People v. Carpenter
| Decision Date | 27 May 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 37185,37185 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Earl CARPENTER, Plaintiff in Error. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
James B. Moran, Chicago, for plaintiff in error.
William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago , for defendant in error.
Earl Carpenter contends his bench trial in the criminal court of Cook County upon a charge of unlawful sale of narcotic drugs to William R. Jackson resulted in his conviction and subsequent sentence to a term of 20 to 25 years imprisonment, because of the erroneous admission of evidence and that reversible error was committed by the State in failing to call an informer who participated in the transaction. Defendant was jointly indicted with Prince Parson, but the latter is not included in this writ of error.
At the trial Federal Bureau of Narcotics agents Jackson, Dayle and Connolly testified. Jackson stated that on the evening of March 4, 1960, he and a special employee left Dayle and Connolly in a government car near 43rd Street and St. Lawrence Avenue in Chicago and entered Joe's 600 Bar located at the intersection. He testified he had seen the special employee about once a week between March 4, 1960, and the following October, but knew him only as 'Sam'. Prince Parson appeared at the bar about 6:00 P.M., and Sam, Jackson and Parson met in the men's room where Sam introduced Jackson as a friend named 'Benny'. Parson told Jackson he had heroin for sale at $120 a spoon, and Jackson paid him $120 for one spoon. Jackson had received this money from Dayle. Parson then told Jackson and Sam to wait in the tavern and that someone would get in touch with them in about an hour. Parson left the tavern shortly after 6:00 o'clock that evening and after driving a short distance parked, left his automobile on Champlain Avenue and disappeared from view in the 4200 block. Agents Dayle and Connolly, who had followed Parson in their unmarked car, returned to the 43rd Street-St. Lawrence area and parked in the alley south of 43rd Street. They testified they saw Carpenter, Jackson and the special employee (Sam) leave the tavern, that Sam returned to the tavern and then Carpenter and Jackson walked south across 43rd Street and into the alley. Jackson's testimony was that defendant, Carpenter, entered the tavern about 7:00 o'clock the same evening and nodded; then he and Sam followed Carpenter out to the sidewalk and Sam re-entered the tavern; that he and Carpenter walked into the alley where defendant recovered a package from on top of the snow, gave it to Jackson and told him to be careful and to 'see Prince' if he wanted 'more stuff'. Carpenter then continued down the alley. Jackson stated that he had never seen Carpenter before and did not see him again until January 18, 1961, shortly before the trial.
Dayle testified he observed Carpenter from across the intersection and from the car at the end of the alley, but had not previously known him, nor did he see him again until after his arrest on November 18, 1960. Carpenter stated he knew none of the Federal agents. Dayle also said the informer's name was Sam Neal, but that he was sometimes known as Howard Hughes; that he (Dayle) had caused him to be hired as a special employee; that Neal worked only with Dayle and that Neal had testified in another case in the latter part of 1960. He did not see Parson until his arrest on August 2, 1960.
The defendant points out that his arrest occurred more than 8 months after the incident; that only William R. Jackson was named as a witness on the indictment and that neither Sam Neal nor Howard Hughes was named in the list of witnesses. Defendant claims he first learned at the trial of the informer's alleged participation in the transaction and that his name was either Sam Neal or Howard Hughes. Sam Neal was then being held in the witness quarters of the State's Attorney, and defendant contends he was not given an opportunity to interview this alleged eyewitness before a finding of guilty was entered, thereby depriving him of a fair trial.
Allegations that reversible error existed as a result of the People's failure to call an informer as a witness have been frequently considered by this court, and we have there held the People are not so obligated. (People v. Green, 27 Ill.2d 39, 187 N.E.2d 708; People v. Aldridge, 19 Ill.2d 176, 166 N.E.2d 563.) Here the defendant was informed of the identity and readily accessible location of the witness in the early stages of the trial. In addition the trial judge offered to call the informer as a court's witness, an offer not accepted by defense counsel. Following the finding of guilty, the judge directed the State to produce the informer in court so that defense counsel might interview him in order to present any material matters in a motion for a new trial. Defendant's attorney did so interview the witness, thereafter stating he had nothing new to present. In the light of this concern for defendant's protection manifested by a conscientious trial judge, it is...
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State v. Galloway, 55370
...the truth of the matter asserted therein, and resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter. (People v. Carpenter (1963), 28 Ill.2d 116, 121 ; McCormick, Evidence sec. 246, at 584 (2d ed. 1972).) The confusion arises, as is often the case, in the application of the......
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...was true. Such testimony is hearsay evidence and clearly inadmissible since Holiday could not be cross-examined. People v. Carpenter (1963), 28 Ill.2d 116, 190 N.E.2d 738. " 'Hearsay evidence is testimony in court * * *, of a statement made out of court, (which is) * * * offered as an asser......
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People v. Albanese
...hearsay, the evidence must be offered for the truth of the matter asserted, rather than for some other purpose. (People v. Carpenter (1963), 28 Ill.2d 116, 121, 190 N.E.2d 738; 6 Wigmore, Evidence sec. 1766 Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976).) In the case at bar, whether M.J. intended to fire Charles......
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People v. Bonds, 1-07-1629.
...truth of the matter asserted and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter. People v. Carpenter, 28 Ill.2d 116, 121, 190 N.E.2d 738, 741 (1963) see also C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 225 (1954). Historically, an unsworn extrajudicial stat......