People v. Carpenter
| Citation | 627 N.W.2d 276,464 Mich. 223 |
| Decision Date | 12 June 2001 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 115617. |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James A. CARPENTER, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Michael D. Thomas, Prosecuting Attorney, and Janet M. Boes, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Saginaw, MI, for the people.
Gurewitz & Raben, P.L.C. (by Harold Gurewitz), Detroit, MI, for the defendant-appellant.
Amicus Curiae: Jeffrey L. Sauter, President, Prosecuting Attorneys Association, David G. Gorcyca, Prosecuting Attorney, Joyce F. Todd, Chief, Appellate Division, and Anica Letica, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Pontiac, MI, for the people of the state of Michigan.
Defendant presented evidence at his bench trial that, although not legally insane, he lacked the mental capacity to form the specific intent required for the crimes of first-degree home invasion, M.C.L. § 750.110a(2), and felonious assault, M.C.L. § 750.82. The trial court found defendant guilty of both offenses, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
We originally granted leave to consider whether the lower courts properly determined that it was defendant's burden to establish his diminished capacity defense by a preponderance of the evidence under M.C.L. § 768.21a. However, we are now persuaded by the prosecution's argument that, by enacting a comprehensive statutory scheme setting forth the requirements for and the effects of asserting a defense based on either mental illness or mental retardation, the Legislature has signified its intent not to allow a defendant to introduce evidence of mental abnormalities short of legal insanity to avoid or reduce criminal responsibility by negating specific intent.1 Therefore, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals on that basis.
The events giving rise to defendant's convictions took place in the early morning of July 9, 1995. After attending a dance at a local community hall, complainants Audrey Thomas and Aron Blakely returned to Thomas' home in Saginaw at approximately 2:00 a.m.2
Thomas and Blakely were sitting in the family room when Thomas heard the doorbell ring. Thomas discovered that defendant was at the door. Defendant demanded to be let in, yelling that Blakely should "come on out" and that Thomas was his "woman." When Thomas refused to admit him, defendant eventually crashed through a window. Defendant produced a handgun and fired two shots in the general direction of Thomas and Blakely. Neither was hit. Blakely then announced that he was leaving. As defendant opened the door for him, defendant struck Blakely in the face with his fist. Although defendant initially walked out the front door with Blakely, he immediately returned to the house where he confronted Thomas, striking her head with the butt of his gun. The blow apparently caused the gun to discharge a third time. Blakely heard the shot and went next door to call the police.
Defendant eventually fled the scene and drove to his nearby home. He immediately called Thomas and threatened her. Several police officers arrived at defendant's home a short time later. A stand-off ensued, during which defendant threatened to shoot himself and any officers who attempted to enter the house. Saginaw Police Sergeant Terri Johnson Wise established telephone contact with defendant and spoke with him several times. She testified that defendant was yelling and screaming initially, and that when he calmed down he began talking about demons and "money that was stolen from him."
At some point, defendant asked for some heart medication that was in his truck. Saginaw Police Officer Daniel Kuhn lured him to a window by offering to give defendant his medication. When Officer Kuhn tried to grab defendant through the open window, defendant got free and slammed the window on Officer Kuhn's fingers. Defendant eventually allowed the officers to enter and he was placed under arrest. He was subsequently charged with first-degree home invasion, M.C.L. § 750.110a(2), two counts of assault with intent to commit murder, M.C.L. § 750.83, being a felon in possession of a firearm, M.C.L. § 750.224f, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, M.C.L. § 750.227b, and resisting and obstructing a police officer, M.C.L. § 750.479.
At his bench trial, defendant presented a diminished capacity defense. In addition to several lay witnesses that testified that he had been drinking before the incident and that he appeared intoxicated, defendant presented a report from Kingswood Hospital, where he had been treated approximately a month after the incident. The report described him as being "delusional" and indicated that he suffered from organic brain damage. The report further described his conduct upon admission to the hospital:
He stated that his son had been killed in April 1995 and "they had broken into my computer." He says that he has special forces that are guarding him; that people are stealing money from his son's records. He also hears voices telling him that people are looking and laughing at him.... He is afraid that someone is trying to poison him. He talks of the organization that is manipulating him and that someone has put "voodoo dolls" on him.
