People v. Carson

• Decision Date: 03 February 2005
• Docket Number: No. S117568.,S117568.
• Citation: 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 482,104 P.3d 837,35 Cal.4th 1
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. David V. CARSON, Defendant and Appellant.

23 Cal.Rptr.3d 482

35 Cal.4th 1

104 P.3d 837

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. David V. CARSON, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S117568.

Supreme Court of California.

February 3, 2005.

Chris R. Redburn, under appointment by the Supreme Court, San Francisco, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Robert F. Katz, Donald E. De Nicola, William T. Harter and Xiomara Costello, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

BROWN, J.

We granted review in this case to determine whether a trial court may terminate or revoke a criminal defendant's right of self-representation only for in-court misconduct. (See Ferrel v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 888, 891, 144 Cal.Rptr. 610, 576 P.2d 93 (Ferrel).) We conclude that neither the language nor the logic of Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (Faretta) imposes such a limitation. Regardless of where it occurs, a court may order termination for misconduct that seriously threatens the core integrity of the trial.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant David V. Carson was charged with murder (Pen.Code, § 187), mayhem (id., § 203), and aggravated assault (id., § 245, subd. (a)(1)) as well as various enhancement allegations. Counsel was appointed and represented him through the preliminary hearing. Well before the scheduled trial date, defendant made a motion to represent himself. After determining the waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary (see Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525), the trial court granted the motion. Several months later, however, the court terminated defendant's in propria persona status based on out-of-court conduct relating to discovery matters. Standby counsel assumed representation, and the case proceeded to trial. A jury convicted defendant on all counts and found true the enhancement allegations.

The Court of Appeal reversed the conviction. Relying in part on Ferrel, supra, 20 Cal.3d 888, 144 Cal.Rptr. 610, 576 P.2d 93, it concluded defendant "engaged in no disruptive or obstructive conduct," and therefore the trial court abused its discretion in terminating his right of self-representation. Nevertheless, the court questioned the analytical soundness of certain language in Ferrel: "Although this does not appear the case to do so, we suggest our Supreme Court, in a proper case, revisit Ferrel, supra, 20 Cal.3d 888, 144 Cal. Rptr. 610, 576 P.2d 93, and reexamine the issue of when a trial court may terminate the defendant's right of self-representation. (See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty (D.C.Cir.1972) 473 F.2d 1113, 1124-1126 [courts may appoint standby counsel to represent defendant who is representing himself if the defendant begins to subvert the core concept of a trial].) Dougherty was one of the two cases cited by Justice Stewart in Faretta's brief discussion of the trial court's authority to terminate the right of a defendant to represent himself when he engages in obstructionist conduct. (See Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 834-835, fn. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525.) Although far from unambiguous, we believe that this reference suggests the Faretta court intended to embrace Dougherty's standard for termination of the right of self-representation: does the defendant's misconduct seriously threaten the core integrity of the trial. Termination of the right of self-representation is a severe sanction and must not be imposed lightly. Nonetheless, we believe trial courts should be given sufficient discretion when confronted with behavior—whether occurring in court or out of court—that threatens to compromise the court's ability to conduct a fair trial. (Cf. Illinois v. Allen [ (1970) ] 397 U.S. [337,] 343 [90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353].)"

At respondent Attorney General's behest, we accepted this invitation and granted review to reconsider whether the authority to terminate a defendant's right of self-representation is limited to in-court misconduct.

DISCUSSION

I.

In Ferrel, the trial court terminated the defendant's right of self-representation after his "repeated violation of jail rules involving abuse of his pro. per. privileges" (Ferrel, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 891,144 Cal.Rptr. 610,576 P.2d 93), principally using his legal runner to pass illegal gambling proceeds out of the jail and damaging a jail telephone. In addressing the propriety of the court's ruling, we acknowledged that "[l]imitations on or suspension of a defendant's pro. per. privileges, whether or not such privileges may initially be required, may be necessary in certain circumstances as a result of a defendant's misconduct in jail." (Id. at p. 892, 144 Cal.Rptr. 610,576 P.2d 93, fn. omitted.) With respect to in propria persona status, however, we stated, "Since it is manifest that the right to present a defense must necessarily be exercised in court, we conclude that an accused should only be deprived of that right when he engages in disruptive in-court conduct which is inconsistent with its proper exercise." (Id. at p. 891, 144 Cal.Rptr. 610,576 P.2d 93.)

On its facts, the ultimate conclusion in Ferrel was correct. The defendant's misconduct was unrelated to and independent of the underlying prosecution and thus presented no danger of impairing the integrity of the trial. Because the acts in Ferrel did not threaten to obstruct the proceedings, the trial court had plainly abused its discretion in revoking the defendant's in propria persona status. Now that we confront misconduct that might compromise the fairness of the trial, however, we deem it prudent to reconsider the breadth of our holding in Ferrel, which appears to sanction termination of Faretta rights only for "disruptive in-court conduct." (Ferrel, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 891, 144 Cal.Rptr. 610, 576 P.2d 93.) Having reexamined our conclusion, we find it unsupported by either the language or logic of Faretta. Moreover, it unnecessarily restricts the trial court's authority to respond to misconduct occurring outside the courtroom that can equally threaten to obstruct the trial proceedings.

The fundamental question before the Supreme Court in Faretta was "whether a defendant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed [to trial] without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so." (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525.) The opinion thus understandably contains scant reference to the circumstances that would justify termination of the right of self-representation. In a footnote, the court noted:

"We are told that many criminal defendants representing themselves may use the courtroom for deliberate disruption of their trials. But the right of self-representation has been recognized from our beginnings by federal law and by most of the States, and no such result has thereby occurred. Moreover, the trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct. See Illinois v. Allen, [supra,] 397 U.S. 337 [90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353]. Of course, a State may — even over objection by the accused—appoint a `standby counsel' to aid the accused if and when the accused requests help, and to be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the defendant's self-representation is necessary. See United States v. Dougherty [ (1972) ] 154 U.S.App.D.C. 76, 87-89, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124-1126.

"The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. Thus, whatever else may or may not be open to him on appeal, a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of `effective assistance of counsel.'" (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834, fn. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525.)

Nothing in this passage implies any intent to limit "serious and obstructionist misconduct" to the courtroom. (Cf. State v. Whalen (1997) 192 Ariz. 103, 961 P.2d 1051, 1055 & fn. 5.) The citation to Illinois v. Allen, supra, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, does not suggest otherwise. In that case, the defendant was represented by counsel and became obstreperous during the trial. In answering the question whether his removal violated constitutional guarantees, the high court held that "a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful to the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom." (Id. at p. 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057.) With respect to Faretta rights, this holding means simply that to the extent a defendant represented by counsel may be removed from the courtroom for disruptive behavior, so too may an in propria persona defendant: "The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom." (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834, fn. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525.) Because Allen was not a case of self-representation, however, it is not authority for the conclusion that only in-court misconduct will justify terminating that right. (See People v. Nguyen (2000) 22 Cal.4th 872, 879, 95 Cal. Rptr.2d 178, 997 P.2d 493.)

Although the trial is the central event in a criminal prosecution, it represents the culmination of many weeks or months of preparation and related proceedings, such as discovery matters and in limine rulings. Not all these pretrial activities will take place in court. Concomitantly, opportunities to abuse the right of self-representation and engage in obstructionist conduct are not restricted to the courtroom. (See United States v. Flewitt (9th Cir.1989)...