People v. Carron

• Decision Date: 22 August 1995
• Docket Number: No. B078892,B078892
• Citation: 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 328,37 Cal.App.4th 1230
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6681, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,368 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William Clark CARRON, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 328

44 Cal.Rptr.2d 328

37 Cal.App.4th 1230, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6681,

95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,368

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William Clark CARRON, Defendant and Appellant.

No. B078892.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7, California.

Aug. 22, 1995.

Review Denied Dec. 14, 1995.

[37 Cal.App.4th 1232] Bradley Wm. Brunon, Los Angeles, for defendant and appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Carol Wendelin Pollack, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Linda C. Johnson, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., and William H. Davis, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

FRED WOODS, Associate Justice.

In this case of first impression, we hold that the crime of stalking (PEN.CODE, § 646.9)¹ does not require an intent to kill or cause great bodily injury, but only a specific intent to make a "credible threat" so as to make the threatened person reasonably fear death or great bodily injury. Accordingly, we affirm the stalking conviction and judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

There being no insufficiency of evidence claim, the facts may be stated simply. Our perspective favors the judgment. (People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 303-304, 228 Cal.Rptr. 228, 721 P.2d 110.)

Wayne Jackson, the victim, was a male model and sometime actor who met appellant in February 1991. The victim told appellant they could only be friends, but appellant said he had a "crush" on the victim. By July 1991 appellant was obsessed with the victim, telephoning him all night and coming to his residence uninvited.

In the fall of 1991, when the victim went to appellant's office, he saw photographs of himself all over appellant's walls.

The victim repeatedly told appellant to leave him alone. Appellant continued to telephone the victim and come to his residence.

In November 1991, to avoid appellant, the victim moved to a rear bungalow at 415 S. Irving Boulevard in Los Angeles. Appellant's telephone calls continued.

In July 1992 the victim obtained a temporary restraining order against appellant and, at a hearing on August 12, 1992, a court issued an order, effective for three years, prohibiting appellant from harassing or telephoning the victim and from coming within 75 yards of his residence.

In September 1992 the victim built solid wood gates at both ends of his residence, strung perimeter tin cans, and installed outside lights.

In October 1992 the victim's car, while parked at his residence, was vandalized.

During the ensuing months, until February 19, 1993, the victim changed his telephone number repeatedly, obtained a telephone security code, switched to Pacific Bell Message Center, had the telephone company install a "trap" on his phone, obtained a post office box after his mail was stolen, parked his car a mile away from his residence, and for security, had friends stay at his residence.

Nothing worked. The harassing, threatening phone calls--more than 1,000--continued. Some were recorded. The recorded calls--all traced to appellant's residence--contained barking, screams, tapping sounds, epithets, and such threats as; "You're going to have your face cut off. You mother fucker son of a bitch." And "You know what they do to Arabs ... who lie ... they cut their tongues out. I'd hate to have that happen to you. You little mother fucker lying son of a bitch, whore, cunt, mother fucker, bitch, prick, whore." And "call me here ... or you're gonna have your tongue cut off, Eeehhh! Eeehhh!"

Appellant continued to come to the victim's residence, repeatedly vandalized the victim's car (puncturing tires, breaking windows, cutting wires), followed the victim when he went to the market, and, on February 19, 1993, after destroying a car belonging to the victim's friend, told the victim, "Next time I'll kill you."

Appellant was arrested and charged with two counts of felony stalking (count I for the period July 1, 1992-December 1, 1992, count III for the conduct committed on February 18 and 19, 1993) and one count of making terrorist threats (§ 422; count II).

A jury found appellant guilty of one felony stalking count (count I for the July 1, 1992-December 1, 1992, period), not guilty of the terrorist threat count, and was unable to reach a verdict on the other felony stalking count (11 to 1 for guilty). The trial court sentenced appellant to the upper three year state prison term.

DISCUSSION

1. The requisite intent for stalking.

The trial court gave this felony stalking instruction:

"Defendant is accused in Counts 1 and 3 of the information of having committed the crime of felony stalking, a violation of Section 646.9(b) of the Penal Code.

"Every person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury, when there is a temporary restraining order, or an injunction, or both, in effect prohibiting such behavior against the same party, is guilty of the crime of felony stalking in violation of Penal Code Section 646.9(b).

"In order to prove such crime, each of the following elements must be proved:

"1. A person willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly followed or harassed another person;

"2. The person following or harassing made a credible threat against the life of, or to cause great bodily injury to, the other person;

"3. The person who made the threat did so with the specific intent to place the other person in reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury;

"4. A court had previously issued a temporary restraining order, injunction, or both, prohibiting such behavior against the same other person, and

"5. The temporary restraining order, or injunction, or both, were in effect at the time of the conduct described in elements 1, 2 and 3.

" 'Harasses' means a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and which serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause emotional distress to the person. 'Course of conduct' means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose.

" 'A credible threat' means a threat made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his, or her safety. The threat must be against the life of, or a threat to cause great bodily injury to, a person. Great bodily injury means a significant or substantial physical injury." (CALJIC No. 9.16 (1991 new).)

During deliberation, the jury asked for a clarification of "credible threat." Their question was "do we need to show that intent to carry out the threat exists or just that the intent to cause the person fear exists?" ²

Over defense objection, the trial court answered the question by repeating part of the already given instruction and adding "it is not required that the person making the threat actually intended to carry out the threat."

Appellant contends this added instruction is erroneous and "directly contrary to the statutory definition of 'credible threat' contained in Penal Code, section 646.9 [subdivision] (e)." Appellant is mistaken.

As we explain, when the provisions of the statute are "construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice" (§ 4) it is clear no intent to kill or cause great bodily injury is required.

We apply the following established principles in construing the subject statute. The " 'fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.' [Citation.] In determining this intent, courts look first to the words contained in the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning." (People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 271, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 526, 820 P.2d 1036.) "[T]he various parts of the statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause in the context of the whole statute." (Nunn v. State of California (1984) 35 Cal.3d 616, 625, 200 Cal.Rptr. 440, 677 P.2d 846.) " '[L]anguage of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend.' " (Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 113, 145 Cal.Rptr. 674, 577 P.2d 1014.) "Statutory language must be read in context, keeping in mind the nature and purpose of the enactment, and must be given such interpretation as will promote rather than defeat the objective of the law. [Citation.] In ascertaining legislative intent, not only the statutory language should be considered; we should also take into account the object of the legislation, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy and other matters helpful in discerning the intended meaning of the words used." (Clinton v. County of Santa Cruz (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 927, 933, 174 Cal.Rptr. 296.)

As pertinent in 1992, section 646.9 reads: "(a) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury is guilty of the crime of stalking, ...

"(b) Any person who violates subdivision (a) when there is a temporary restraining order or an injunction, or both, in effect prohibiting the behavior described in subdivision (a) against the same party, is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state prison.

"...

"(d) For the purposes of this section, 'harasses' means a knowing and willful...