the statute, it must be presumed that the Legislature, aware of this Court's inclusion of the diminished capacity defense within the codification of the insanity defense, intended that this Court's construction of the insanity statute remain in force. Therefore, the newly amended procedural requirement that a defendant prove the defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence also applies to the included defense of diminished capacity. The trial court correctly required defendant to establish the defense of diminished capacity by a preponderance of the evidence.
Defendant next contends that, even if he was required to establish the defense of diminished capacity, the evidence he presented at trial sufficiently established that defense and thereby negated the specific intent necessary for the home invasion charge and the two assault charges. We review the sufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial de novo in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether the trial court could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Petrella, 424 Mich. 221, 268-270, 380 N.W.2d 11 (1985).
There was evidence that defendant had been drinking prior to the incident, and several of his friends testified that they believed he was intoxicated. However, none of them reported that he engaged in any bizarre behavior or made any delusional statements, and two of them believed defendant was sober enough to drive his vehicle. Defendant's behavior in demanding entry to his former girlfriend's home, his forcible entry into the home, his confrontation with and assault on his former girlfriend and her male companion, and his subsequent telephone call to her warning her not to contact the police was-as the trial court concluded-goal oriented and understandable, even if it is not the sort of behavior that organized society condones. It was not until the police arrived at defendant's home that he began ranting and talking about demons and the F.B.I., and about someone stealing money from his company. This case does not present a situation where there is insufficient evidence for the trial court's conclusion. Each side presented both expert and lay testimony concerning defendant's state of mind. Where there is adequate evidence on both sides of this issue, it is a matter for the trier of fact to determine where the truth lies. We find that the trial court's findings were supported by sufficient evidence.
Defendant next contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that he intentionally broke and entered the complainant's home and that he should therefore have been acquitted of the charge of first-degree home invasion. To establish the charge of first-degree home invasion, the prosecutor had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, among other elements, that defendant broke into a dwelling. MCL 750.110a; MSA 28.305(1). Under Michigan law, any amount of force used to open a door or a window to enter the building, no matter how slight, is sufficient to constitute the breaking. People v. Toole, 227 Mich.App. 656, 659, 576 N.W.2d 441 (1998). The uncontradicted testimony of the witnesses established that defendant demanded entry into his former girlfriend's home, that he insisted that he was coming in, and that when he was refused entry, he jumped through a glass window and proceeded to assault his former girlfriend and her companion. In response, defendant offered only his speculation that he accidentally fell through the window. Because...
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