Defendant also presented expert testimony from Dr. Michael Abramsky, a board-certified clinical and forensic psychologist. Dr. Abramsky testified that defendant's bizarre behavior at the time of the shooting and ensuing standoff "suggests that he was mentally ill at the time" and that defendant's drug-induced organic brain damage,3 combined with his ingestion of alcohol and various prescription drugs, was the likely cause not only of his behavior but his claimed loss of memory of the incident. In sum, Dr. Abramsky believed that defendant suffered from diminished capacity and that he therefore could not formulate a specific intent.
In rebuttal, the prosecution presented the testimony of Dr. George Watson of the Center for Forensic Psychiatry. Although he acknowledged defendant's apparent organic brain damage, Dr. Watson did not believe defendant to be obviously and acutely psychotic. Instead, on the basis of his clinical interview, Dr. Watson believed "that the possibility of Mr. Carpenter exaggerating appeared to be more likely...."
In a comprehensive written opinion, the trial court issued its findings. The court found defendant guilty of resisting and obstructing a police officer and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Regarding the two counts of assault with intent to commit murder, the court found that the prosecution had failed to prove that defendant intended to kill either victim. Instead, the court found that the evidence only supported a finding of guilt on the lesser offense of felonious assault. Finally, the trial court found defendant guilty as charged of both first-degree home invasion and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
The court proceeded to address and reject defendant's diminished capacity defense:
The [c]ourt does not find that the defendant has supported his burden of proof of diminished capacity by a preponderance of the evidence. His actions seem very "goal oriented".... His actions in driving to Ms. Thomas's home, his ringing the door bell, the epitaphs [sic] of displeasure, his entry into Ms. Thomas's home, his aiming the gun, his shots into the ceiling and near the ceiling scaring the victims, his striking Mr. Blakely and Ms. Thomas, his departure from the home, and significantly, his threatening phone call back to [Ms.] Thomas, all suggest very goal oriented actions consistent with the capacity to form a specific intent.
The trial court eventually sentenced defendant to the following prison terms: twenty-eight months to twenty years for the home invasion conviction, twenty-eight months to four years for each of the felonious assault convictions, twenty-eight months to five years for the felon-in-possession conviction, and one to two years for the resisting and obstructing conviction. The court further ordered that these sentences be served consecutive to the mandatory two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction.
In affirming defendant's convictions and sentences, the Court of Appeals rejected defendant's argument that the trial court erred in shifting the burden to defendant to prove his claim of diminished capacity by a preponderance of the evidence.4
This Court granted defendant's application for leave to appeal. 462 Mich. 912, 613 N.W.2d 727 (2000).
The proper application of M.C.L. § 768.21a is a question of law subject to de novo review. People v. Rodriguez, 463 Mich. 466, 471, 620 N.W.2d 13 (2000).
In Michigan, use of the insanity defense has been governed by statute since 1975. 1975 PA 180. Legal insanity is an affirmative defense requiring proof that, as a result of mental illness or being mentally retarded as defined in the mental health code, the defendant lacked "substantial capacity either to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law." MCL 768.21a(1).5 Importantly, the statute provides that "[t]he defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence." MCL 768.21a(3) (emphasis added).
There are also several procedural requirements that must be satisfied before an insanity defense may be raised. We recently summarized those requirements in People v. Toma, 462 Mich. 281, 292, n. 6, 613 N.W.2d 694 (2000):
A defendant in a felony case who wishes to interpose an insanity defense, must serve written notice on the court and the prosecutor not less than thirty days before trial and submit to a court-ordered examination, relating to the claim of insanity, by personnel for the center for forensic...
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